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At first glance, the very idea of liberal nationalism appears to be an oxymoron.  
It is dedicated to universal liberal values but it maintains that a nation, a particularistic 
entity par excellence, is a justifiable, legitimate, and even beneficial entity. Liberal 
nationalism, in other words, tries to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable values: 
national and liberal ones. 
However, if one thinks of liberal nationalism as a set of practices, it becomes clear 
that liberal nationalism is both possible and actual: it exists, and it is articulated in diverse 
spheres that touch our everyday lives as well as the foundations of liberal polities. In this 
study, I consider nationalism (and liberal nationalism in particular) to be a set of practices 
that continuously create and define the image of the nation, its boundaries, and the 
meaning of national identity. 
This  dissertation focuses on one of these national practices: national monuments. 
I argue that as an example of a national practice in the built environment, they are 
appropriate grounds for exploring the intersection between space and nationalism and, 
more specifically, between space and liberal nationalism.  
At the heart of my discussion is the assumption that as a national practice, 
monuments must operate not only in a traditional (e.g., ethnic) national context, but also 
in a liberal national one. Therefore, I argue that within a liberal national context, 
monuments would construct an image of a liberal nation—a nation that melds together 
national and liberal values. To do so, I first examine how monuments construct an image 
of a nation; specifically, I focus on the politics of memory and death. This, in turn, leads 
to my discussion of liberal monuments. I explore the ways in which national monuments 
can be liberal, as well. Overall, the dissertation seeks to show that liberal monuments 
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Introduction  /  Layered Geographies 
Walking down the steps of the ceremonial entrance to the National World War II 
Memorial in Washington, DC, one is immediately struck by the national geographies at 
play. The memorial weaves physical geographies with imagined geographies. The 
memorial itself reflects the physical map of the war, with two pavilions rising on either 
side, one representing the Atlantic front and the other the Pacific front. The pool in the 
center of the memorial reminds us that the war was not fought at home but across oceans, 
in places far away. But the mapping also includes the physical boundaries of the United 
States, quite independent from the battle-lines of the war. Fifty-six pillars encircle the 
pool, each carrying the name of one state or territory of the United States. One enters the 
memorial as if entering a three-dimensional political map—one is, in other words, in a 
symbolic representation of the nation itself.  
Standing at the center of memorial one cannot help but see the Washington 
Monument casting its long shadow nearby as well as the image of a seated Lincoln 
gazing at us from just beyond the Reflecting Pool. The memorial is posed in dialogue 
with these two memorials—a fact that is readily acknowledged, if not proudly stated, in 
the memorial’s brochure under the section “ideals of democracy.” The axis that was once 
left open, the axis that connects the founder of the nation with the man who reasserted its 
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principles four score and seven years later, is now shared by a third event: World War II. 
A new founding moment, not just a new memorial, has been added. The change in the 
geography of the Mall becomes linked to a change in the imagined geography of how 
America sees itself: which moments are its founding moments and what defines those 
moments. 
Wandering through the structure, the memorial brings to one’s attention national 
memories, sacrifices, and values. The bas-relief sculptures that line the entrance to the 
memorial depict fragmented (but apparently highly significant) memories of the war. The 
scenes are intimate but also are somewhat of a caricature: there is an image of the 
meeting of U.S. and Russian troops, enlisting in the military following the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, the active women in the army, and so on. These are scenes of what could be 
personal memories, but they seem more iconic than personal. The memorial itself 
operates almost entirely through iconography. Wreaths and eagles abound, and every 100 
dead are represented by a golden star. Despite the fragmented scenes at the entrance, 
memory here seems total. The war was fought, above all else, by a unified nation; in the 
memorial, any personal memories and stories of the war are eclipsed, if not entirely 
erased, by the “big picture.” 
But standing in front of the “Freedom Wall”, one knows that people are present. 
The dead are here, their stars filling the wall, and those who remember them are also 
here: we, the visitors. Amidst the celebration of the victories of the war, the memorial 
leaves a space open for the commemoration of death and loss. But this is not Maya Lin’s 
Vietnam wall. Here the memory of the dead is not a “gash in the earth,” a black granite 
wall carved into the side of a hill. In this memorial, the dead are not so much mourned as 
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honored. The text etched on the stone below tells us that their death marks the price of 
freedom. But, who are the individuals we honor? How many of them peer at us behind 
each star? This, the memorial does not reveal. 
The memorial is fairly terse. Not much text, except the names of the states, the 
famous battles, and the war front. The only sentence to be read is in front of the stars: 
“Here we mark the price of freedom.” It seems almost like a slogan. Freedom is the 
principle message here, reinforced once again by the proximity to Washington and 
Lincoln. We, who believe in (and die for) freedom, belong here. 
Or so it seems. Not all those who care for freedom have a space within these 
imaginary boundaries. There is no mention of our allies or of the dead of our allies. One 
is also steadfastly surrounded by a space that mimics the borders of America and that 
marks the location of the war from an American perspective. Freedom speaks to 
everyone, but here it seems to be reserved for Americans. The memorial revolves around 
freedom, a universal value, but paradoxically, it remains quintessentially American. The 
representation of the political geography of America is met by an imagined geography of 
those who belong in America and the values they believe in. 
 
*     *     * 
 
In this dissertation, I explore how monuments, like the National World War II Memorial, 
operate as a national practice. I am interested in the way ideas about nation and 
nationhood are situated in our daily lives. To do so, I have chosen to focus on national 
monuments. These are architectural and symbolic tools that speak to us in national terms 
-4- 
about national events, heroes, and values. But how do monuments do this? How does 
their design, for instance, affect the image we have of our nation? Or, alternatively, what 
do the activities that monuments inspire tell us about our nation and our relation to it? 
How, in other words, are monuments a national practice?  
In the dissertation, I extend this idea further: if monuments are part of the 
discourse of nationalism, I want to understand how would they operate in a particular 
kind of nationalism—in this case, liberal nationalism. I am especially interested in liberal 
nationalism because it seems, on the surface, to be a contradiction in terms. Liberal 
nationalism is dedicated to universal liberal values but it maintains that a nation, a 
particularistic entity par excellence, is a justifiable, legitimate, and even beneficial entity. 
How would a monument capture these tensions? If it did so, what would this tell us about 
the tensions that liberal nationalism seems to have at a theoretical level? 
To answer these questions, I begin the dissertation with a chapter dedicated to a 
theoretical analysis of liberal nationalism. I outline the main differences between liberal 
nationalism and ethnic nationalism, and, in more detail, I examine the ways in which 
liberal nationalism is indeed liberal. The discussion leads into a brief discussion of liberal 
nationalism versus cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Throughout, the chapter 
seeks to highlight the tensions that are inherent in liberal nationalism. 
In Chapter 2, I re-examine nationalism but from the perspective of national 
practices. I show what it means to think of nationalism as a set of practices and I 
introduce monuments as an example of these. I define the term “national monuments” as 
I use it in this dissertation  and I discuss why monuments can indeed be considered as a 
national practice. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the next two chapters. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 discuss how monuments operate as a national practice. In 
Chapter 3, I examine the way in which monuments construct a national memory and 
thereby define a national community. This chapter emphasizes the way in which 
monuments deal with the representation of different types of memory, such as vicarious 
memory or the memory of absence. The discussion foreshadows some of the arguments 
developed in the last chapter about the possibility of liberal national monuments. In 
Chapter 4, I focus on the way in which death and dying is conceptualized in the nation. In 
particular, I discuss the idea of sacrifice in the nation—the way in which the death of the 
individual is transformed into the life of the nation. The chapter centers on the 
memorialization of the hero and the presence of funerary architecture and customs in 
national monuments. This chapter, as the one before it, sets the stage for the final, 
concluding chapter of the dissertation. 
The final chapter explores the possibility of liberal, national monuments. Here, I 
bring back the tensions within liberal nationalism that I explored in Chapter 1, and I 
relate them to monuments. The chapter begins with a description of the illiberal 
tendencies of monuments and the obvious challenge this poses to a liberal polity. 
However, the rest of the chapter is dedicated to showing how monuments, in spite of 
these tendencies, can fit in a liberal polity. The chapter highlights, with the help of the 
discussions in Chapters 3 and 4,  the ways in which monuments can be more liberal. 
Overall, the chapter shows not only that liberal monuments do exist and are possible, but 
that this suggests that liberal nationalism can, despite its contradictions, be practiced. 
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Chapter One  /  Liberal Nationalism 
At first glance, the very idea of liberal nationalism appears to be, using Levinson’s 
language, an oxymoron. (Levinson 1995) Indeed, if one thinks of liberal nationalism 
primarily as a theory, one cannot escape the inherent tensions which lie at its center. It 
proposes to meld together particularistic values with universal ones. It simultaneously 
conceives of the individual as dependent on his culture for self-definition and, at the same 
time, as an independent and autonomous agent. Liberal nationalism, in other words, tries 
to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable values: national and liberal ones. 
However, if one thinks of liberal nationalism as a set of practices, it becomes clear 
that liberal nationalism is both possible and actual: it exists, and it is articulated in diverse 
spheres that touch our everyday lives as well as the foundations of liberal polities. In this 
study, I consider nationalism (and liberal nationalism in particular) to be a set of practices 
that create or sustain an image of the nation. These are practices that construct the image 
of the nation in a variety of realms such as architecture, politics, education, and art. 
Although I discuss national practices (what they are and what they do) in more detail in 
Chapter 2, it is sufficient to say here that by considering nationalism as a set of practices, 
my approach implies that nationalism is not limited to being a theory, but rather that it is 
negotiated on the level of the individual and daily life. Therefore, I argue that to study 
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nationalism we must look at national practices. These can reveal to us which national 
ideas are articulated and, not least, how they are articulated. My dissertation focuses on 
one of these national practices: national monuments. As a form of national practice, they 
participate in the definition, maintenance, and definition of the boundaries of the nation 
and the meaning of national identity. They reveal to us, as I will show in Chapter 5, that 
although liberal nationalism may seem to be oxymoronic in theory, it can be and is 
indeed practiced. 
This chapter begins with a theoretical analysis of nationalism. Through a 
discussion of the theoretical aspects of liberalism, it aims to highlight the inherent 
tensions within liberal nationalism. Here I discuss how liberal nationalism relates both to  
nationalism and liberalism. With respect to nationalism, liberal nationalism aims to 
distance itself from the exclusionary, oppressive, and authoritarian manifestations that 
have been associated with nationalism, especially as witnessed during the last century. 
However, it maintains that these profoundly illiberal tendencies are not intrinsic to 
nationalism, and instead it proposes that there is a “good” nationalism—a liberal one. 
But, as liberal as liberal nationalism proposes to be, it also keeps a distance from 
liberalism. As opposed to the liberal view of the individual, liberal nationalism sees the 
individual as having attachments, e.g., national loyalty, that are constitutive in the 
political sphere. These attachments are seen as beneficial rather than detrimental to 
liberal polities. Therefore, liberal nationalism must constantly mediate between values 
that seem to come to a head: universalistic-liberal values and particularistic-national 
values. This constant mediation is inherent to liberal nationalism. 
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I. Nationalism and modernity 
Traditionally, nationalism has been regarded as a political tool of the state. From the early 
writings on nationalism there has been a strong correlation between the discourse of 
nationalism and the nation-state. Elie Kedourie, for example, argues that to speak of 
nations necessarily implies that we are speaking of nation-states: nationalism defines a 
particular set of relations between the individual and the state. The individual’s relation to 
the state is based on his right not only to demarcate his differences from others, whether 
these are natural or not, but also to make “these differences [his] first political principle.” 
(Kedourie 1993) To give our differences primary political significance means that we 
expect our political structure, i.e., the state, to embody, or rather protect, these 
differences. Therefore, Kedourie argues that “a society of nations must be composed of 
nation-states, and any state which is not a nation-state has its title and its existence 
perpetually challenged.” (Kedourie 1993, 73) 
What is important about Kedourie’s theory of nationalism is that it emphasizes the 
politicization of the national identity. Similarly, Ernest Gellner links national and 
political identity by examining the role of literacy in the development of nation-states. 
(Gellner 1983) Whereas Kedourie focuses on the way national identity becomes a 
primary political identity for the individual, Gellner is more interested in the way that 
state (or administrative) boundaries lead to the creation, or definition, of a national 
identity. Rather than looking at how an individual comes to feel part of a nation, Gellner 
looks into the changes in certain social conditions which lead to the link between a 
culture, a nation, and a specific political structure. 
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According to Gellner, modernity brought with it the need for “standardized, 
homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures.” (Gellner 1983, 55) Specifically, Gellner 
has in mind the need for a broad educational system, whereby citizens are trained to 
becomes “clerks” in the great machinery of the state. The main medium of this 
educational system is, according to Gellner, the medium of language. A unified language 
becomes crucial because “if the educational machinery is [to be] effective, its products 
will be, within reason, substitutable for each other, but less readily substitutable for those 
produced by other and rival machines.” (Gellner 1983) What occurs, then, is that the 
language that one speaks, or more importantly, the language in which one was educated, 
will determine one’s political identity. Political loyalties will be “centered on political 
units whose boundaries are defined by the language of an educational system.” (Gellner 
1983) 
However, the rise of the nation-state is not the only link between nationalism and 
modernity. Many theorists of nationalism have argued that the loss of religious credibility 
in modernity created a vacuum that was easily filled by nationalist sentiments. 
Nationalism seemed to return to individuals a lost sense of the sacred by moving “the 
central locus of the sacred … from the religious sphere to the political sphere.” (Milosz 
1992) Anthony Smith explicitly likens nationalism to “ a ‘surrogate’ religion,” arguing 
that it helped “overcome the sense of futility engendered by the removal of any vision of 
an existence after death, by linking individuals to persisting communities whose 
generations form indissoluble links in a chain of memories and identities.” (Smith 1986) 
And, in the same vein, Kedourie argues that “the break-down of … the religious 
community in modernity … [led to] a growing need for a community which can take the 
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place of these structures.” Nationalism became, in many ways, a new civil religion. It 
replaced the old locus of divine authority with that of the nation and nationhood.  
As a civil religion, nationalism made the image of the nation sacred. Its sanctity 
was strengthened by the creation of national myths. These myths offered, similar to 
religion, promises of salvation. (Tismaneanu 1998) The myth of immortality, for 
instance, ties the life of the individual with that of the nation. As I explore in Chapter 4, 
the memorialization of the national hero plays the role of a promise of immortality in the 
nation. The hero and those for whose sake he fought or in whose name he stands, i.e., the 
nation, are guaranteed eternal remembrance. The life span of an individual expands from 
the here-and-now to the eternal life of the nation. Rogers Smith also emphasizes the 
stories of peoplehood that define a national community. These are stories that help create 
a sense that one’s nation is unique and special, and they help the members of the nation 
“feel proud and confident about who they are and about their futures, both as individuals 
and as a national community.” (Smith 1997, 38) Furthermore, Smith argues that this often 
takes the form of an “‘ethnic myth’ of common descent” because after the loss of divine 
authority in modernity, “the most straightforward way to make a membership seem 
natural is to portray it as an expression of actual physical kinship or shared ancestry.” 
(Smith 2003, 66) 
The ethnic myth is at the center of ethnic nationalism. Leah Greenfeld defines 
ethnic nationalism as the case in which ethnicity, and hence belonging to a specific 
nation, “is believed to be inherent—one can neither acquire it if one does not have it, nor 
change it if one does; it has nothing to with individual will, but constitutes a genetic 
characteristic.” (Greenfeld 1992, 11) This view of the nation and national belonging is a 
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primordialist view. Ethnicity, and in general differences between groups, is seen as not 
only unique but as having roots in the primordial past. The nation, therefore, claims to be 
“so ‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-assertion.” (Hobsbawm & Ranger 
1983, 14) Ethnic nationalism has grown, in most instances, to be an illiberal nationalism, 
one that is known for its exclusion and persecution of minorities, at times culminating in 
genocide. This is particularly true of the Nazi case and more recently we have seen the 
bloodshed caused by the ethnic nationalisms in the Balkans. The historical events marked 
by ethnic nationalism have led to a rejection of nationalism as inherently dangerous both 
to individuals and to a healthy political life. 
It is precisely in light of this critique of ethnic nationalism that liberal nationalism 
has found its voice. Liberal nationalism joins the rejection of ethnic nationalism as 
dangerous to our political, and possibly also cultural, life. But rather than reject 
nationalism altogether, it proposes a third way: there is a “good” nationalism (a liberal 
nationalism)—one that can both guard against the dangers of ethnic nationalism and, at 
the same time, provide a sense of belonging and loyalty, and offer protection of one’s 
cultural community. In short, liberal nationalism offers an argument for the legitimacy 
and justification of the nation and national belonging in a world shaped by the horrors of 
virulent nationalism. 
II. What is liberal nationalism? 
One of the first distinctions to be made between ethnic and liberal nationalism is that, 
whereas ethnic nationalism claims that the nation is natural, liberal nationalism claims 
that the nation is a social construction. Gellner argues that nationalism does not, as 
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nationalists claim, awaken the nation from a long slumber, but rather that nationalism 
“invents nations where they do not exist.” (Gellner 1964, 168) A nation is invented by 
creating myths about the origin of the nation, its defining characteristics, and its destiny. 
Though the myths need “some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on,” they are 
nonetheless manipulated by “social engineering which [is] often deliberate.” (Gellner 
1964, 168, Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983, 13) This has led thinkers like Ernest Renan to 
claim that “to forget and—I will venture to say—to get one’s history wrong are essential 
factors in the making of a nation.” (Renan 1994) The nation is a social construction also 
in the sense that it is an imagined community. Benedict Anderson argues that a nation is 
imagined because “the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an 
image of their community.” (Anderson 1991, 6) This means that members of the nation 
are tied through a common imagination of the nation and their membership in it. It is this 
shared imagination of the nation that constitutes the heart of nationalism. 
In liberal nationalism there is a conscious acknowledgment of the nation as a 
social construction (something that is missing from ethnic nationalist discourse). But the 
idea that nations are socially constructed does not mean that nations do not actually exist. 
Rather, “at most what can be denied is that they exist (and have existed) in the terms 
claimed by nationalists.”1 (Archard 2000, 161) The myths that surround the nation should 
be understood as necessary tools in creating and sustaining a sense of belonging—a sense 
that for liberal nationalism is beneficial rather than destructive. Therefore, David Miller 
                                                
1 David Archard goes on to say: “No one should dispute that groups of human beings are bound together, 
and distinguished from others, by a real sense of common nationality. That is indisputable, even if the 
basis of the sentiment can be shown to be dubious.” 
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points to two important purposes of national myths: First, “they provide reassurance that 
the national community of which one now forms part is solidly based in history, that it 
embodies a real continuity between generations.” And second, “they perform a 
moralizing role, by holding up before us the virtues of our ancestors and encouraging us 
to live up to them.” (Miller 1995, 36) For liberal nationalism, the social construction of 
nations does not amount to a dismissal of nationalism at large. Rather, it pushes its 
scholars to ask a different set of questions, such as the way in which nationhood is 
institutionalized, the power of nationhood as an identity category, the resonance of this 
category in social movements, etc. (Brubaker 1996, 16) 
The distinction between viewing the nation as either natural or an invention can 
also be interpreted “as a tug of war between reason and passion.” (Gellner 1964, 146) 
Because ethnic nationalism requires no other justification for its indigenous roots than the 
fact that they are ours, the politics in such a nationalism becomes a “fight for principle,” 
rather than an “endless composition of claims in conflict.” (Kedourie 1993, 18) In ethnic 
nationalism, the existence of the nation is never debated and the claims of others to the 
same indigenous roots (e.g., language, territory, or race) are not negotiable. Politics in 
this context is therefore accompanied by strictly emotional responses which are divorced 
from critical deliberation. 
The most common emotions associated with ethnic nationalism are those of 
humiliation, marginality, and resentment. Isaiah Berlin argues that a defining 
characteristic of nationalism is that it results from “some form of collective humiliation.” 
(Berlin 1990, 245) The oppression and denigration of a people leads to the creation of 
nationalism because it will necessarily result in a reaction like that of a bent twig, “forced 
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down so severely that when released, it lashes back with fury.” (Berlin quoted in Gardels 
1991, 19)  Borrowing from Nietzsche, Greenfeld describes this “backlash” as 
ressentiment, which she defines as the “selection out of [one’s] own indigenous traditions 
of elements hostile to those of [the oppressing nation] and their deliberate cultivation.” 
(Greenfeld 1992, 16) The emphasis on indigenous traditions provides “emotional 
nourishment” to a nation that sees itself humiliated or under attack. (Greenfeld 1992, 16)  
Liberal nationalism, which by and large distances itself from ethnic nationalism, 
agrees with ethnic nationalism on this point: that emotions are not only an integral part of 
nationalism but that they are neither regrettable nor unimportant. However, liberal 
nationalism tends to emphasize another set of emotions, such as dignity and self-respect, 
which are not intended to deny the role of humiliation and resentment in nationalism but 
rather to complement them. Liberal nationalism sees, in Miller’s words, “nationality as an 
essential part of our identity.” (Miller 1995, 10) This means that “the self-image of 
individuals is highly affected by the status of their national community.” (Tamir 1993, 
73) Therefore, in order to preserve individual dignity and self-respect, liberal nationalism 
assumes a need for nations to be “generally respected and not be made a subject of 
ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution.” (Margalit & Raz 1990, 449) Liberal 
nationalism emphasizes the importance of dignity on two levels: first, at the national 
level: the nation must have “a safe, dignified, and flourishing … existence [in order to] 
significantly contribute to [individuals’] well-being.” (Tamir 1993, 73) And second, at 
the individual level: the “demand of recognition of [individuals’] dignity as human 
beings” must be recognized and respected in any national endeavor. (Berlin 1990, 257) 
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Recognizing the role of dignity in nationalism does not, however, preclude the 
existence of debate in liberal nationalism. National memberships to which one ties one’s 
well-being and self-respect “are not beyond choice” or deliberation. (Tamir 1993, 7) 
Because liberal nationalism does not see the nation and national identity as natural, but as 
a social construction, the members of the nation are expected not only to help preserve 
the national culture but also to constantly participate in negotiations over its meaning and 
boundaries. This obligation mirrors Ernest Renan’s definition of nationalism as “a daily 
vote of the people”: un plebiscite de tous les jours. (Renan 1994, 17) Here the nation is 
interpreted as, first of all, being in the hands of the people. Neither the state, a divine 
entity, nor history are responsible for its creation and maintenance. And, secondly, the 
nation is not seen as static, as an entity that was created in a singular event in the past. 
Rather, the nation claims its legitimacy from an ongoing deliberation among its members 
about the nature and meaning of the nation’s boundaries. 
Liberal nationalism, like liberalism, emphasizes the autonomy of the individual. 
The individual should be able “to make as many effective decisions without fear or favor 
about as many aspects of her or his life as is compatible with the freedom of every other 
adult.” (Shklar 1989, 21) To be free to make one’s choices means that in a liberal society, 
there will be room for “different experiments of living.”2 (Mill 1978, 55) The nation does 
not have to endorse, or even support, those experiments of living, but if it respects the 
autonomy of the individual, it will let its citizens choose how they should live their lives. 
As Jürgen Habermas argues, “the legally guaranteed freedom of choice of private legal 
                                                
2 Mill goes on to argue that pluralism goes to the heart of what makes us human, because “he who lets the 
world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the 
ape-like one of imitation.” (Mill 1978, 56) 
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subjects creates the free space for pursuing a plan of life informed by one’s own 
conception of the good.” (Habermas 1998, 100) 
The variety of experiments of living in liberal nationalism is framed by a common 
belonging to the nation. However, the boundaries and “the nature of the national culture” 
are far from fixed. (Tamir 1993, 89) There is room, in other words, for a variety of 
experiments about the meaning and breadth of the national identity. So, for example, 
Miller argues that “recognizing one’s French identity still leaves a great deal open as to 
the kind of Frenchman or Frenchwoman one is going to be.” (Miller 1995, 45) Liberal 
nationalism requires internal debate because it is only through self-reflection that national 
identity can be legitimately argued to be a matter of individual choice. Choice is 
important in liberal nationalism because it brings with it individual liberty and 
autonomy—something which is absent from ethnic nationalism. 
The importance of individual liberty and autonomy in liberal nationalism has 
much to do with its conception of the individual. In ethnic nationalism, the individual is 
understood as fundamentally a member of a group. One’s identity is fundamentally tied 
to that of the group in the sense that “it sees social roles and affiliations as inherent, as a 
matter of fate rather than of choice.” (Tamir 1993, 20) Therefore, the history of the nation 
becomes intimately linked to that of the person and even though the life of an individual 
is finite, he will nonetheless identify himself with a national history that appears to loom 
“out of immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future.” 
(Anderson 1991, 19) For this reason, in ethnic nationalism the individual takes on the fate 
of the nation (whether glorious or victimized) as though it was his very own. The 
particular life of an individual becomes submerged by the collective life of the nation. 
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In liberal nationalism, the individual is seen neither as solely a member of a group 
nor an isolated individual, but rather as both. There is a conscious effort to find a 
“midway position able to encompass the nationalist belief that individuals are the 
inevitable products of their culture, as well as the liberal conviction that individuals can 
be the authors of their own lives.” (Tamir 1993, 13) Liberal nationalism, therefore, argues 
that one should simultaneously understand the individual as living within a cultural 
context, from which he derives his moral and national identity, and at the same time 
accepts that this “contextuality need not preclude choice.” (Tamir 1993, 33) In other 
words, cultural contextuality is said to co-exist with individual autonomy. For liberal 
nationalism, it is central to the conceptualization of the individual that these two aspects 
of the individual are seen to be in co-existence. A liberal such as John Rawls does not 
deny this cultural contextuality: we may have attachments that we cannot give up, even 
constitutive attachments. However, he argues that attachments that we are not willing to 
give up, even in his original position—such as national belonging—have no place in a 
well-ordered society. For a liberal society to be at all possible, according to Rawls, it is 
necessary to have reasonable pluralism rather than pluralism as such. That is, in liberal 
society it is possible for the citizens to have irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines as 
long as those doctrines are also reasonable. (Rawls 1996, 36-8) 
As for the individual, liberal nationalism, like liberalism, argues that one must 
have “will, choice, reflection and evaluation” in one’s life plan if one is to claim true 
autonomy. (Tamir 1993, 20) However, what distinguishes liberal nationalism from 
liberalism is that liberal nationalism argues that these choices and reflections not only 
can, but necessarily must occur within a social context. For example, a liberal like 
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Stephen Holmes does not believe that liberalism fits comfortably within a national 
context; rather, he sees it as universalistic: “In principle, basic liberal rights should be 
extended charitably across all national borders. … As a universalistic or cosmopolitan 
doctrine, liberalism is wholly unable to draw territorial boundaries or separate insiders 
from outsiders in a principled way.” (Holmes 1995, 39) However, according to Avishai 
Margalit and Joseph Raz, national belonging “shapes to a large degree [individuals’] 
tastes and opportunities.” (Margalit & Raz 1990, 448) In this sense, being a social animal 
cannot be reduced to a game of means and ends in which society is no more than a 
vehicle to satisfy individuals’ goals. Rather, being a social animal in the sense used by 
liberal nationalism means that “those goals themselves are the creatures of society, the 
products of culture.” (Margalit & Raz 1990, 448) 
Because cultural context frames the choices made by individuals, it is impossible 
to separate these choices from the social context in which they are created. A defense of 
individuals’ right to choose must therefore recognize that the choice is bounded by the 
culture. However, Yael Tamir is careful to note that “liberal nationalism does not claim 
that individuals can find true freedom and expression only through complete 
identification with the community.” (Tamir 1993, 84) Rather, liberal nationalism only 
makes the assumption that individuals can lead a more meaningful life in a cultural 
context. For Tamir, understanding life within a social context is more meaningful because 
“it conceptualizes human actions, no matter how mundane making them part of a 
continuous creative effort whereby culture is made and remade.” (Tamir 1993, 85) By 
being part of a nation, our actions take a personal and national relevance. For Isaiah 
Berlin, on the other hand, a contextualized life is meaningful because of the ease it 
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creates for individuals to communicate with others. Loneliness, he says, “is not just the 
absence of others but far more a matter of living among people who do not understand 
what you are saying: They can truly understand only if they belong to a community 
where communication is effortless, almost instinctive.” (Gardels 1991, 21) Communal 
life allows for human relationships that are more conducive to mutual understanding 
while at the same time communal life is the context within which we frame our 
individual goals and values. 
III. Liberal nationalism and the self-governing individual 
Liberal nationalism argues that our ability to have individual “will, choice, reflection and 
evaluation” depends on the presence of society itself. Only by being part of society can 
we determine “the boundaries of the imaginable” and “the limits of the feasible.” 
(Margalit & Raz 1990, 449) To talk about individual choice becomes meaningless 
without a social context in which to understand those choices. Culture does not so much 
limit our choices as enable them. Therefore, if one is interested in an individual’s ability 
to exercise choice, one must be equally interested in protecting the cultural context within 
which the individual frames and exercises his choices. Liberal nationalism is as much 
concerned with the preservation of cultures, in so far as they contextualize the individual, 
as it is with the protection and promotion of an individual’s ability to make meaningful 
choices within those cultures. 
Maintaining a plurality of cultures, in which a variety of individuals are situated, 
becomes closely connected with a concern for individual autonomy—the right to choose. 
In order to allow for all people to “make cultural choices” there is a need to create a 
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“world where the plurality of cultures is protected.” (Tamir 1993, 30) Only by 
guaranteeing the existence of different cultures, which enable individuals to make a 
variety of choices, can liberal nationalism claim that individual autonomy is being 
protected. In order to protect that autonomy, it is important that members of a liberal 
nation, in particular members of minority groups, should be able to challenge public 
decisions and policies that harm them without at the same time challenging the 
legitimacy of the institutions that made them. Ronald Dworkin thinks that this can be 
accomplished with “a scheme of civil rights, whose effect will be to determine those 
political decisions that are antecedently likely to reflect strong external preferences, and 
to remove those decisions from majoritarian political institutions altogether.” (Dworkin 
1978, 134) This removal is necessary if the liberal state is to remain neutral between 
conceptions of the good.  
However, whether liberal nationalism ultimately prefers autonomy over diversity, 
that is, that it sees diversity as no more than a vehicle to get at individual autonomy, is 
not clear. William Galston argues that this ambiguity is representative of a tension which 
exists in liberalism regarding these two concepts. (Galston 1995) Galston claims that Will 
Kymlicka, in his book Liberalism, Community, and Culture, is worried about cultural 
diversity only because he is ultimately interested in the protection of choice. This, 
Galston argues, is problematic on two accounts: first, because Kymlicka, and other like-
minded theorists of liberal nationalism, would have to reckon with groups who do not 
value choice and who nonetheless deserve to exist, by Galston’s standard, for the sake of 
diversity. And, second, because if indeed liberal nationalism would deny such groups a 
right to exist, it would lead to the inevitable conclusion that “in the guise of protecting the 
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capacity for diversity, the autonomy principle in fact represents a kind of uniformity that 
exerts pressure on ways of life that do not embrace diversity.” (Galston 1995, 523) This, 
for Galston, would be profoundly illiberal. Therefore, if liberal nationalism wants to 
uphold its claim that it is trying to place “national thinking within the boundaries of 
liberalism without losing sight of either,” it must be watchful of the emphasis it puts on 
either diversity or autonomy. (Tamir 1993, 12) 
Whether liberal nationalism opts to emphasize diversity for its own sake or not, it 
is nonetheless clear that liberal nationalism makes a strong connection between the 
individual and the cultural group, specifically, the nation. More importantly, liberal 
nationalism claims that this connection implies that a concern for the individual must be 
matched with a concern for the nation. That is, to defend the value of the nation is 
nothing more than to defend the individual himself. Yet, liberal nationalism goes one step 
further. Not only is the nation beneficial for the individual but the nation is also beneficial 
for politics. This claim derives from the assumption that “ties of community are an 
important source of trust between individuals … A shared identity carries with it a shared 
loyalty, and this increases confidence that others will reciprocate one’s own co-operative 
behavior.” (Miller 1995, 92) In other words, trust and willingness to work with others, 
created by a national identity, engenders a greater facility for deliberation and social 
cooperation in a polity.3  
But, Miller is not the first to point out the benefit, if not necessity, of national 
identity to politics. John Stuart Mill saw nationality as a “principle of sympathy,” a 
                                                
3 Miller argues that, in particular, states should require citizens to “trust one another if they are to function 
effectively as democracies; in particular if they are guided by the ideal of deliberative democracy.” 
(Miller 1995, 96) 
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“feeling of common interest,” that was essential for good politics, that is, politics that 
promote freedom. In his often quoted statement from Consideration on Representative 
Government that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of 
different nationalities,” Mill makes the claim that a polity that is interested in promoting 
freedom must also promote national cohesion. (Mill 1975) National cohesion provides a 
sense of solidarity that opens up the possibility for citizens to “respect one another’s good 
faith in searching for grounds of agreement.”4 (Miller 1995, 98) In a similar vein, Alexis 
de Tocqueville wrote favorably of American patriotism and noted it as one of the virtues, 
rather than dangers, of American democracy. Tocqueville argued that in the United States 
one finds a patriotism that is “more rational,” drawing its strength from the fact that it is 
“mingled with personal interest.” (Tocqueville 1988, 235) Tocqueville admired this type 
of patriotism because it led each citizen to “see the public fortune as his own.” 
(Tocqueville 1988, 237) For him, such a sentiment meant that an individual had a stake in 
the well-being of society and this would in turn encourage citizen participation in the 
polity. Though Tocqueville and Mill later disagreed with each other regarding the type of 
patriotism each was defending (Mill claimed Tocqueville glorified a national sentiment 
based on “pride” rather than “interest”), both these thinkers saw the existence of a 
national sentiment to be crucial for a society that was interested in the promotion of 
individual liberty and self-rule. 
The argument that national identity is good for politics serves as the basis for one 
of liberal nationalism’s most important tenets: the right to national self-determination. 
                                                
4 For an excellent account of Mill’s writings on nationality see (Varouxakis 2002) 
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This right comes from a liberal concern with self-government and the idea that an 
individual can only be free if he has control over his own life. Any imposition on that 
control, whether by a king, a state or another individual, denotes a loss of freedom. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find Mill defining the word “nationality” in terms of self-
government: “a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they … 
desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be a government by 
themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively.” (Mill 1975) Similarly, Greenfeld 
finds the meaning of the word “nation” to be linked to sovereignty. She traces the 
changing meaning of the word from “group of foreigners” to “a community of opinion,” 
“an elite,” “a sovereign people,” and finally to “a unique sovereign people.” (Greenfeld 
1992, 9) What is important about this transformation is that the final evolution of  
“nation” to mean a particularistic (unique) sovereignty co-exists with its previous non-
particularistic sovereign meaning. This is important to Greenfeld’s argument because she 
argues that it has led to two competing and “dissimilar interpretations of popular 
sovereignty.” (Greenfeld 1992, 11) One interpretation of popular sovereignty is that 
people are sovereign insofar as their nation—understood as a “collective individual”—is 
sovereign. This is a “collectivistic-authoritarian nationalism” that values the sovereignty 
of the collective over that of the individual. The second interpretation is that of liberal 
nationalism. Here popular sovereignty means that the nation is sovereign only insofar as 
there is “actual sovereignty of individuals.” (Greenfeld 1992, 11) This is termed by 
Greenfeld an “individualistic-libertarian nationalism” because national sovereignty 
ultimately relies on individuals actually governing themselves—which does not mean 
that each minority group has a right to its own state. 
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However, the right to national self-determination stands in opposition to classical 
liberalism because it claims that individuals have a right to govern themselves not only as 
individuals but also as members in a group. The defense of national self-determination is 
a consequence of the way in which liberal nationalism conceptualizes the individual. 
Because national liberalism links the well-being of the individual with that of the group, 
the well-being of the group must be protected. This implies that “group interests cannot 
be reduced to individual interests” and that the group, qua group and not simply as an 
aggregation of individuals, deserves rights of its own. (Margalit & Raz 1990, 449) The 
right to national self-determination is a right that aims to protect the well-being of the 
nation for the sake of the individuals who are members in it. Therefore, the right must be 
understood on two levels: national and individual. 
On the national level, the right to national self-determination entails “the right to a 
public sphere.” (Tamir 1993, 8) The public sphere is where a community can express that 
which ties it together, that is, community life requires a space where individuals “can 
share a language, memorize their past, cherish their heroes” and, generally, live a 
fulfilling national life. (Tamir 1993, 8) The public sphere is central to the right to national 
self-determination because the expression of one’s membership in the nation, that which 
gives its meaning, can only take place “in the open, public life of the community.” 
(Margalit & Raz 1990, 451) It is only by guaranteeing this space for national life that 
there can be said to be an honest effort in the “preservation of a nation as vital and active 
community.” (Tamir 1993, 73) 
The existence of a public sphere in which national life can actually take place—
with shared language, memory, ceremony, etc.—implies a corollary right to political 
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institutions. Liberal nationalism interprets this right in two different ways. First, the right 
to political institutions requires that these institutions are seen as “representing a 
particular culture and as carriers of the national identity.” (Habermas 1998, Tamir 1993, 
74) This is achieved by creating public institutions that reflect the history, the culture, and 
the language of the nation. Only by having this representation can members of the nation 
consider these institutions to be their own. Second, the right to political institutions 
means that members of the nation should have access to the political sphere. In the liberal 
view, these political rights, according to Habermas,  
afford citizens the opportunity to assert their private interests in such a way that, 
by means of elections, the composition of parliamentary bodies, and the formation 
of a government, these interests are finally aggregated into a political will that can 
affect the administration. In this way the citizens in their political role can 
determine whether governmental authority is exercised in the interest of the 
citizens as members of society. (Habermas 1998, 240-41)  
From the liberal nationalist perspective, these are rights that allow members of the nation 
to participate “in the political life of their state, and [fight] in the name of group interest 
in the political arena.” (Margalit & Raz 1990, 452) In this sense, the right to political 
institutions is a right to political participation. 
In order to effectively exercise the right to political institutions, there is an 
implicit need for as little external interference as possible. However, according to liberal 
nationalism, this need does not necessarily imply that the members of the nation should 
be granted autonomy and the right to establish their own sovereign nation-state. The 
demand for sovereignty is not necessarily part of the right to political institutions, nor 
part of the larger right to national self-determination. Rather, the degree to which 
autonomy is desirable must “take into account that all nations are equally entitled to it.” 
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(Tamir 1993, 74) Therefore in order to avoid inequalities, liberal nationalism emphasizes 
the variety of political arrangements that can be established to satisfy the right to national 
self-determination without necessarily granting a nation a sovereign nation-state. For 
example, Tamir suggests “the establishment of national institutions, the formation of 
autonomous communities, or the establishment of federal or confederal states.” Margalit 
and Raz point to “multinational states, in which members of the different communities 
compete in the political arena for public resources for their community.” (Margalit & Raz 
1990) All these solutions are meant to grant nations the right to self-determination while 
at the same time avoiding dogmatism by being sensitive to the particular conditions of 
each case. 
However, the arguments in favor of the right to national self-determination should 
not lose sight of the fact that ultimately this is a right that belongs to individuals. Because 
the membership of individuals in a nation constitutes, according to liberal nationalism, an 
important aspect of their identity, the justification for the right to national self-
determination is in essence based on a concern for the protection of this individual 
identity. This means that in order to preserve their national identity, individuals must be 
given the opportunity to express this identity, both privately and publicly. This is the 
sense by which the right to national self-determination should be understood at an 
individual level. For liberal nationalism, it is only insofar as the nation is valuable to 
individuals that there is any “moral importance” to protecting the group’s interest. 
(Margalit & Raz 1990, 450) In other words, “the right to national self-determination 
should be seen as an individual right.” (Tamir 1993, 73) 
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IV. Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism 
In addition to its dialogue with both nationalism and liberalism, liberal nationalism is also 
in a debate with cosmopolitanism. Precisely because liberal nationalism tries to rescue 
nationalism from the bad reputation it has received during the history of the 20th century, 
cosmopolitanism is eager to show that liberal nationalism is no better than the old (or 
“bad”) nationalism, and, contrary to the claim that liberal nationalism is a liberal theory, 
cosmopolitans find liberal nationalism to be just the opposite. 
The cosmopolitan critique of liberal nationalism can be divided into two central 
arguments. The first concerns what Salman Rushdie calls the “mongrel self.” (Waldron 
1995, 94) Cosmopolitans do not, by and large, challenge the liberal nationalist notion that 
we have cultural attachments that create and shape our choices and identity. In fact, 
cosmopolitanism takes our cultural identities very seriously—more seriously, it argues, 
than liberal nationalism does. What is challenged in the cosmopolitan view is that the 
existence of a cultural contexualization of our choices does not mean that we “need any 
single context to structure all our choices.” (Waldron 1995, 108, emphasis added) Rather, 
the cosmopolitan self draws meaning for its choices from a variety of cultural contexts. In 
other words, contextuality can be fragmented and diverse.  
By upholding the multiple sources of identity, cosmopolitanism leaves liberal 
nationalism with the challenge of knowing precisely which culture constitutes the 
individual, and therefore, which culture must be protected in order to secure the well-
being of the individual. Whereas liberal nationalism tries to draw cultural boundaries 
around the individual, cosmopolitanism aims at disrupting them. Cosmopolitanism 
stresses boundary-crossing because it sees this as the only honest defense of diversity. To 
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put any kind of boundary would mean some sort of exclusion, and this is precisely what 
cosmopolitanism thinks is dangerous with liberal nationalism.5 
The second argument of cosmopolitanism concerns what I call the “universal, 
cosmopolitan spirit.” Cosmopolitanism argues that there are some universal values that 
everyone, regardless of their cultural background, should (or do) believe in. Judith 
Lichtenberg argues that one of the problems of liberal nationalism is that while it 
“promotes diverse national sentiments and ideas within a state” it is unable to answer the 
question “whether members of different cultures will have enough in common to bind 
them into one society.” (Lichtenberg 1990, 68) For Lichtenberg this question of social 
unity is important because she suspects that lacking a shared sense, various national 
groups within a society will not only be at odds with each other, but may also experience 
actual conflict. Therefore, she argues that to avoid this social disunity there should be a 
“glue that binds us”  specifically, the recognition that “we are all human beings.” 
(Lichtenberg 1990, 69) Martha Nussbaum modifies this somewhat, seeing “reason and 
the love of humanity” as common to all human beings. (Nussbaum 2002, 15) 
Lichtenberg’s “glue” translates into a commitment among all people that “recognizes our 
undifference,” that is, it accepts both our difference and equality. (Lichtenberg 1990, 69) 
The mutual recognition of our humanity is part of the effort to recognize diversity and 
avoid the trait in liberal nationalism of protecting one culture at the expense of others. 
The “glue” that Lichtenberg writes about is echoed in Jeremy Waldron’s article 
“Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative.” Here Waldron argues that liberal 
                                                
5 For a response to the cosmopolitan critique of liberal nationalism see, for example, (Taras 2002, 203-5) 
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nationalism fails to appreciate the existence of a cosmopolitan spirit that is committed to 
the protection of cultures in a way that is very similar to that of liberal nationalism. 
Because liberal nationalism is concerned with protecting boundaries around minority 
cultures, it loses sight of the fact that there are a “large number of men and women who 
are prepared to devote themselves to issues of human and communal values in general.” 
(Waldron 1995, 104, emphasis in original) Similarly, Nussbaum warns that “by 
conceding that a morally arbitrary boundary such as the boundary of the nation has a 
deep and formative role in our deliberations, we seem to deprive ourselves of any 
principled way of persuading citizens they should in fact join hands across these other 
barriers.” (Nussbaum 2002, 14) Neither Nussbaum nor Waldron are interested in 
contesting the fact that people have “their own particular heritage” and that this should be 
protected. (Waldron 1995) However, they are contesting the denial by liberal nationalism 
that this precludes the existence of a cosmopolitan spirit that can help promote these 
particular heritages.  
Furthermore, Waldron is also concerned that liberal nationalism overlooks the 
value and benefit of international institutions. He argues that similar to the way 
“individuals need communal structures in order to develop and exercise the capacities 
that their rights protect, so minority communities need larger political and international 
structures to protect and to sustain the cultural goods that they pursue.” (Waldron 1995, 
104) In a similar vein, Kymlicka also remarks that minority nationalism would benefit 
from increased attention to the way international institutions “exercise an increasing 
influence over our lives.” (Kymlicka & Straehle 1999, 79) International institutions cross 
national and state borders and represent a universal concern for the protection of cultural 
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minorities—a concern that is not unique to liberal nationalism, International institutions 
should therefore be considered relevant and valuable in any discussion about the 
protection and promotion of cultural groups. 
V. Liberal nationalism and communitarianism 
Although liberal nationalism has entered into a debate with cosmopolitanism, the relation 
between liberal nationalism and communitarianism has not been as readily debated. 
Communitarians share liberal nationalists’ suspicion that the liberal individual is too 
decontextualized. Michael Sandel, for example, claims that the liberal individual is a 
disembodied self, a self unencumbered by attachments and by the specifics of the local 
context. This means that the liberal individual is not shaped by experience:  
No commitment could grip me so deeply that I could not understand myself 
without it. No transformation of life purposes and plans could be so unsettling as 
to disrupt the contours of my identity. No project could be so essential that 
turning away from it would call into question the person I am. (Sandel 1982, 62)  
Likewise, Benjamin Barber criticizes the liberal emphasis on autonomy as being 
isolating. This is how he describes the liberal individual: “We are born into the world 
solitary strangers, live our lives as wary aliens, and die in fearful isolation.” (Barber 
1984, 68) Both liberal nationalism and communitarianism argue against liberalism by 
stressing the view that an individual’s identity is properly conceived as formed by 
constitutive attachments to community and culture. Thus, understanding the “nation” as a 
type of “community” can easily lead to a smooth reconciliation between the 
communitarian emphasis on community and the defense of the nation by liberal 
nationalism. Given the strong similarity between these two critiques of liberalism, is there 
a difference between liberal nationalism and communitarianism?  
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In his article “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists,” John O’Neill argues that 
communitarians should not consider the nation a community and should, therefore, 
distance themselves from nationalists. According to O’Neill the modern state was 
“responsible for centralizing power that was previously diffused—empire, church, prince, 
lord, city and guild had distinct powers over an individual.” (O'Neill 1994, 137) The 
nation-state, therefore, “demands of its citizens loyalty that overrides all others.” (O'Neill 
1994, 137) O’Neill is particularly critical of the view that the nation can be considered a 
community at all. He argues that the idea of a coherent national culture is a myth because 
no modern nation actually has a coherent ethnic and cultural identity. Rather, nationalism 
has had to go out of its way to create a coherence and to “suppress the differences within 
a nation.” (O'Neill 1994, 141) Though he does not argue this directly, O’Neill is also 
implying that the “centrifugal force inherent within nationalism that each ‘ethnic and 
cultural group’ within existing nations deserves its own nation” means that nationalism 
can only deal with difference by allotting it an independent realm. In other words, 
nationalism does not acknowledge real difference; the only tool it has to do so is to apply 
the principle of the right to self-determination to smaller and smaller homogeneous sub-
groups within the nation ad infinitum, thus retaining its original position that nations (or 
sub-nations) need to be internally cohesive. Liberal nationalism does not embrace 
diversity as much as it compartmentalizes it. However, for Tamir, the problem of 
minorities in the liberal nation is of a different nature. Rather than a concern for the 
internal cohesion of minorities, she argues that although minorities in a liberal nation will 
have “a wide range of rights and liberties and distribute goods and official positions 
fairly… [they] will unavoidably feel alienated to some extent.” But, she argues, “the 
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openness of the political culture and the readiness to compensate culturally disadvantaged 
members of minority groups may lessen the hardship faced by cultural minorities.” Tamir 
acknowledges that “this tension is endogenous to any liberal national entity and cannot 
be resolved.” (Tamir 1993, 163, emphasis added) 
For communitarians, the rise of the nation is largely responsible for the processes 
of monopolization of power and the suppression of difference that has left the individual 
isolated, lacking local loyalties and cultures, i.e., using Sandel’s term, an unencumbered 
self. On this basis, O’Neill argues that it is a mistake for communitarians to align 
themselves with the nationalist defense of the nation, because “if communitarianism is to 
be understood as a form of social criticism that is aimed at the disappearance of 
community in modern society, then nationhood and nationalism should be amongst its 
targets.” (O'Neill 1994, 141) The inability of the nation to work as a real and meaningful 
community means that communitarianism is not only different from liberal nationalism 
but that it stands in opposition to it. 
O’Neill’s critique of the relation between communitarianism and liberal 
nationalism depends on the main claim that the nation is not a community. However, the 
extent to which a nation is a community goes back to the theory of liberal nationalism 
itself. From the standpoint of liberal nationalism, the nation cannot help but be a 
community, albeit an imagined one. Anderson’s description of the nation as an imagined 
community is not an accusation of the nation as being a “false” community. Rather, the 
term “imagined community” serves as a distinction between “real” communities where 
there is actual physical interaction among people, and “imagined” communities where 
such contact is impossible due to its large size but in which the sense of belonging exists 
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nonetheless. (Archard 1996) Therefore, according to Archard, “any nation whose 
members consider themselves to be a nation is a genuine community.” (Archard 1996, 
218) But this argument does not make the relation between communitarianism and liberal 
nationalism irrelevant. Rather, Archard claims that the real question nationalists should 
address is not whether nations are real communities, but rather they should examine 
“what sort of status [nations] are to have as communities.” (Archard 1996, 219) In a 
world that is increasingly globalized there is no longer a need to restrict the existence of 
the nation to the state level, but instead focus on its significance as a community. 
Following Kymlicka, Archard argues that the value of the nation as a community should 
be questioned in terms of its worth in providing a meaningful identity, a cultural resource 
and in contextualizing our lives and choices. (Archard 1996, Kymlicka 1989) 
Conclusion 
By virtue of trying to bridge between two seemingly irreconcilable values, liberal 
nationalism is in constant dialogue with nationalism and liberalism. It espouses liberal 
values which are universal because everyone is entitled to them regardless of cultural, 
racial, or geographical background. This means that within liberal nationalism there is an 
aspiration to some kind of universality whereby one’s identity and political choices 
depend on one’s ability to reason and, as Nussbaum terms it, to seek the pursuit of justice 
and the good. However, these universal values must sit with national-particularistic 
values which situate the individual in a particular cultural context. These values 
emphasize the importance of belonging to a group, i.e., the nation, and the importance of 
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this belonging for political life. For liberal nationalism a healthy political life depends, in 
fact, on our protecting our cultural or national background. 
Naturally, liberal nationalism has many voices which can be, at times, in tension 
with one another. On the one hand, Tamir believes that a liberal nation will have 
necessarily one dominant national group whose cultural values will have more 
representation in the political structures (e.g., the Jewish population in Israel). On the 
other hand, someone like Kymlicka increasingly emphasizes the idea of cultural 
federalism in the nation where no one group dominates over the others. However, in this 
chapter I have sought to describe liberal nationalism in broad strokes, avoiding the finer 
distinctions within theories of liberal nationalism. I have done so in order to emphasize 
the inherent tensions of liberal nationalism, i.e., national versus liberal values, which are 
shared by all theorists of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism must walk the fine line 
between arguing that national sentiments (and the nation-state) are still legitimate and 
defensible in today’s world, and avoiding the dangers that nationalism is known for. 
In the chapter that follows, I reconsider nationalism not as merely a theory, but as 
a set of practices. My discussion turns from theoretical analysis of the values espoused by 
liberal nationalism to an analysis of national practices, specifically national monuments. 
The next chapter, as well as the rest of the dissertation, focuses on the idea that 
nationalism is a situated practice. This means that to understand nationalism, and by 
extension liberal nationalism, we must not look only at the theoretical arguments in its 
defense (or against it), but rather look to its manifestations in our daily life. It is in the 
practice of daily life that we can see how nationalism operates. Such an analysis can show 
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that problems that nationalism may face on a theoretical level, such as the tensions within 
liberal nationalism, find a whole host of solutions when it takes form on the ground. 
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Chapter Two  /  National Monuments 
Nationalism is sustained by a set of practices that together construct the idea of a nation. 
Far from being an idea that exists apart from the material world, nationalism is embodied 
in the everyday life of individuals. From political and economic policies to aesthetics in 
art, music, and literature, nationalism finds expression in a range of activities that affect 
the individual in an immediate and real way. Through these practices the idea of a nation 
is continuously created and reproduced. The practices create imaginative ties, in the sense 
proposed by Benedict Anderson, that bind people into a community and which define the 
boundaries of the nation, its characteristics as well as its relation to the individual. 
Together, these practices comprise a national narrative, or alternatively, they are the 
substance of nationalism. 
This chapter explores the ways in which nationalism can indeed be considered a 
set of practices. It serves, more specifically, as an introduction to the study of national 
monuments as a vehicle for a study of liberal nationalism. It argues that national 
monuments are an example of a national practice in the built environment and that, as 
such, national monuments are appropriate grounds for exploring the intersection between 
space and nationalism and, more specifically, between space and liberal nationalism. It 
further argues that national monuments produce meaning and are capable of embodying a 
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particular image or interpretation of the nation. In Chapters 3 and 4, I analyze how 
monuments do so—I explore this question by focusing on the politics of memory and 
death—while here I provide a general discussion of what monuments do and I make 
explicit what I mean by the term “national monuments.” 
I.  Nationalism as a collection of practices 
National practices produce national meaning. They include all those activities that 
contribute to the construction of the “nation.” National practices are considered a 
category of cultural practices, to use William Sewell’s language, in the sense that they are 
part of a dialectical relation between a system of symbols (a semiotic code) and the 
practical activities that reproduce them. (Sewell 2005) National practices produce a 
distinctly national meaning by using the symbols available to them and by interpreting 
them through a national lens.  More specifically, national practices are elements that 
contribute to our understanding of what the nation is, how it is defined, and who belongs 
to it. They produce what is often referred to as the national narrative or discourse. Like 
other cultural practices, national practices cut across spatial, political, educational, and 
aesthetic dimensions. They are present in the buildings we construct, in the social policies 
we support, in the music we compose, in the history we learn at school, etc. They 
permeate, to borrow from Pierre Bourdieu, our habitus. (Bourdieu 1992) 
Along these lines Rogers Brubaker argues that the nation should be seen as a 
category of practice rather than a category of analysis. (Brubaker 1996) He sees the idea 
of “nation” as arising from a series of practices and not, as it is usually seen, as 
engendering them. In this view, the “nation” as such does not exist; what exists are the 
 -38-  
practices that give rise to it. Brubaker argues that “nationalism is not engendered by 
nations” but rather that “it is produced—or better, it is induced—by political fields.”1 By 
political fields Brubaker means the diverse locations where national meaning, i.e., the 
construction of the nation, is contested, produced and challenged. By this account, the 
study of nationalism will turn away from asking the routine question: “What is the 
nation?” and instead ask “How is a nation practiced?” The analysis will look into the 
different modes and conditions by which the “nation” affects our perception of the past 
and future, our relation to others, and our sense of self. The study of nation and 
nationalism will, in other words, investigate the political fields of nationalism, or rather, 
the set of national practices that produce the “nation.” 
National practices take a variety of forms and in this work I focus on one of them: 
national monuments. National monuments are a national practice because they produce 
meaning for the nation. Through their design and location, as well as the debates and 
competitions that precede their construction, national monuments, like other forms of 
national practices, participate in the construction of the “nation.” However, as opposed to 
other national practices—which may include educational curricula, language policies, or 
political rhetoric—national monuments reveal a particular mode of producing meaning 
that is anchored in space. The configuration of space, both of the monument itself and of 
its surroundings, serve as a medium through which national meaning is constructed and 
                                                
1 This is reminiscent of Ernest Gellner’s view that “nationalism engenders nations.” (Gellner 1983, 55) 
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reproduced. Therefore, the role of space in the production of meaning becomes central to 
a study of national monuments as a form of national practice.2 
By this account, the debates that precede the construction of national monuments 
can be considered as a separate set of national practices that is distinct from practices 
which operate after a national monument has been built. The practices that precede the 
construction of many national monuments often involve bargaining and negotiation 
between political interest groups which seek to determine the construction, design, and 
location of national monuments. This was famously the case with the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial, whose original design by Maya Lin was contested (and eventually modified) 
due to efforts by Secretary of the Interior James Watt, and with the National World War 
II Memorial, whose design and placement on the National Mall’s main axis was subject 
to many controversies. (Hass 1998, Mills 2004, Mock 2003) The politics at play before 
national monuments are constructed not only reveal that national monuments do not 
arrive on the scene de novo, but also that national monuments are the result of prolonged 
efforts by individuals whose diverging views reflect competing ideas about the nation and 
the monuments that are erected in its name. 
Ironically, the very practices that are at play before a national monument is 
constructed are often concealed by the actual, built monument. Kirk Savage argues that 
“public monuments [exercise] a curious power to erase their own political origins and 
                                                
2 The idea that national monuments contribute to the construction of the nation is not new. Eric Hobsbawm 
argues that monuments can play an important role in the invention of tradition. In his discussion of 
France during the Third Republic, he finds that the multiple statues of Marianne, which appeared 
throughout France during this time, were not simply a collection of public art works, but that they were 
“the visible links between the voters and the nation.” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) In other words, the 
monuments to Marianne were active participants in the construction of an “image of the Republic.”  
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become sacrosanct.” (Savage 1997, 7) This is a power, he believes, that is evident 
“whenever people rise to defend monuments from change or attack.” (Savage 1997, 7) 
Once a monument is built, it seems to have always existed. Its design does not refer, at 
least not in an explicit or intentional way, to the debates and controversies that may have 
surrounded its construction. Furthermore, a national monument often appears to exist 
quite independently from any particular human choices and debates. Therefore, as 
opposed to the practices that operate after the construction of national monuments, these 
early practices are quintessentially non-material: once the monument is built, all traces of 
them seem to disappear.   
However, the seeming disappearance of debates and controversies does not mean 
that the national meanings produced by the built monument are immutable. On the 
contrary, national monuments produce an array of national meanings through their 
design, configuration in space, and the activities they inspire. These elements are 
necessarily influenced by the debates and intentions that brought the monument into 
existence, but it is precisely because these are often concealed from us that meaning is 
rooted, ultimately, in the monument as it stands before us. In other words, the debates 
that occur before a monument is built—in particular, the way in which these debates 
reflect different national meanings—are relevant only insofar as they help us understand 
monuments as objects anchored (and existing) in space; otherwise, the debates that 
precede the construction of monuments would be similar to any other non-material 
national practice. Therefore, in considering national monuments as a national practice 
that is quintessentially embedded in space, I focus on the production of meaning that 
occurs once national monuments are, indeed, put in place. 
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Yet beyond the questions of space, what is particularly interesting about national 
monuments producing a national meaning, or in Hobsbawm’s term, an invented tradition, 
is that not all national monuments produce the same meaning. Different monuments will 
produce different visions of what the nation is and how an individual relates to it. These 
differences will often play out in the diverse design choices of monuments. Monuments 
on a grand scale, for example, are likely to construct an image of the nation as larger than 
life—larger, perhaps, than the individual. Monuments that are smaller, even dispersed, 
are more likely to signal a view of the nation as composed of (and not imposed on) 
individuals. Since different design choices in national monuments reflect an array of 
different national meanings, the study of national monuments opens the door to a parallel 
examination of different, and often competing, ideas of the “nation.”3  
In order to discuss national monuments as a national practice, i.e., to study the 
national meanings they produce, it is necessary to first define what I consider to be a 
national monument. The second part of this chapter looks at what monuments do—a  
discussion about the production of national meaning. But here I begin first with a 
discussion about the definition of national monuments. I offer this discussion not in order  
to arrive at a definite and final definition of the concept but rather to explore the 
subtleties and nuances that are at stake when considering national monuments as a type of 
                                                
3 In Chapter 5, I discuss how national monuments might produce a national meaning that is congruent with 
liberal nationalism. My discussion relies on the idea that since national monuments produce different 
national meanings one would expect national monuments built in the context of liberal nationalism to 
appear different from monuments built in, say, the context of ethnic nationalism. In particular, I examine 
how national monuments can contribute not only to a national narrative but also a liberal one. That is, 
how might they produce a national meaning without sacrificing a commitment to liberal values?  
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national practice. Above all, this discussion aims to map the potential for multiplicity of 
meanings and functions in national monuments. 
II.  What is a monument? 
Monument or memorial? 
A distinction is often drawn between a monument and a memorial. A monument is 
sometimes associated with a life-affirming commemoration, such as a celebration of a 
victory or a hero, whereas a memorial is linked to the commemoration of death and is 
considered part of the grieving process. However, etymologically the words “monument” 
and “memorial” come from roots that do not draw this distinction between life and death. 
The word “monument” is derived from the Latin monre which means to remind; so 
monument could be construed as a “remind-ment.” The word “memorial” is the adjective 
form of the Latin word memoria, that is, memory. Both these roots refer to the way in 
which we recollect the past. A monument refers to those objects that bring back to mind, 
through representation, events or stories that otherwise would remain forgotten. And a 
memorial functions as a physical extension of memory itself. The etymological roots of 
both words imply that both monuments and memorials are active participants in the 
reenactment (or even invention) of a past. 
If both monuments and memorials engage with the past, how can we distinguish 
between them? Or, rather, should we distinguish between them? Maya Lin once said that 
in order to understand her work properly it is important to differentiate between a 
monument and memorial. (Lin 1995) For Lin, monuments and memorials perform 
different functions: the first stands detached and works to inform or educate its audience, 
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while the latter engages the individual, encouraging introspection and self-evaluation. 
About her commemorative designs, Lin said: “I consider the work I do memorials, not 
monuments; in fact I’ve often thought of them as anti-monuments. I think I don’t make 
objects; I make places.” (Lin 1995, 13) Here Lin associates monuments with objects and 
memorials with places. The distinction that she draws between an object/monument and a 
place/memorial is important because Lin argues that a place allows for “experience and 
for understanding experience.” (Lin 1995) And since she is keenly interested in the 
processes that occur within the individual rather than the processes that impose a certain 
experience or knowledge on the individual she is interested in designing memorials and 
not monuments. 
Lin’s distinction is appealing because it differentiates among the roles that 
commemorative structures may have. However, such a distinction is weakened by the 
day-to-day use of the terms “monument” and “memorial.” For example, on the National 
Mall both the Lincoln and Jefferson structures are officially named memorials, even 
though they are structures that do not immediately seem to allow for the type of personal 
experience that Lin is interested in. They do not encourage an active engagement with 
their audience, but are rather objects which tower above their audience and whose main 
object is to invoke awe and respect. And, conversely, there are commemorative structures 
whose aims are similar to Lin’s definition of a memorial, which nonetheless carry the 
title “monument.” Such is the case with Jochen Gerz’s Monument to Racism—a 
commemorative structure composed of 2,148 engraved stones dispersed throughout the 
Saarbrucken plaza in Berlin. Gerz’s design is meant to create a space where one can 
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experience a sense of absence and loss. It is, like Lin’s memorials, a place that reaches 
for personal, inward experience. 
Lin’s desire to distinguish among different commemorative functions is 
important. But doing so through terminological distinction, i.e., monument versus 
memorial, is counterproductive. The two terms are so often used interchangeably that 
forcing a separation between the two becomes not only artificial but cumbersome. 
Therefore, in this dissertation, I use the words “monument” and “memorial” 
interchangeably, and what I say about one refers to the other. This does not mean that I 
think that different commemorative structures cannot have different functions—far from 
it. In Chapter 5, I focus precisely on the different commemorative functions that a 
monument (or memorial) might have in the context of liberal nationalism. As opposed to 
Lin, I do not anchor these differences in the choice of word (monument/memorial), but 
rather in an extended description about how these differences operate.4 
What is a national monument? 
Although I use “monument” and “memorial” interchangeably, I must distinguish a 
national monument from other non-national monuments. In a succinct formulation, I 
consider a  national monument to be a monument that forms part of the national 
discourse. By national discourse I refer to (similar to Brubaker) the practices that 
contribute to the construction and maintenance of the idea of the “nation.” In this sense, 
                                                
4 My choice of the word “monument” in the title of the dissertation, and its more common use throughout 
the text, is to some extent arbitrary. I prefer the word “monument” over “memorial” because “memorial” 
appears to be linked more strongly to memory and, although I certainly think it has a lot to do with 
memory (see Chapter 3), I also argue that monuments are linked to death, space, the production of 
meaning, etc. 
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monuments, as I have discussed at the beginning of this chapter, are one of the many 
practices of nationalism. Yet, what is at stake with national monuments, as opposed to 
other monuments, is the way in which they address their viewers. The primary viewers of 
a national monument are assumed to be members of the nation. In order for the 
monument to function as part of the national discourse, it must be able to engage the 
individuals who form part of the national community. Therefore, the location, as well as 
the values, events, and people represented in the monument, are meaningful only if the 
viewer, the individual, sees himself as part of the nation. Because national monuments 
are only one in a variety of mechanisms that bind the individual to the nation, national 
monuments have a dual role of both reinforcing and inspiring the relationship between 
the individual and the nation. And, although different national monuments may vary in 
the way that they represent the nature of this relation, asserting the existence of such a 
relationship is nonetheless an integral part of what makes a monument national. 
The difficulty in defining national monuments as monuments that participate in 
national discourse is that some monuments may not intend to engage in the national 
discourse but do so nonetheless. James Young discusses this particular phenomena with 
regard to Holocaust memorials. In The Texture of Memory, Young examines Holocaust 
memorials in four countries: Poland, Germany, Israel, and the United States. (Young 
1993) On the surface, these memorials are dedicated to an event that transcends national 
discourse and national belonging. They are memorials dedicated to an event that is 
relevant to the Jewish people, or alternatively, to humankind in general—their 
significance is not limited to any particular nation. However, Young finds that the 
Holocaust memorials have different designs and interpretations about the meaning and 
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significance of the Holocaust and that these differences are dependent on the national 
context in which they are embedded. Holocaust memorials in Poland, for example, fail to 
distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish Polish victims and therefore couch the 
Holocaust within a general Polish suffering. Similarly, in the United States and Israel, the 
Holocaust is memorialized from each country’s perspective: America as a safe haven and 
Israel as Zionist redemption, respectively. And, finally, in Germany, the design of 
counter-memorials convey the uneasy and difficult task of Germany which has “[called] 
upon itself to remember the victims of crimes it has perpetrated.” (Young 1993, 21) 
Young’s study shows that monuments that commemorate events that are not originally 
limited to a national audience, can nonetheless become “nationalized.” 
However, Young leaves open the converse question, that is, can a national 
monument gain an international, supra-national, significance? Because national 
monuments are often sites for international tourism, they may become part of an 
international stage and have international significance that may replace, or add to, the 
national one. A good example for this is the Hiroshima Peace Memorial in Japan. The 
memorial speaks to a specific Japanese narrative of nationalism which, according to 
Benedict Giamo, views the Japanese as “a pacifist people emerging from the very act of 
atomic victimage.” (Giamo 2003, 705) However, for the non-Japanese visiting the site, 
the memorial functions as a reminder of the horrors of nuclear weapons in general and as 
a warning against all future nuclear wars. The memorial functions both as a Japanese 
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national memorial and as an international one.5 This example indicates that national 
monuments may have an ambiguous character, oscillating between having a national and 
universal significance.  
However, despite the way in which international tourists may approach a national 
monument, the role of the monument in participating in and framing the national 
discourse is not diminished. The various ways in which a monument can operate—for 
example, as an international symbol—does not bear on the role national monuments have 
as one of the practices of nationalism. What distinguishes national monuments from other 
monuments is their conscious effort to speak to members of the nation. As I have 
discussed, national monuments may have a parallel effect on individuals who are outside 
the national community. Although an examination of the nature of this parallel discourse 
is interesting, it lies outside the scope of my study of monuments as national practices.6 
National monuments function as national tools insofar as they deliberately contribute to, 
and participate in, the national discourse.7 
                                                
5 Giamo’s critique of the memorial as “the ideal project of specious national identity for public 
consumption and reiteration” rather than “historic accuracy,” is misguided. He criticizes the memorial for 
doing exactly what national monuments are meant to do: giving a historic event a national significance. 
On the whole, it is not clear whether his dislike of the “mass ignorance” that the memorial produces is a 
criticism of the memorial as a national memorial, or whether it is a criticism of “bad” Japanese 
nationalism. 
6 Monuments that have a super-national audience, e.g., humankind, or a narrower one, e.g., a particular city, 
should of course be considered monuments, but not necessarily national ones. 
7 The question of “intent” is, of course, tricky. Monuments do not have a will or agency. They do not intend 
to be part of the national discourse. Rather, the design, location and construction indicate a particular way 
of integrating the monument into a national landscape. This is true even in the case of the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial whose architect, Maya Lin, did not intend it to be specifically a monument about 
American nationhood (she wanted it to be “about death”). However, the location and some elements in 
the design of the monument make it quintessentially an American monument. Located at the intersection 
of the axis between the Washington and Lincoln memorials, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial places the 
Vietnam war in relation to, and in dialogue with, the American War of Independence and the Civil War. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the names of only the American dead on the black granite wall shows again 
that, despite Lin’s intent, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is a monument about and for Americans. 
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National monuments are public monuments 
The function of national monuments as tools that affect the way people think of 
themselves and their relation to the nation is dependent on the monuments’ being placed 
where people can view them and, in some cases, interact with them. National monuments 
are, in other words, public monuments. They are located in public spaces that have open 
access for people to see them. The location of national monuments can be divided into 
two types of public spaces: official space and everyday space. An official space is a space 
that is dedicated to the symbolic representation of the nation. Often these spaces are 
located in a center of a city, either in official buildings or great avenues and squares, such 
as the location of monuments on the National Mall. It is important to note that an official 
space does not have to be purely symbolic. Often it can be tied to a function, such as 
housing a governmental body (e.g., the Capitol building in Washington, DC). However, 
even when official space is functional, its design and location is imbued with symbolic 
significance. One enters these spaces as a member of a particular public (i.e., the nation), 
rather than as a private individual. And, therefore, these official spaces might be more 
properly called national spaces. They are spaces that derive their meaning from the 
national discourse with which they are imbued and to which they contribute.8  
National space is not limited to what one might call “intentional national space.” 
There are national spaces that become significant to the nation by virtue of a particular 
event. This is the case for places like Pearl Harbor and Ground Zero that have become 
                                                
8 The National Mall is a good example of a national space. It is especially interesting to note that 
L’Enfant’s original design of the National Mall was meant to actually replicate the geography and 
national destiny of the United States. The western extreme of the Mall, where the Lincoln Memorial is 
located today, was left open with a clear view of Virginia and the Potomac in order to represent the open 
Western frontier.  
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meaningful to the nation not because they were designed to be so (as with L’Enfant’s 
design of the National Mall), but rather because of the events that took place on their 
grounds. This type of national space may be thought of as accidental. Despite the fact that 
the space was originally built for a military or economic purpose, it has become a space 
that is meaningful for the nation because of subsequent events that occurred there and 
therefore a place where one finds national commemorative monuments. However, 
although these two types of national space are distinguished by their “intentionality,” 
they both share the characteristics of a space imbued with national meaning and 
identified with a specific representation of the nation.  
National monuments can also be public by being located in everyday spaces, such 
as neighborhoods, shopping centers, or public parks. Everyday spaces are characterized 
by their immediacy to people. As opposed to official spaces, one does not have to travel 
to an everyday space—one lives in it. Monuments that are built in these locations derive 
their public character from the interaction of individuals in their vicinity. They are 
monuments that are woven into daily routines, even though their design is often meant to 
interrupt it. Take, for example, Shimon Attie’s Writing on the Wall, a memorial which 
consists of projected images in the old Jewish quarter of Berlin. The images are 
photographs of buildings from the 1920s and 1930s that are projected onto the current 
buildings. Through this juxtaposition, Attie seeks to draw attention to the loss of the 
Jewish community in the places where this community actually lived.9 
                                                
9 In Chapter 3, I further discuss the problems that designs like Attie bring to the memorialization of 
absence. 
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One of the main differences between national monuments in official and everyday 
spaces is what they say about how individuals relate to the nation. Monuments in official 
spaces address the individual only when he stands, both metaphorically and literally, in a 
national space. What is relevant to the nation, the representation of its values and history, 
occurs only in official spaces (potentially, strictly state-sanctioned spaces). The designers 
of monuments that are built in everyday spaces, on the other hand, offer a critique of this 
view. By locating the monuments where people actually live, the designers hope to make 
their monuments (and their message) more visible and harder to ignore. But, more 
importantly, the location of national monuments in everyday spaces is meant to remind us 
that what is relevant on a national level must also become relevant in our daily life. One 
cannot relegate the various debates about the content of our national identity to an official 
space. In this view, the individual becomes responsible for defining the nature of his 
national identity, rather than leaving this responsibility to the power structures from 
above. 
A typology of national monuments 
National monuments can be roughly divided into four types.10 These types can overlap 
and be used simultaneously; they are not mutually exclusive. However, it is useful to 
provide a typology of monuments insofar as it elucidates the various elements that may 
be used by monuments to construct a national meaning. The various elements resonate in 
different ways and each contributes to the image of the nation, its characteristics and 
                                                
10 I restrict myself here to “useless” monuments. Living memorials, monuments that are functional, such as 
freeways and stadiums, provide an alternative view of how monuments should commemorate. (Shanken 
2002) However, assuming that monuments should commemorate through a “useless,” arguably aesthetic, 
artifact, this typology is relevant. 
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boundaries. The types of national monuments are: founding monuments, hero 
monuments, value monuments, and object monuments.  
Founding monuments 
First, founding monuments are monuments that are dedicated to specific historic events 
that are deemed significant to the national community. The historical moments can be 
represented either as the moment of the birth of the nation or as a significant and 
therefore defining moment in the nation’s history. However, whether it is a literal 
moment of birth (e.g., independence) or a significant turning point, these events 
symbolize a founding moment for the nation, that is, a moment that quintessentially 
defines the way in which the nation sees itself. The particular moment that is 
memorialized is deemed crucial to the identity of the nation and to articulating its 
defining characteristics. The memorialization of founding moments often take the form of 
war monuments. In these monuments, the victory or defeat is represented as an event that 
has fundamentally changed the nation. This is the case with such monuments as the 
World War II Memorial, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and the Korean War Memorial 
whose presence on the National Mall reflect the important historic events that changed 
the way America sees and understands itself. Founding monuments  can be 
simultaneously seen either as new founding moments in the history of the nation or as 
moments that strengthened or redefined the original founding.    
Hero monuments 
The commemoration of national founding moments can overlap with the other type of 
national commemoration: the hero monument. The national founding monuments often 
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play the double role of memorializing heroes whose ideas or actions are believed to have 
allowed the nation to come into existence (or, as Gellner would have it, “to be 
awakened”). This is the case, for example, with the Washington Monument that presents 
George Washington as a role model for American civic virtue, and George Washington 
as the father of the American nation. Similarly, the Lincoln Memorial has the dual 
function of commemorating Lincoln as national hero and representing the Civil War as a 
second founding of the United States. (Johnston 2001) 
Monuments to national heroes are probably the most common form of national 
monuments. The construction of national monuments can be traced back to the 
identification of the king as national hero. (Borg 1991) Since the king was seen as 
embodying the nation, in order to commemorate the nation, the king himself was 
commemorated as its representative. This concept proceeded to spill over to the 
representation of military leaders as national heroes. (Borg 1991) Monuments to 
particular battles were centered around the person who led them—a good example here is 
Nelson’s Column in London, commemorating Lord Nelson and the Battle of Trafalgar. In 
these monuments, it was not just the war that was commemorated, but the hero associated 
with it. Later, particularly after World War I, the concept of a national hero was expanded 
to include the common soldier as a representative of the national community.(Borg 1991, 
Mosse 1991, Savage 1997) In particular, the concept of the “tomb of the unknown 
soldier” was developed during this time—in the United States it lies in the Arlington 
Cemetery. It was a response to the changing nature of war which made the scale of the 
dead immensely larger, and to a growing inclination to de-emphasize military rank in 
favor of anonymous heroism. Hero monuments, whether those that commemorate the 
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leaders or the common soldier, have the dual function of memorializing the person along 
with the cause or ideas for which he or she died.11 
Value monuments 
However, the commemoration of specific ideas that are important to the nation is not 
always directly tied to a hero. The idea of freedom, for example, recurs in many 
American national monuments with the actual word appearing as part of the monument’s 
design. This is most noticeable in the World War II Memorial, which bears the following 
text at the center of the memorial, “Here we mark the price of freedom.” (See Figure 1.)12 
In this memorial, the concept of “freedom” is presented as one of the values for which the 
nation is willing to sacrifice its own. In other words, the memorial articulates a threat to 
freedom as an equivalent threat to American identity. In this, and many other memorials, 
it is not merely an event or a person that is being memorialized but there is an affirmation 
and commemoration of national values. 
Object monuments 
Lastly, the fourth type of monument is a monument that commemorates an object. Rather 
than abstract ideas, there are certain objects that become focal points for national 
commemoration. National monuments that commemorate objects are rare since it is 
seldom that a national identity centers around an object. However, in the United States 
                                                
11 Civil War memorials are an interesting case. Kirk Savage argues that after the Civil War it was more 
common to see monuments to soldiers than to the ideas, e.g., emancipation, for which the war was fought. 
(Savage 1997) Savage claims that the common soldier provided a better “glue” for a recently-divided 
nation, whereas the commemoration of emancipation was more likely to revive the North-South 
animosities. In the case of the Civil War’s hero monuments, by omitting one idea (emancipation) another 
idea was memorialized: the hero died for unification, not for emancipation. 
12 All figures can be found in the appendix. 
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(and possibly in other constitutional democracies) the Constitution, as a physical object, 
becomes an especially cherished object. The Constitution is seen as a concentrated, 
physical representation of the core of American values. As an example, the Constitution 
has received its own commemorative center in the National Constitution Center in 
Philadelphia. The center revolves around the Constitution and its significance to the 
American nation. Although not strictly a monument to the Constitution, the center 
provides an insight into how an object can become integrated into national 
commemorations.13 
What is not a national monument?  
This typology of monuments provides a broad sketch of the different themes that are 
commemorated in national monuments and which are woven into the national discourse. 
However, these different types of national monuments share the same function, that is, 
the construction of a national community. This function is not unique to national 
monuments. As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there are many other 
practices that form part of the national narrative and participate in the construction of a 
national community. However, some of these practices are particularly interesting in the 
context of national monuments because they function in a very similar but ultimately 
different way than national monuments. The following discussion covers a selection of 
practices whose function often becomes blurred with that of national monuments. They 
deserve special attention not so much in order to distinguish them from national 
                                                
13 The Center becomes particularly lively around Constitution Day when there are four days of activities 
and commemorative ceremonies on the Center’s grounds. 
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monuments, therefore making the definition of a national monument more narrow, but 
rather to elucidate the subtleties that are at play with the practices of nationalism. 
 A museum is not a national monument   
Museums can be similar to national monuments in two important ways: they can be 
pedagogic tools and vehicles for the construction of memory.14 In museums, there is a 
particular organization of knowledge that is meant to display a specific view of society. 
Michel Foucault regards museums as places that, like a mirror, reflect a real image of 
ourselves—of society—but do so through the creation of a space that is not real—in the 
case of museums, a space that is isolated and apart from society. (Foucault 1986) By 
functioning as both “utopias” and “heterotopias,” museums are capable of creating 
knowledge about ourselves and our place in society. This knowledge is particularly 
interesting when it is appropriated by a national narrative, because the knowledge that we 
gain about ourselves becomes filtered as knowledge about the nation and the nature of 
our relation to it. Through a national narrative, the content of the museum and even the 
building that houses the museum is seen as part of a national heritage that must be studied 
and preserved. Therefore, the museum becomes a symbol of “national identity” and a site 
of “civic education.” (Bennett 1995, Macdonald 1998) Like a national monument, the 
museum can be a place that can teach us who we are and what our society, or nation, is. 
The display of artifacts, and the instruction that results from viewing them, means 
that museums also engage in the construction of memory. Museums use artifacts in 
                                                
14 There are many different types of museums. Here, I particularly have in mind history museums, such as 
the American History Museum in Washington, DC. These museums not only aim to reconstruct the past 
but also to put it into a distinctly national context. 
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exhibitions to display, like national monuments, a certain narrative about the past. The 
collection and exhibition of artifacts is guided by a specific interpretation about what the 
past contains and, more importantly, what elements about the past are important to the 
viewers of today. The past is organized, categorized and presented as a re-telling of the 
past, not least a national past. This organization of the past is nothing less than the 
construction of memories, elements of the past that we wish to re-enact in the present. In 
this sense, museums are lieux de memoire—sites of memory—since they collect and 
archive memories.15 (Nora 1989) The relation of museums to memory in this sense is 
similar to that of national monuments. Both engage in the politics of memory and use it 
to construct, or sustain, a national community. 
The similar roles that national monuments and museums play in the construction 
of a national community has led to an apparent blurring of the two concepts. The 
apparent blurring is literally achieved in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
which houses both a museum, with its usual series of displays and educational resources, 
and a memorial. (See Figure 2.) The existence of both an educational component and a 
contemplative one makes the Holocaust Memorial Museum neither “just” a museum nor 
“just” a memorial, but both. However, the combination of both museum and memorial 
does not mean that there is a blending of both national practices. Rather, the combination 
serves as an illustration of what a museum needs but a memorial can fulfill, and vice 
versa—what a memorial lacks but a museum can supply. The museum is capable of 
teaching its viewers the history of the Holocaust. It uses its archives, which are an 
                                                
15 I shall return to this point and discuss it extensively in the next chapter. 
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extension of the exhibits, to preserve the testimonies of survivors and to make them 
accessible to visitors. However, in order for the museum to provide a place for visitors to 
“reflect upon the moral and spiritual questions raised by the events of the Holocaust,” the 
museum avails itself of a distinctly memorial practice: it creates a sacred space.16 Later in 
this chapter I discuss the creation of sacred space in more detail, but here it is enough to 
point out that memorials have the capacity of creating a space—sacred-like in nature—
that is separate from our everyday life and that encourages introspection and 
contemplation. And this is precisely what the Holocaust Memorial Museum incorporates 
into its structure. 
However, the inclusion of a memorial within the Holocaust Museum also signals 
that memorials may need museums too. The memorial in the Holocaust Museum is 
especially powerful precisely because it comes after the experience of walking through 
the exhibitions. The process of learning that precedes entering the memorial augments the 
impact of the memorial itself and makes the need to reflect more acute. Memorials 
therefore seem to lack something that museums can provide: education. The increase and 
broadening of visitor centers at national memorials is an indication that there is a need to 
educate in order to remember properly. The growing visitor centers often function as 
quasi-museums which serve as built-in educational tools for the memorial. Therefore, the 
increasing overlap between monuments and museums shows that while both can 
                                                
16 The full mission statement of the Museum is: “to advance and disseminate knowledge about this 
unprecedented tragedy; to preserve the memory of those who suffered; and to encourage its visitors to 
reflect upon the moral and spiritual questions raised by the events of the Holocaust as well as their own 
responsibilities as citizens of a democracy.” (http://www.ushmm.org/museum/mission/) 
 -58-  
complement one another, this does not imply that they replace one another. They are, in 
other words, two related but distinct national practices. 
A historical monument is not a national monument  
Historical monuments are sites that become appropriated by the national narrative as a 
place that is significant to the nation. They share with national monuments the 
preoccupation with the preservation of the past. However, like national monuments “the 
past that is invoked and called forth, in an almost incantatory way, is not just any past: it 
is localized and selected to a critical end, to the degree that it is capable of directly 
contributing to the maintenance and preservation of the identity of an ethnic, religious, 
national, tribal, or familial community.” (Choay 2001, 6) Historical monuments are often 
architectural structures, such as buildings or gates, that are selected from the ruins of the 
past and are conceived as symbolic or meaningful to the history of the nation. Once 
selected, these sites require conservation because keeping the structures intact in some 
way guarantees the survival of the national memory attached to them. This process is 
linked to the construction of a national heritage which seems to become particularly 
urgent when the site is “couched in terms of some national legacy at risk.” (Lowenthal 
1996, 25) 
Historical monuments are sites that become significant to the nation post factum. 
The original functions of the sites are different than they are today—they move from 
being sites with particular utilitarian functions to being conceived as “mirrors of a world 
or a period.” (Nora 1989, 22) It is in this sense that historical monument differ the most 
from national monuments. Historical monuments lack what Pierre Nora calls an “intent to 
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remember.” (Nora 1989) They become monuments, whereby they contribute to the 
national discourse, only by accident. As Alois Riegl argued: “Any object from the past 
can be converted into an historic witness without having had, originally, a memorial 
purpose. Conversely, any human artifact can be deliberately invested with memorial 
function.” (Riegl 1998) The accidental nature of historical monuments means that given a 
different construction of the national past, the same building that today is considered a 
historical monument (or a national heritage site) could have been left to oblivion. 
National monuments, on the other hand, owe their meaning not to their location but to the 
premeditated will to remember, that is, to the conscious intent to build them in order to 
remember. 
However, as was the case with museums and national monuments, historical and 
national monuments can overlap. This is the case with sites that become integrated into 
the national narrative and as a result are provided with a new memorial structure on their 
grounds. For example, many battlefields are considered “monuments to the nation” but 
the actual memorial that is placed on the battlefield is also considered a “monument to 
the nation.” The field, in this case, is a historical monument, whereas the memorial is a 
national monument. The two types of monuments share a space that is specifically set 
aside for remembering the past. They both contribute to commemorating the battle as a 
significant and formative event for the nation. But, while both historical and national 
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monuments may share the same national space, they do not lose their distinguishing 
characteristics, of preservation and memorialization, respectively.17  
National monuments and national cemeteries 
Similar to museums and historical monuments, national cemeteries are also national 
practices. They too define the nation by a specific relation to the past. However, national 
cemeteries are distinctive due to their immediate relation with death. It is in this regard 
that they are more similar to national monuments than museums and historical 
monuments. Like national monuments, national cemeteries integrate the dead into a 
national narrative. By being buried in a distinctly national cemetery, the body becomes 
literally embedded in the national space. The burial in the cemetery marks the 
individual’s death as significant for the nation, thereby incorporating it into a national 
narrative. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the death of the individual becomes transformed 
into the life of the nation. In both national cemeteries and monuments, the 
memorialization of the dead converts death into sacrifice, the ordinary into heroism and 
the inevitable into destiny. 
The similar attitude towards death in both national monuments and cemeteries can 
also be seen in the architecture and ceremonies that they inspire. Both places can be 
                                                
17 There are symbolic buildings such as the Capitol that are neither historic nor national monuments. While 
they are structures that have utilitarian functions and have grown more iconic with time, they lack both 
the accidental element of historical monuments and the commemorative purpose of national monuments.  
However, the Statue of Liberty (not Ellis Island) can arguably be seen as both a historical and national 
monument. Its aesthetic and symbolic imagery reminds us of traditional national monuments. But, at the 
same time, it was not built with the intent to commemorate liberty, but was rather built as a token and 
symbol of friendship between France and the United States. In this sense, it is more like a historical 
monument. However, the Statue of Liberty is an interesting case because its prominence as an American 
icon is rather divorced from its original role as a symbol of universal friendship. 
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marked by similar architecture, some of which is inspired by Christian motifs. The cross, 
for example, is a common symbol that is used for marking a grave site as well as being 
integrated into memorial forms. (See Figure 3.) (Borg 1991) National war memorials can 
often be confused in their scale and design for mausoleums, that, in the absence of an 
actual body, memorialize rather than bury the dead that are honored by the nation. By 
constructing monuments to the dead, national monuments inspire the same type of 
funerary practices that are commonly found in cemeteries. These may include laying of 
flowers or wreaths, routine pilgrimages, speeches, and possibly even the act of respectful 
silence. The blurring of the lines between tombs and monuments is the result of 
extending the boundaries of the national community to include the dead. This inclusion 
links the present with the past. The national community does not only exist today, but it is 
presented as though it has always existed, and, by extension, always will exist. 
In many ways, national cemeteries, e.g., the Arlington Cemetery, can be 
considered national monuments. They are built intentionally to memorialize the dead. By 
cordoning off a space that is solely dedicated to the nation’s dead, national cemeteries 
create a national space that both speaks to the construction of a national community and 
contributes to the definition of its boundaries. However, although I argue in Chapter 4 
that national cemeteries can be analyzed as national monuments, there are a few 
differences between the two that should not be overlooked. First, national cemeteries, like 
most cemeteries, are located on the outskirts of the city. (Ariès 1974) They are not, like 
national monuments, integrated into the main axis or spaces of public life. Second, in 
national monuments, the memorialization of the dead is achieved only through metaphor 
and symbol, while in national cemeteries, the incorporation of the dead into the national 
 -62-  
community is not metaphorical—the actual body is interred in national ground.  Third, 
because national cemeteries are actual locations of death, they can inspire a reverence for 
the dead that may be absent in national monuments. National cemeteries appear to be 
more sacred in this sense. There are far more social taboos about death that deny the 
possibility of protests, marches, graffiti, or political rallying on cemetery grounds than 
around national monuments.18 National cemeteries demand a reverence (or arouse 
anxiety) in a way that national monuments do not. Therefore, national cemeteries are 
more immune to the type of political activities that national monuments often inspire—an 
immunity, one might add, that is augmented by the location of cemeteries away from the 
city. Arguably, this makes national cemeteries a more powerful national practice. They 
are more protected than other practices from challenges and debates about their role in 
constructing a certain image of the nation. 
III.  Monuments as practice: What do national monuments do? 
National monuments, like other national practices, produce meaning.19 However, 
monuments, in particular, create meaning through space. In this final part of the chapter, I 
discuss the ways in which monuments produce meaning. First, I look at the capacity of 
monuments to create a space that is distinctly national and sacred-like in character. And, 
second, I describe how the choices in monument design and location contribute to the 
construction of an imagined national community. The latter discussion serves as the basis 
                                                
18 See Ariès for a discussion about social attitudes toward death. (Ariès 1974) 
19 From here on, and throughout the rest of the dissertation, I will use the word “monument” to refer to 
“national monuments.” I do so in the interest of simplicity only. 
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for Chapters 3 and 4 which analyze the construction of an imagined community through a 
particular approach to memory and death in the national narrative. 
Monuments separate the sacred and the profane 
Monuments create a spatial separation between sacred and profane space. The creation of 
a sacred space in particular contributes to the sense in which nationalism can be thought 
of as a civic religion. (Mosse 1991, Smith 1986) Whether through their design or the 
space formed around them, monuments have the capacity to inspire activities akin to 
those usually associated with religious ones. The sacredness of a monument is often 
upheld through repetitive ceremonies on its grounds: for example, the President 
delivering a speech inside the Lincoln Memorial on Lincoln’s birthday not only honors 
Lincoln’s memory; it also serves to associate the current President with Lincoln’s legacy. 
(See Figure 4.) These ceremonies can include laying wreaths or holding an official event 
on its grounds, such as the annual Memorial Day ceremony held at the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial. These ceremonies mark the monument as a place of veneration and of paying 
one’s respect. In addition, one finds that marches or protests often begin or end at 
monuments. The significance of the march or protest is increased by its proximity to a 
national symbol. The monument is used as a sacred spot that might be said to bless the 
event and give it its extraordinary—i.e., outside of the ordinary—meaning. In both these 
cases, of ceremonies and marches, the monument and the space around it are used as 
locations, similar to temples, that one visits on holidays, or special, non-ordinary, days. 
Thinking of monuments as temples is also expressed in the structure of the 
monuments themselves. Many monuments resemble temples both in scale and in their 
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design. The grandiose scale of cathedrals, for example, is shared by monuments in which 
the individual is meant to feel small and insignificant compared to the grandeur of God or 
the nation, as the case may be. But, beyond a question of scale, the architecture of 
monuments has borrowed heavily from traditionally religious architecture. The obelisk, 
for example, was originally dedicated to the worship of the sun-god. (Borg 1991) It later 
evolved as a monument to victory, and today we see it on the National Mall as a 
monument to George Washington and the nation he founded. (See Figure 5.) Similarly, 
the Doric columns of the Lincoln memorial are reminiscent of Greek temples. The steps 
leading up to the platform where Lincoln’s larger-than-life sculpture appears God-like 
contribute to the sense that one is entering a sacred place. (See Figure 6.) The memorial is 
similar to a religious temple, because its architecture is designed to inspire awe and invite 
worship and is thus unlike everyday useful buildings.20  
The capacity of monuments to provide a sacred space is harnessed for the purpose 
of converting bureaucratic centers into spiritual ones as well. A nation’s bureaucratic 
center is usually in its capital which houses such institutions as the Parliament or the 
Supreme Court. However, a nation’s capital is also a symbolic center for the nation, and 
therefore it must go beyond being merely a bureaucratic center. Monuments bring to a 
city both a symbolic and spiritual power. They are built along the main avenues and 
squares of the city as markers of a place that is special. One example of this is the recent 
construction of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe one block south of the 
Brandenburger Tor in the center of Berlin. In the United States, on the other hand, the 
                                                
20 Viewing the memorial as a temple is made explicit in the memorial itself. Above Lincoln’s sculpture, the 
text reads: “In this temple, as in the hearts of the people for whom he saved the Union, the memory of 
Abraham Lincoln is enshrined forever.” (Emphasis added.) 
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whole city of Washington was designed around the axis of the National Mall which was, 
from its inception, intended to include governmental institutions, such as the Capitol and 
the White House, as well as symbolic elements, such as the monument to George 
Washington. In fact, one of the original proposals for Washington’s monument called for  
bringing his body to Washington, DC and placing it in the monument (then conceived as 
a mausoleum). The presence of Washington’s body on the National Mall was intended to 
emphasize the sacred aspect of the monument and, by extension, of the city itself. 
(Savage 1992) 
Nevertheless, the idea that a monument ought to create a scared space that is 
separate from daily life and its routines has not always been seen as a positive thing. 
After World Wars I and II, there was an increasing criticism of monuments that were not 
integrated into the environment of daily life. Traditional monuments were said to be 
“cluttered and random” and that their distance from living space made them easily 
ignored and forgotten. (Shanken 2005, 7) There was a call to make monuments useful, 
rather than merely works of public art—pieces that risked becoming stale and purely 
decorative. It was argued that the fallen could only be appropriately commemorated 
through an actual and real improvement in the lives of those who survived them. In the 
1940s and 50s, this notion of living memorials led to a wave of public institutions such as 
highways, parks, and community centers that were built in the name of people or events 
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to be memorialized.21 (Borg 1991, Shanken 2002) Some examples include the Kennedy 
Center in Washington, DC and the Nimitz Freeway in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
However, the integration of monuments into daily life is problematic. Practical 
monuments rob them of their sacred character. Practical monuments undo the separation 
between a daily space, in which we perform our biological necessities (borrowing 
Arendt’s terms), and a space that is set aside for contemplation and introspection. One of 
the more striking elements of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, for example, is the silence 
it inspires. As one approaches this monument, one involuntarily quiets down, forgets the 
heat or hunger one often experiences on a hot summer day at the Mall, and instead one’s 
eyes are drawn to the black granite and to the names etched onto it and one’s thoughts 
begin to wander. Similar to the type of silence one encounters in a church, monuments 
are places were the buzz and hum of daily life stops. On the grounds of a monument, our 
minds are turned away from our personal needs towards a contemplation of the thing 
being memorialized. We stop and ponder about the meaning of, for example, the Vietnam 
War or the values for which our nation stands. At a monument we are oriented toward the 
nation and our relation to it; that is, our thoughts reach beyond ourselves.22 By making 
monuments practical, we lose this silence and contemplation that monuments can 
provide. 
In addition to silence and a contemplative environment, the sacredness of 
monuments is also maintained by the prohibition of touching. Monuments are restricted 
                                                
21 Borg argues that although these charitable institutions might themselves risk losing their memorializing 
meaning, at the very least, “it is better to provide a form of remembrance that will be of some practical 
value.” (Borg 1991, 138) 
22 This is different from the type of contemplation that occurs in a church where our thoughts are directed 
inwards towards an examination of our actions and our innermost thoughts and desires. 
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areas where playing, picnicking, or climbing is prohibited. (See Figure 7.) The scale itself 
can also prohibit meaningful contact with monuments, since many of them can only be 
appreciated from a distance. By placing monuments beyond our reach, their sacred 
character is emphasized. Like holy objects, we are allowed to view them, but not touch 
them. This sacred distance also occurs with monuments that ostensibly invite people’s 
interactions with it. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial is a classic example, but one can 
also think of the Monument Against Fascism in Harburg, Germany, where the viewers 
are encouraged to engrave their thoughts onto the monument itself. (See Figure 8.) 
However, even in such monuments, the type of touch that is encouraged is contained. We 
do not touch these monuments in the sense of using them, but rather, we touch them on 
the terms determined by what is being memorialized. The interaction that we have with 
such monuments is still sacred in nature; touching them is done out of reverence and 
respect, something akin to the way we might touch a gravestone or the feet of a sculpture 
of a saint. 
The creation of sacred space is also significant in terms of separating the spaces 
we enter as individuals and those we enter as members of a group. Because the space 
around monuments is public, when we enter these spaces we necessarily become mindful 
of our existence in relation to others. Rather than retreating into our private lives, 
monuments propel us into a space that binds us to others. Of course, what binds us to 
others may vary. However, the communal worshiping and meditation that occurs at 
monuments strengthen the sense in which we can understand monuments as creating a 
sacred space that emphasizes and defines our membership in the nation. 
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That being said, there are numerous new monuments whose designs seek to 
disturb precisely this sense of “holy-ness” and “religious-ness” of monuments. These 
monuments are purposefully placed within our living places, so that we do not need to 
take a special trip to visit them, but rather we encounter them in our daily routines. A 
good example of this type of monument is Gunter Demnig’s Stumbling Blocks in Berlin 
and other cities in Germany and Austria. This monument is composed of blocks of stone 
engraved with names of individuals killed by the Nazis which are distributed throughout 
the city. (See Figure 9.) The monument is not limited to one particular place, but rather it 
is scattered throughout different neighborhoods in the city. The intent of Deming’s 
monument is to bring the reality of the Holocaust into our daily life where we are more 
likely to perform a personal reckoning, rather than visit the monument with a tourist-like 
detachment. Monuments like Deming’s undo the sense in which monuments can be 
thought of as sacred, and instead, they offer a vision of monuments that disrupt (if not, 
undo) the sacredness of what is associated with the nation. 
Monuments like Deming’s blur the separation between the sacred and the profane 
but they do so at some risk. With such monuments, the everyday spaces that are normally 
reserved for our profane activities as individuals or as members of other non-national 
groups, become invaded by the symbols, texts, and images of monuments. Elements that 
would otherwise be relegated to national, i.e., sacred space, become an inseparable part of 
our everyday life. The difficulty in the blurring produced by such monuments is that 
spaces that we enter as individuals and those we enter as members in the nation become 
indistinguishable. The blurring of the sacred and profane, in other words, means a 
blurring of national and individual space as well. 
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The risk of blurring national and individual space is not so much the loss of the 
national space as it is a loss of individual space. The loss of individual space means a loss 
of a distinct space where an individual can be just that—an individual. The existence of 
individual space is crucial for the development of a sense of self and a capacity for self-
government. Therefore, without this space, the individual may be left without the tools 
necessary to build an identity separate from a national one. The loss of individual space 
should be of particular concern to those who are wary of a nationalism that does not 
distinguish between an individual and national identity. In Chapter 5, I will discuss this 
line of argument more at length. However, here it is sufficient to say that, although the 
concerns that motivate the construction of monuments that are integrated into our daily 
environment are appealing, such monuments may ultimately risk losing a distinction—
between the sacred and the profane—that can be important for safeguarding the 
individual.23 
Monuments construct and define the nation  
The production of sacred space is linked to the production of a certain image of the 
nation. The sacred space creates an area that is dedicated to the display of what the 
nation, now deemed sacred, looks like. Similar to a church, the sacred space is not only 
used for worship, but also for the presentation of the history, values, and promises of the 
nation (or in the case of the church, of Christianity). In the sacred space, monuments 
create an image of the nation through the activities, images, and spaces they encourage. 
                                                
23 To be sure, there are other ways in which nationalist practices can invade our daily life, e.g., the use of 
nationalist slogans in advertising or postage stamps. However, the difference between such practices and 
monuments is that monuments need not enter our daily routines, whereas other practices would not exist 
if they did not do so. 
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They become objects in the national landscape in both a literal and metaphorical sense. 
Literally, monuments are visually present on national grounds, such as the National Mall, 
just as their reproductions are present on postcards and in film and advertising. However, 
if we think of the national landscape as a metaphor for the ideas and actions that 
contribute to the definition of the nation, we find that monuments play a role in inspiring 
and reflecting competing interpretations of the nation itself. The design of monuments 
reflects a certain conception of the nation which, when it is observed by an audience, 
creates an understanding not only of the nation as an abstract entity, but of an individual’s 
relation to it. Furthermore, because the construction of monuments is never a smooth and 
unchallenged process, the contestations about the design, location, or necessity of a 
monument are in themselves a contestation about how the nation defines itself and the 
relation of individuals to it. Therefore, a monument is not a stagnant object that, once in 
place, becomes simply an ornament that neither stirs nor challenges us. Rather, the space 
created by monuments is a “morally and politically charged space.” (Barshay 1995, 
emphasis in original) 
At stake with the politics of space and monuments is the representation of 
competing ideas about the character and boundaries of the nation. The location and the 
design of monuments are critical in conveying a certain image of the nation. This image 
is based on the creation of an imagined community. Similar to the role Anderson assigns 
the printing industry (itself a form of national practice), monuments also participate in the 
construction and definition of an imagined national community. According to Anderson, 
an imagined community is defined by a feeling of comradeship among people who are, 
by all accounts, strangers. However, the feeling of comradeship that Anderson writes 
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about is not only limited to people who are presently alive and who are separated by 
remote distances. In the nation, the comradeship extends backward in time to include 
people who are dead but who are still considered part of the community. The inclusion of 
the dead in the imagined community is central to the way a nation defines itself. Without 
a connection to a life preceding our own, a nation can only exist for a single generation. 
By linking the community to the past, a nation simultaneously creates a sense of shared 
history and a shared destiny. 
Death 
The presence of the dead in national monuments—particularly, the memorialization of 
the fallen—creates a promise of life beyond death. With the dead included in the national 
community, there is a sense that the nation has existed since antiquity. This strengthens 
the idea that the nation is timeless and that its existence does not require further 
justification. However, the inclusion of the dead does not merely give the nation a certain 
characteristic, i.e., that it is eternal, but it also affects the way an individual is related to 
the nation. The memorialization of the dead provides an assurance that one’s life is not 
lost with physical death, but rather that it can be immortalized through its appropriation 
by the nation. One’s life is no longer seen as beginning with one’s own birth and ending 
with one’s own death, but rather one’s life is reconceptualized as linked to the life of the 
nation. And, since the nation is seen as eternal, one’s life is also seen as eternal. The 
inclusion of the dead in the  national community is nothing short of a promise of 
immortality. This is a promise which, one might add, makes the idea that nationalism is a 
civic religion seem once again compelling. 
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The memorialization of the dead plays a role in defining the character of the 
nation, that is, of its national values. By publicly memorializing those who died for the 
nation, monuments associate the willingness to die for the nation with a respectful and 
admirable act. The memorialization of the dead signals an endorsement and appropriation 
of the willingness for sacrifice as a value that defines the members in the nation. To be 
included in the national community, one must, in other words, accept the occasional need 
for sacrifice. However, the causes that lead to the individuals’ death are also articulated 
as national values and they too find expression in monuments. The causes for which 
people died are represented as values worth dying for. Without these particular values the 
nation would risk losing its defining character—hence the willingness to die for them. 
Once again, the etching of the sentence “This is the price of freedom” at the World War 
II Memorial is significant because it links the death of the soldiers with a cause: a threat 
to freedom. This link establishes the value of freedom as a distinct value for Americans. 
If it were not an important American value, the death of the soldiers in its name would 
have been pointless. Therefore, the representation in monuments of the causes that lead to 
the death of people serves as an indication of the values that define the nation.24 
Memory 
By memorializing the dead, monuments become responsible for conserving the past. In 
them, they capture a glimpse into the past and the people who lived before. However, 
                                                
24 The particular way in which the dead are memorialized can signal how the boundaries of the nation are 
defined. For example, the racial makeup of the figures that are represented can serve as an indication of 
the inclusion, or exclusion, of a racial factor in national membership. A good example of how this plays 
out can be seen in the Fredrick Hart’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial sculpture which includes a racially 
diverse ensemble. The design choice of the soldiers’ racial background conveys the notion that American 
heroes are considered heroic regardless of race.  
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beyond the pervasive presence of the dead in monuments, monuments also relate to the 
past through the collection and reproduction of memories. By representing past events, 
monuments bring to our attention specific moments and help us re-live them, thus serving 
as a vehicle for collecting and re-telling the stories of the past. However, the selection of 
events from the past is not random, but is rather done through a nationalist lens. The 
events are selected because they are deemed relevant to the nation and their mere 
presence in a national monument gives them a national significance. The assembling of 
memories in monuments creates a distinct interpretation of the past. It is a past that has 
become, by way of monuments, a national memory. Monuments, in other words, help us 
remember the past but they do so while giving the past a distinctly national meaning. In 
this sense, monuments do not simply reify memory by collecting it; rather, they are also 
involved in producing memory, namely, a national memory.25  
The production of national memories is central to the way in which monuments 
create an imagined national community. Because the construction of a national past is 
also the construction of a shared past, monuments link individuals who may not know 
each other but who are joined through “shared” national memories. A shared past also—
and perhaps more importantly—creates a sense of companionship that extends over 
several generations. Generations of the past become linked to those of the present, and 
both of these become linked to the generations of the future. Therefore, the construction 
of shared past establishes a national life, so to speak, that extends beyond our own. It 
                                                
25 The idea of a national memory is not restricted to one, singular, monolithic memory. Monuments can 
produce national memories. They can do so both in the sense that different monuments remind of us of 
different things, but also in the sense that one monument can host a multiplicity of national memories. In 
Chapters 3 and 5 I discuss the latter type of monument particularly in regard to counter-memorials. These 
memorials speak to the idea that memory, like individual identity, is varied, multiple and fluid. 
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both looks back toward a shared past and forward toward a shared future (if not a shared 
destiny).  The companionship that arises from the construction of a shared, national past 
implies the construction of an imagined national community.  
In addition to constructing an imagined community, national memory also helps 
define the character of the nation. The nature of the events being memorialized defines in 
some way the character of the group that is being linked to these events. The connection 
between what the past consists of and the defining character of the nation is particularly 
important to Isaiah Berlin. He writes that nationalist sentiment springs from a shared 
sense of a past injury. (Berlin 1990) The event, or series of events that mark the moments 
of collective humiliation, awakens the nation to self-awareness and defines the terms in 
which it sees itself. Berlin argues that the experience of being under attack leads its 
victims to assert themselves as a nation through the cultivation of specific traits that 
separate them from their attackers. These traits are cultivated as a resistance to and 
separation from the other. Berlin’s discussion of collective humiliation as defining the 
character of the nation is, to be sure, only one example. Other non-humiliating events, 
such as victory or independence, can be equally important for the definition of a nation. 
However, in general, the legitimization of the existence as well as the definition of the 
distinguishing character of a nation is based on having a common past. And, it is 
precisely this—a common past—that monuments create so well. 
The creation of a national past means that monuments define what should be 
remembered, as for example with the memorialization of instances of collective 
humiliation. However, beyond what is remembered, monuments also give us a sense of 
how we remember. The construction of a specifically shared past establishes a 
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relationship between the individual and the group. It binds the individual to memories 
that he may not have lived through but with which he identifies precisely because they 
are presented as a shared past. As I argued earlier, this means that the individual is 
connected to a past beyond his lifetime. But, more than that, it means that, in a national 
context, to remember adequately, one must do so with others. A shared national past tells 
us that the past can only make sense when it is shared by a community. In other words, 
we cannot remember alone because our memories do not have meaning in the absence of 
others. Therefore, the question of how we remember is related to how the nation 
conceptualizes individuals, i.e., as forming part of an imagined community.   
Conclusion 
Monuments, both with regard to death and memory, are oriented toward the past. The 
preoccupation with the past is central to the way a monument can function as a national 
practice. In order to contribute to the construction of an imagined community, 
monuments must extend their meaning beyond the immediate and the daily. A past that is 
not limited to our life span, either because there is a shared past or because the concept of 
sacrifice transforms individual death into national life, connects us in a fundamental way 
to others. Furthermore, the way in which the past is articulated helps define the 
boundaries and character of those included in the group. Since monuments articulate the 
past in a variety of ways, whether with regard to memory or death, monuments construct 
different, possibly competing, ideas about the “nation.” And this, as I argued at the 
beginning of the chapter, makes monuments a national practice. 
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In the chapters that follow I look at monuments and memory. In the next chapter, 
I use Nora’s concept of lieux de mémoire as a framework for thinking of monuments in 
relation to memory. I examine the way in which monuments function as sites of memory 
that simultaneously safeguard memory but also have the potential of corrupting it. I 
discuss how different ideas about the way we remember and what we can remember 
affect the design of monuments. Then, in Chapter 4, I analyze the ubiquitous presence of 
death in monuments. I look at the place of the hero in the memorialization process and I 
examine the ways in which the memorialization of the hero reflects a certain 
understanding of the relation between the individual and the group. In that chapter I also 
discuss how the concept of sacrifice in the nation denies death itself and asserts, instead, 
the eternal life of the nation. Finally, in Chapter 5, I investigate how monuments not only 
are able to construct national meaning but also accommodate liberal values. I rely on 
Chapters 3 and 4 to develop a discussion about how monuments might respond to a 
conception of the “nation” as both traditionally national but also liberal. Chapter 5 
examines how monuments can open up to liberal possibilities while maintaining their role 
in the production of a national narrative. More generally, the chapter serves as a 
concluding discussion about monuments as a national practice but with particular 
attention to how monuments would serve as a national practice in the context of liberal 
nationalism. 
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Chapter Three  /  Memory and Monuments 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of monuments, as a national practice, is their 
relation to the past. Overwhelmingly, monuments bring to our attention events that 
occurred in the past or people that have lived before us. They represent, or more 
accurately, they create memories that contribute to the construction of the image of the 
nation. These memories, in turn, become national memories because they both create a 
national community and define its character.  
In this chapter, I begin with a discussion about memory as a particular approach 
to the past. I argue that memory infuses the past with particular meanings. In the case of 
national memory, the past is interpreted through a national lens. The second section of the 
chapter analyzes the particular relationship between monuments and memory. Here I 
expand Pierre Nora’s brief discussion of monuments as lieux de memoire to illustrate the 
way in which monuments can be simultaneously places, sites, and loci of memory. 
Finally, the third part of the chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the relationship 
between the design of monuments and their approach to memory. In particular, I am 
interested in the implications that this relationship has on the way in which the nation is 
imagined. Therefore, I discuss a variety of different designs and I examine how each 
might reflect a particular understanding of national memory and, by extension, of the 
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nation as well. The purpose of this analysis, as of the chapter as a whole, is to illustrate 
how monuments, vis-à-vis memory, function as a national discourse. 
I.  Memory and nation 
Pierre Nora famously distinguishes between the role of history and memory. He argues 
that memory is an organic, if at times inaccurate, retelling of the past. It relates to the past 
as a source for explanation and meaning for the present. In particular, memory 
participates in the construction of communities and their respective identities. In a similar 
vein, David Lowenthal argues that memory is responsible for exaggerating, emphasizing, 
de-emphasizing, or minimizing the significance of events. He argues that memory 
imposes a framework on the past that infuses it with purpose. (Lowenthal 1996, xi) 
However, Paul Ricoeur is careful to point out that the selection of certain events at the 
expense of others has the dual effect of recalling and forgetting. Ricoeur reminds us that 
“seeing one thing is not seeing another, recounting one drama is forgetting another.” 
(Ricœur 2004, 452) In order to make sense of past events, memory purposefully selects 
those moments that are most meaningful to us. But, in doing so, it cannot help but reject 
some other moments as well. So, although memory is neither an accurate nor an infallible 
re-telling of the past, it is not a total creation or fabrication of facts either. Memory is the 
process through which the past is subject to “successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically 
revived.” (Nora 1989, 8) 
For Nora, history, as opposed to memory, is a distinctly modern phenomenon that 
is rational, ordered, and objective in its aim. It organizes the past rationally, according to 
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universal guidelines, in order to make its re-presentation intelligible to us. (Nora 1989, 9) 
Nora argues that history besieges memory because it aims to explain the past rather than 
mold it in order to give meaning to the present. Lowenthal argues that the desire to 
explain the past, if not rationalize it, makes the past seem as though it were 
fundamentally separate from the present, that is, as though the past were “a foreign 
country.” (Lowenthal 1985) Both Nora and Lowenthal see memory as having opposing 
tasks: revealing the past only insofar as it supports or creates values in the present 
whereby it blurs the separation between our life in the present and the past.1 (Nora 1989, 
22) 
However, it should be made clear that Nora’s definition of history and memory, 
as well as the distinction he draws between them, reflect different approaches to the past. 
Whether or not we agree with calling one approach “history” and the other “memory,” 
Nora’s discussion is useful insofar as it illustrates that the past can indeed be approached 
in different ways, and that the way we approach the past affects the way we frame the 
present. In this chapter, I am particularly interested in how the past can be “infused with 
meaning,” which in Nora’s terms would be the construction of memory. To take Nora’s 
definition of memory as an approach to the past opens the possibility of analyzing how 
meaning is constructed, how that construction changes over time, and the shape and 
effect of these constructed meanings on our society. Therefore, in the discussion that 
follows I understand the term “memory” as Nora does: it is neither a neutral nor an 
                                                
1 For a good review of the literature about the distinction between history and memory, see (Jenkins 1997, 
Legg 2005, Olick and Robbins 1998) 
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objective re-telling of the past. That “history” also is neither neutral nor objective goes 
without saying. 
Collective memory 
Maurice Halbwachs argues that the processes of memory cannot help but be social. He 
rejects Freud’s notion that the ultimate source of memory stems from an individual’s 
subconscious. Rather, Halbwachs thinks that what is crucial about memory is not what 
we remember, but rather how we remember. He argues that our memories spring from 
our social, exterior environment. Memory cannot be individual, as Freud would argue, 
because “it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society 
that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories.” (Halbwachs 1992, 38) This 
notion of the social source of our memory leads Halbwachs to introduce the term 
“collective memory.” Collective memory is the understanding that “memory is a matter 
of how minds work together in society, how their operations are not simply mediated but 
are structured by social arrangements.” (Olick & Robbins 1998, 109) Therefore, to speak 
about memory is to speak about a social community. 
The collective nature of memory can be understood in two parallel ways: first, as 
Halbwachs points out, memory draws meaning from the social frameworks to which we 
belong. Second, memory interprets the past so that our current experience makes sense to 
us. That is, the meaning and values that memory imposes on the past provide a social 
context for our identity. The power of collective memory is, therefore, its ability to 
connect us to other people. Specifically, it makes us feel linked to people we may not 
even know, but who nonetheless form part of our same collective memory. Eviatar 
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Zerubavel argues that collective memory gives us “the ability to experience events that 
happened to groups and communities to which we belong long before we joined them as 
if they were part of our own past.” (Zerubavel 1996) This means that collective memory 
allows for the development (or the maintenance) of such familiar emotions as pride or 
humiliation that result from events we did not experience in our own life, but feel 
connected to through the groups to which we belong.  
The fact that we feel connected to people who essentially are  strangers is an odd 
notion. This should remind us of Benedict Anderson’s discussion of “imagined 
communities.” Anderson uses the term “imagined community” to define communities in 
which members “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community.” (Anderson 1991, 6) 
For Anderson, the national community is an imagined community par excellence. 
However, the nation is noteworthy not because of its imagined quality but because of 
what is imagined and the way in which it is imagined. A nation is often imagined to share 
language, culture, territory, history, and destiny. And, while some nations may have only 
some of these elements, and others may have elements not listed, what characterizes a 
nation above all else is the sense of belonging to it. (Renan 1994) A nation owes its 
existence to a specific collective memory: a memory that interprets the past and imposes 
on it meaning, purpose, and values that give the nation its legitimacy. 
Eric Hobsbawm calls this process of imposing national meaning on the past, the 
invention of tradition. Hobsbawm argues that nations are “exercises in social 
engineering” because they claim to “to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the 
remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so 
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natural as to require no definition other than self-assertion.” (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983, 
14) The ancient and natural quality assigned to the nation forms the basis for the 
justification of its existence. And, furthermore, this justification becomes the base for any 
actions carried out in the name of the nation, whether they be struggles for independence, 
external or internal war, citizenship restrictions, etc. A nation cannot help but be a 
community tied by memory because it uses the past to transmit values—in this case 
values that affirm its antiquity and legitimacy.  
The invention of tradition, the construction of a collective national memory, 
works through various processes and discourses. Ernest Gellner, for example, argues that 
the codification and extensive literacy of vernacular language and folk culture in general 
in the 19th century gave rise to a sense of solidarity and loyalty to the new political unit, 
the nation. He points out that “the age of nationalism” was defined by a rise of a 
bureaucratic machinery that required the invention of a common language for its workers, 
i.e., the people. (Gellner 1983) This, he claims, constructed a sense of national belonging. 
The spread of a common national language was simultaneously sustained by the rise of 
print-capitalism. Anderson argues that not only did the newspaper extend its reach further 
than ever before, therefore transforming local events into national news, but more 
importantly, the spread of the newspaper gave rise to a new national awareness and 
consciousness. (Anderson 1991)  
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II.  Monuments and memory 
Monuments play a particularly interesting and important role in the construction 
of a national memory.2 This role makes them, once again, a national practice. The role of 
monuments in the construction of memory is distinct because they are exclusively 
constructed for the sake of memory. As I discussed in the previous chapter the very word 
“monument” is derived from the word monare, which means “to remind” in Latin. 
Monuments remind us of past events and re-enact them for us in the present. In this sense 
they truly re-present the past for us. But, by doing so, monuments link the past with the 
present. A monument, by virtue of having a public, necessarily brings together its 
audience—the present—with the symbolic representation of the past. 
A monument does not, however, remind us of just anything: it reminds us about 
what is deemed important for the nation. By choosing specific events or people to 
memorialize, monuments control “the narrative of actual events, determining the 
sequence of experiences, and interpreting them for subsequent generations.” (Ivy 2002, 
190) A monument serves as a reminder of a nationally significant past which in turn 
serves as a vehicle for the communication of national values. But, more importantly, 
monuments participate in the justification and legitimization of the nation. The selection 
and manipulation of the past is done to serve the present. In Nora’s terms, this would 
mean that the past that is captured in monuments is transformed into memory, rather than 
history, because it does not aim for accuracy—rather, the past is a malleable substance 
that contributes to the national discourse. The memory that results from this construction 
                                                
2 As before, I use the term “monument” to mean national monuments. 
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is a “memory of a national past [that] aims to affirm the righteousness of a nation’s birth, 
even its divine election. … To do otherwise would be to undermine the very foundations 
of national legitimacy, of the state’s seemingly natural right to exist.” (Young 1992, 52)  
The interplay of the past and the present in monuments has a pedagogic element. 
Monuments can instruct us about events we never lived through. Since most monuments 
are constructed to last for many generations, or at least so that they seem to last forever, 
most monuments are seen by people who did not actually live through the events that the 
monuments memorialize. Despite not having lived through the experience that is being 
memorialized, the fact that it been deemed worthy of a monument teaches the audience 
that this event was, and continues to be, important to the nation. In addition, a monument 
teaches how one ought to remember a specific event. The monument represents a specific 
interpretation and explanation of the past and as such it is, once again, a tool of memory. 
The audience is instructed in what the past, the event that is memorialized, should mean 
to them. For example, the Korean War Memorial bears the inscription “Freedom is not 
free.” The inscription is significant because it simultaneously teaches us that the war 
required human sacrifice, and, more importantly, that the war was fought for the sake of 
freedom. In this way, monuments can “supplement” our memory, that is, teach us about 
the past, as well.3 
                                                
3 A special case of the pedagogic character of monuments can be seen in the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum. Again, this museum is unusual because it combines a museum with a memorial. In 
the context of memory, this example is relevant because one enters the memorial only after having 
walked through the museum and learned about the Holocaust. In this way, the museum provides an 
additional pedagogical tool to the memorial.  
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Though monuments are artifacts of memory and therefore are bound to the past, 
they also promise an existence in the future. The construction of collective memory 
implies a timeline which extends not only from the past to the present, but to the future as 
well. Gellner observes that “the most commonly used word in the nationalist vocabulary: 
[is] awakening.” (Hutchinson & Smith 1994, 8) He argues that saying that national 
sentiments are being awakened, rather than constructed, implies that one conceives of the 
nation as having been merely asleep rather than non-existent. Monuments participate in a 
similar process of awakening because they remind us of—literally, they bring back to our 
attention—memories that otherwise would be forgotten. This is particularly interesting 
when the meaning of monuments change over time. To illustrate how this occurs, in 1988 
the artist Hans Haaschek built a replica of a Nazi monument in Garz, Germany as a 
protest against the Nazi regime. The same monument that previously celebrated Nazi 
Germany now served to condemn it. What is important here is that although the meaning 
of monuments may change, the existence of the monument itself provides an important 
link between the present generation and the future ones. In this case, it allows for a 
symbolic dialogue between Nazi Germany and the present non-Nazi generation. 
Therefore, a monument can address present as much as future viewers.  
The orientation of monuments toward the future can take unexpected shapes. A 
striking example is the case of the “Victory Arch” designed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 
The monument was meant to mark the victory of Iraq over Iran, yet it was commissioned 
in 1985 when no victory was in sight. Its conception therefore “precedes the reality it is 
meant to commemorate, which is most uncommon in the history of monument making.” 
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(Makiya 2004, 10) This monument is future-oriented in a different sense: it is preemptive 
because it serves as a prophetic declaration, or memorialization, of victory. 
The continuity between past, present, and future makes the destruction of a 
monument significant to the processes of construction—and destruction—of memory. 
The physical destruction of a monument symbolizes a break in the connection to the past 
and the future. It literally demolishes the image of the nation as eternal and ever-lasting 
that is conveyed by the monument. The ruins symbolize the end of national values, 
myths, and destinies. There are countless examples of monuments that were destroyed as 
part of an effort either to bring an end to a certain society and the memories that shaped it 
and/or to herald the beginning of a new era with new memories. It suffices simply to 
mention the well-publicized demolition of the statues of Lenin after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, and in a similar manner, those of Saddam Hussein after the American invasion. 
III.  Monuments as lieux de mémoire 
The link between monuments and memory is significant because monuments serve, in 
addition to vehicles for the construction of memory, as lieux de mémoire. The term 
follows from the distinction Nora draws between history and memory and from what he 
sees today as the rise of history and the relegation of memory as primitive or irrational. 
As I have discussed before, Nora argues that modern society is obsessed with history, 
resulting in compulsive archiving, and that memory is being endangered. But, he argues, 
the decline in “spontaneous memory” results in a forced, unnatural protection of memory 
at the hands of history; it consecrates memory in the form of lieux de mémoire. Lieux de 
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mémoire can be thought of as islands of memory in a constantly rising ocean of history. 
They are the stuff of memory but they are inextricably situated in the world of history.  
Unraveling the term “lieux de mémoire” 
Nora’s term lieux de mémoire has been translated in a variety of ways. The word lieu is 
problematic because it can have different meanings in English. Lieux de mémoire can be 
translated as places, sites, or loci of memory. Each of these choices expresses a different 
aspect of what Nora meant by the term . Lieux de mémoire can rightfully be translated as 
places of memory because for Nora these “shells of memory” are material locations or 
things which host or embody memory. He gives the examples of museums, monuments, 
and cemeteries (Nora 1989, 12) These are the locations where the politics of memory 
play out. But Nora is also careful to include in his definition of lieux de mémoire such 
things as calendars and national flags. (Nora 1989, 19 and 23) These examples are not a 
physical location of memory but rather its place in our social imagination. The Stars and 
Stripes, for instance, embodies our American collective memory and identity even when 
we are not confronted with the physical flag itself. Any image, description, or allusion to 
the flag are sufficient to inspire in us the memories it symbolizes. Therefore, we would be 
wise to extend the places of memory to sites of memory, as well. 
However, for Nora what is crucial about lieux de mémoire is that they are the 
remnants of organic memory. In the face of the danger of being lost to the advance of 
history, lieux de mémoire serve as a safeguard for memory. In this sense, they should also 
be understood as loci of memory because our memories emanate from them while at the 
same time they keep our memories safe and secure within them. Nora’s term lieux de 
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mémoire describes the varied ways in which memory is preserved and reproduced in 
today’s world. Selecting only one of these translations, whether places, sites, or loci of 
memory, would limit the scope of the term and would highlight one aspect of it while 
obscuring another.4  
What makes monuments lieux de mémoire 
In his definition of lieux de mémoire, Nora includes three different characteristics: Lieux 
de mémoire are material, functional, and symbolic. Although Nora identifies monuments 
as examples of lieux de mémoire, he does not provide a comprehensive analysis of how 
monuments embody these three characteristics. (Nora 1989, 12 and 22) It is possible, 
however, to draw this analysis rather directly from Nora’s work. The monument as 
physical object is the most obvious way in which a monument has a material 
manifestation. The choice of its location and design is purposeful and is different from, 
say, historical monuments, which are “ensembles constructed over time” and which serve 
as mirrors to history rather than as objects of memory. (Nora 1989, 22) Furthermore, the 
very existence of the monument is testimony to the will to remember. The materiality of a 
monument reflects the desire to “stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a 
state of things, to immortalize death, to materialize the immaterial.” (Nora 1989, 19) By 
being, both literally and metaphorically, inscribed into the material of the monument, 
memory appears to be fixed and permanent. Like the stone (or marble, or granite, or 
                                                
4 In order to maintain its richness, I have chosen to keep Nora’s term in its French original. I will only use 
the words places, sites, or loci of memory to emphasize a particular aspect of the broader concept. 
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glass) of the monument, memory seems to be protected from decay and, ideally, from 
destruction as well.5  
A monument shares with other lieux de mémoire a functional aspect as well. Like 
other lieux de mémoire, monuments have the function of preserving memory. Through 
different design choices and the selection of specific imagery, text, and location, a 
monument “preserves an incommunicable experience that would disappear along with 
those who shared it.” (Nora 1989, 23) According to Nora, a monument captures memory 
and saves it from forgetfulness, not to mention from the claws of history. In addition, the 
preservation of memory has a pedagogical function, as well. It instructs us about a shared 
past and teaches us about our national values and their meaning. 
Finally, monuments have a strong symbolic power. The very image of 
monuments plays an important symbolic role in popular culture. For example, Miranda 
Banks traces the imagery of monuments in science fiction films and illustrates how their 
appearance in films such as Independence Day or The Day the Earth Stood Still 
reinforces “the ideals and aspirations … related to the nation and the political body.” 
(Banks 2002, 144) Monuments that are reproduced and used as icons in popular culture 
carry with them a reference to the nation and what it stands for. And, conversely, 
monuments can integrate recognizable symbols, such as eagles or flags, in their designs 
to elicit an immediate, partially pre-existing response.  
                                                
5 As I will discuss later in this chapter, the need for a “materiality” requirement in monuments is challenged 
by James Young. Young argues that the debate surrounding a monument prior to its construction is in 
itself a monument.  
 -90-  
For Nora, the symbolic aspect of lieux de mémoire is particularly important 
because he argues that beyond the symbols themselves, monuments inspire symbolic 
actions. Monuments could be said to inspire two different kinds of actions: “dominant” 
and “dominated” (to use Nora’s terms). The former would include official events such as 
ceremonies and parades that occur on and around monuments, while the latter points to 
non-official or spontaneous activities inspired by monuments—such as protest marches, 
demonstrations, and speeches, as well as objects for graffiti and vandalism. Monuments 
can become, in other words, centers for resistance movements and oppositional politics. 
Monuments also draw non-political and extremely personal pilgrimages, such as those 
that occur at cemeteries or road-side shrines. (Santino 2002) The Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial is noteworthy in this case because it not only attracts tourist-like visitors, as do 
most of the other national monuments on the National Mall, but also individuals who 
approach the monument as a tombstone for their loved ones. The monument’s funerary 
architecture has inspired the now well-known tradition of leaving objects to the dead 
ones, much like the tradition of visiting a grave. (Hass 1998) This array of symbolic 
activities, official and non-official, contribute to the politics of memory and monuments. 
However, even though Nora argues that lieux de mémoire are our only connection 
to memory in a time when it is increasingly being lost, he also argues that lieux de 
mémoire are fundamentally unsatisfactory. He distinguishes between the memory 
embedded in lieux de mémoire and “true” memory. He argues that lieux de mémoire are 
born out of a fear of loss of memory whereas “true memory” is an organic extension of 
society. True memory is transmitted through story-telling, ceremony, and ritual. It is a 
memory that is born out of experience within our social or cultural frameworks, and not 
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kept in the constrained, somewhat artificial, form of a lieu de mémoire. For this reason, 
Nora thinks that lieux de mémoire are “like shells on the shore when the sea of living 
memory has receded”; they have the trappings of memory but are lacking its real 
substance. (Nora 1989, 12) Surprisingly, therefore, to understand monuments within the 
framework of Nora’s lieux de mémoire means that one takes monuments to be a 
fundamentally unsatisfactory medium for the exercise of memory.  
Furthermore, Nora argues that the less memory is experienced from the inside, in 
our daily life, the more it will exist through “exterior scaffolding and outward signs.” 
(Nora 1989, 13) He claims that the proliferation of lieux de mémoire, and hence of 
monuments, is the result of the general loss of true memory in society. James Young 
extends Nora’s notion that monuments may be inversely related to memory and claims 
that monuments shoulder our “memory-work.” This is crucial for Young because he is 
concerned that the building of monuments may encourage us to abandon our “memory-
work” and be encouraged to forget the past. (Young 1992, 55) He warns that monuments 
in particular may run the risk of relieving us of the responsibility, and possibly the 
burden, of doing our own “memory-work.” Perhaps, he continues, the drive to build 
monuments goes hand in hand with the desire to forget. 
Ironically, the very thing that was meant to protect memory from disappearing 
seems, if we take Young’s word for it, to induce more forgetting. However, at the same 
time, Young believes that monuments are the perfect tools and vehicles of memory 
because they have the capacity to create a discussion, or debate, about memory. He 
argues that the most successful monument may not be a “single memorial at all, but 
simply the never-to-be-resolved debate over which kind of memory to preserve, how to 
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do it, in whose name, and to what end.” (Young 1997, 879) Monuments have the capacity 
to problematize memory in a unique way because they can inspire debate that reaches 
beyond a discussion about the monument, but that extends to a discussion about the 
meaning and nature of memory itself. 
The ability of a monument to inspire debate is important because it can contribute 
to the creation of a meaningful public space. Specifically, Michael North argues that 
monuments are successful only if they engender a public space in the Habermasian sense. 
(North 1992, 27-8) North credits the Vietnam Veterans Memorial with achieving such a 
space because it places the “viewers in a public space that is articulated in terms of 
political controversy so that to view the piece is not simply to experience space but also 
to enter a debate.” (North 1992, 20) The design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
creates not only a symbolic and powerful national monument but also a natural space for 
rallies, reunions, and political speeches. (Griswold 1993) The monument and its 
surroundings are a physical and metaphorical public space. By creating space for debate, 
monuments like the Vietnam Veterans Memorial articulate the idea that memory, 
especially national memory, is fleeting, unsettled, and in need of exploration. Monuments 
that can become locations for debate provide an alternative to “closed” memory that is 
immune to criticism and analysis. Furthermore, monuments as centers of debate that 
create an “open memory” may be particularly important to a democratic nation that 
aspires toward self-reflection and even self-criticism—a point I return to in Chapter 5. 
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IV.  Memory, the design of monuments, and the image of the nation 
The complex relationship between monuments and national memory implies a running 
dialogue with the discourse of nationalism. Because memory is tied to the construction of 
a national community, as I have discussed in the first section of this chapter, whenever 
monuments wrestle with the meaning of memory, they simultaneously grapple with the 
meaning of the nation as well. Different approaches to memory, or rather the 
problematization of memory, as well as competing ideas about the nation, are therefore 
expressed in the design choices of monuments.  
The problematization of memory is most salient in the design and conception of 
counter-monuments. Counter-monuments are “memorial spaces conceived to challenge 
the very premise of the monument.” (Young 2000, 96) Counter-monuments set out to 
question the relationship between memory and monument and to represent this difficult 
relationship in their designs. Rather than do away with monuments entirely—which 
would be an alternative response to challenging the merit of monuments—counter-
monuments seek to integrate the material, functional, and symbolic aspects of traditional 
monuments with new modes of understanding the role of monuments in our society, in 
general, and in constructing memory, specifically. In this sense, counter-monuments 
continue to be lieux de mémoire because they continue to sustain a dialogue with and 
about memory. 
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The complexities of memory and monuments 
The burden / responsibility of memory-work 
One of the most interesting challenges of counter-monuments is the claim that 
monuments cannot remember for us. James Young argues that monuments fall short in 
helping us remember things past because “once we assign monumental form to memory, 
we have to some degree divested ourselves of the obligation to remember.” (Young 1992) 
Rather than view the monument as a guarantee for remembering, monuments can often 
lose their social and political significance and become points of reference in the 
landscape, or artifacts of public art. Counter-monuments are designed to warn us of the 
risk of building a monument in the name of memory, but in actuality building them 
because we do not want to deal with a painful past, that is, building them for the sake of 
forgetting. 
Architects Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz illustrated this danger in their 
design of the Monument Against Fascism. The design of this monument focuses on the 
idea that the responsibility to remember lies on our shoulders, and cannot be relegated to 
the monument itself. The Monument Against Fascism was unveiled in Harburg in 1986, 
and it consisted of a  pillar 12 meters high made of hollow aluminum. The pillar was 
designed to allow for memorial graffiti to be etched onto it, and invited viewers to 
express their thoughts and reactions to fascism or the monument. As the lower sections of 
the monument filled with graffiti, the monument-pillar was successively lowered into the 
ground. At the end of seven years, the pillar was completely underground leaving only a 
burial stone inscribed to “Harburg’s Monument against Fascism.” (Young 1992) (See 
Figure 9.) For the Gerzes, the memory of fascism could not be tied to a monument 
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because, like the metaphoric disappearance of their pillar, the meaning of a monument 
risks fading away with time. The idea of the Monument Against Fascism is that we, the 
viewers, commit “ourselves to remain vigilant.” It represents an understanding that “in 
the end, it is only we ourselves who can rise up against injustice.” (Gerz and Shalev-Gerz 
in (Young 1992, 274) The memory of fascism and its horrors can ultimately survive only 
in the commitments made by living individuals—that is, it can only survive in the 
absence of monuments. 
The Monument Against Fascism brings up the interplay between recalling and 
forgetting which Ricoeur so aptly captures. For Young and the Gerz architects, the 
danger of forgetting is so daunting that they see the building of monuments as a threat to 
memory, rather than its tool or vehicle. For them, monuments should be built only if the 
dangers they imply, i.e., forgetfulness, are made explicit. However, it is worth at least 
noting that in order to remember the past, which both the Gerzes and Young are keen to 
do, there needs to be some form of forgetting. In order to make sense of the past or, in the 
case of the Gerz monument, to make sense of fascism, we must reckon with the need to 
forget as well. To avoid forgetting all together, as the Gerzes argue, may be not only 
impossible, but undesirable.6 
                                                
6 Jorge Luis Borges muses over the consequences of total memory in his short story entitled Funes the 
Memorious. In this story he tells the story of Funes who remembers everything and forgets nothing. 
(Borges 1998) Though at first we are tempted to be jealous of Funes, Borges makes it clear that Funes’ 
gift is nothing other than an affliction from which he suffers considerably. Funes’ present is solidly 
melded to his past (and future). Borges illustrates that forgetting is necessary, because without it we 
cannot have a sense of progression (not progress) through time. 
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Monuments as a medium for changes in memory 
Though Young worries about the role of monuments in our desire to forget and possibly 
deny the past, monuments do not necessarily imply a shirking of responsibility. 
Monuments are not necessarily a medium for forgetting; on the contrary, they can be a 
medium for the on-going and lively process of producing, revising, and re-evaluating the 
meanings of the past. For example, the Lincoln Memorial has served as a framing device 
for a variety of memories over the years. Built in 1922, the monument commemorated the 
end of the civil war and the second founding of United States. The meaning of the 
monument changed, however, after Martin Luther King delivered his “I Have a Dream” 
speech on the steps leading up to the monument. The staging of the event created an 
association between Lincoln in the background and Martin Luther King in the 
foreground, emphasizing not the unity of South and North, but the promises made by the 
Gettysburg address. Martin Luther King’s speech has served to revive and redefine the 
memories of Lincoln and give them a renewed meaning in today’s world. Furthermore, 
the delivery of the speech has become itself incorporated into the memories embodied in 
the monument. To walk up the steps to the monument means not only visiting the 
memorial to Lincoln, but visiting the steps upon which “I Have a Dream” was delivered. 
In this way, the Lincoln Memorial has been far from an excuse for forgetfulness, but 
rather a fertile ground for contestation, layering, and reviving memories. (Thomas 2002) 
Vicarious memory  
By putting the burden of memory on individuals rather than monuments, one is inevitably 
confronted with what Young has termed “vicarious memory.” (Young 2000) For Young, 
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this is the type of memory that springs from experiences that we have not lived through, 
but which we feel are as vivid and important to our current life as if we had. Halbwachs 
uses the term “historical memory” in a similar way to refer to memory that reaches us 
only through historical records and not through personal experience. Though both 
thinkers highlight memory that is informed by external sources, I prefer Young’s term 
“vicarious memory” because it manages to simultaneously point to those who did 
experience the event and those who remember it. Our memory, therefore, is vicarious 
insofar as we experience it through others. 
There are interesting monuments that have approached the problems of vicarious 
memory, and many have dealt with it through a focus on memories of the Holocaust by 
the children of Holocaust survivors. A good example of the use of vicarious memory in 
monuments is the Oregon Holocaust Memorial, built in 2004 which was the product of 
efforts by the Oregon Holocaust Survivors, Refugees, and Families Committee. What is 
striking about this memorial is its didactic character and the incorporation of survivors’ 
names onto the monument. The memorial is located at the end of a short path on which 
are strewn fragments of iron-cast items that were left behind by Jews rushing onto the 
trains, such as a damaged suitcase, broken violin, a menorah. The memorial itself consists 
of a wall of black granite on which there is a relatively lengthy summary of the war, and 
adjacent to it a collection of short quotes of Holocaust survivors. On the back of this wall 
are inscribed the names of Holocaust survivors along with the names of their family 
members who perished in the war. The “instructional” text, designed to literally address a 
non-experienced audience, as well as the transcription of survivors’ testimonies, makes 
explicit the fact that the audience of the monument is not expected to have lived through 
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the Holocaust. On the contrary, the audience is assumed to connect with the event only 
indirectly, i.e., vicariously, through its survivors. The design of the monument focuses on 
enshrining the survivors’ memory rather than some collective or national memory. By 
doing so, the monument engages directly with the issue of vicarious memory; it draws 
attention to what lies at the heart of vicarious memory—memory vis-à-vis the testimonies 
of the other.  
Memorializing absence 
The subtlety of vicarious memory becomes even more difficult when there is no other left 
from which to draw memories. This situation, most noticeable in the case of genocides, 
has opened the door to the problem of memorializing absence. Rather than memorialize 
an idea, hero, or event that is meant to live through the ages, one is confronted with the 
challenge of memorializing that which is lost. The difficulty of memorializing absence is 
that the monument can no longer point to itself as a representative (however inadequate) 
of an event or person, but must now point to that which does not exist. Such a monument 
must deny its role as a safeguard of memory and instead affirm its role as a signifier of 
absence. Many of the counter-monuments that have looked at this problem have, once 
again, done so within the context of the post-World War II era in which entire cultures 
were swept away with few people, if any, left to tell its stories.  
An emerging design solution to this problem among counter-monuments has been 
the construction of negative-form monuments. The Aschrott-Brunnen Monument is a 
good example of this type of monument. It consists of an inverted underground replica of 
a fountain that was located outside Kassel’s City Hall Square. (See Figure 10.) The 
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original fountain was funded by the Jewish entrepreneur Sigmond Aschrott and was 
destroyed by the Nazis in 1939. Horst Hoheisel, the artist who designed the new 
monument, writes that he “designed the new fountain as a mirror image of the old one, 
sunk beneath the old place, in order to rescue the history of this place as a wound and as 
an open question.” (Young 1992, 288) Hoheisel’s design points to the fact that the Jewish 
community is gone and, therefore, a monument cannot memorialize the community, but 
only the absence of the community. The absence of the community, captured in this and 
in other monuments, consists not only of the physical death of the individuals, but also in 
the death of the memories that these individuals carried. The absence that is 
memorialized represents the schism, the unsettling discontinuity between the past and the 
future.7 
Collected vs. collective memory 
The problematization of memory in the design of counter-monuments, whether by 
dealing with the burden of memory-work, vicarious memory, or the memorialization of 
absence, has highlighted the role of the individual in the processes of memorialization. 
And, consequently, it has also brought a reevaluation of the concept of collective 
memory. Collective memory has been the target of growing criticism since the term was 
                                                
7 The memorialization of absence addresses issues of memory at its extreme limit—the total lack of 
memory. However, as the design of negative-form monuments make clear, the place of the audience at 
these memorials is also problematic. The underground space created by negative-form monuments is 
purposefully unapproachable and beyond our reach. It makes gathering around and even viewing the 
monument difficult. By doing so, these monuments run the risk of making not only themselves but also 
the public invisible. The public is excluded from being in the presence of the monument and, though the 
intent of the negative-form monuments is precisely to point to the inaccessibility of the past, this 
exclusion creates the odd situation where we may have a public monument without a public.  
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coined by Halbwachs. Writers such as James Fentress and Chris Wickham criticized the 
term by writing that it is “curiously disconnected from the actual thoughts processes of 
any particular person.” (Fentress & Wickham 1992) Similarly, Allan Pred argues that the 
term is problematic because any conception of collective memory cannot help but be 
constructed through practices, which must stem from actual, non-abstract, individual 
practices. Without any grounding in individual experience, collective memory would be 
meaningless, at best, if not absurd.8 Alternatively, Yael Zerubavel criticizes the notion 
that collective memory is on the decline. In her work on the historical monument of 
Masada in Israel, she has shown that despite the growing obsession with historical 
documentation in modern society, Israel and other nations continue to construct shared 
memories of the past. Zerubavel reverses Nora’s claim that “history besieges memory” 
by arguing throughout her work that “memory can also besiege history.” (Zerubavel 
1994, 73) 
Furthermore, the critique of collective memory puts at stake the conception of 
identity itself. Collective memory assumes that the individual is part of a collectivity 
from which he draws his sense of self, as well as a shared past and future. In this view, 
the individual is thought to be born into a pre-determined path or destiny. An individual’s 
memory in this case is not seen as the product of his own creation but rather as 
hereditary. A critique, therefore, of collective memory implies a related critique of the 
conceptualization of identity. Those who have resisted the term collective memory are 
                                                
8 This idea was suggested to me by Allan Pred in the spring of 2006 when I participated in his graduate 
seminar “Urban Modernities: Culture(s), Space(s), and Everyday Life” at the University of California, 
Berkeley. 
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concerned that the term renders “the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the 
interiorized collective will.”9 (Fentress & Wickham 1992) The use of the term risks 
losing sight of the individual qua individual and instead see him as merely a member of a 
group.  
The design of counter-monuments has distanced itself from the notion of 
collective memory and the view of the individual implied in this view. Counter-
monuments have turned toward an emphasis on individual memory and experience. This 
emphasis has led many of the monument designers toward the idea of collected 
memories. (Young 1993) The idea of collected memories, as opposed to collective 
memory, is based on the understanding that there is no singular national memory, but a 
multiplicity of perspectives and memories. By emphasizing the plurality in the nation, 
counter-monuments are also making monuments more public insofar as they “[preserve] 
the many perspectives through which [they are] understood.” (Donohoe 2002, 239) What 
becomes important here is a steadfast resistance to imposing a singular meaning. 
Following Hannah Arendt’s concept of plurality, Janet Donohoe argues that “it is 
important for those who experience a monument to recognize that we perceive it 
differently.” (Donohoe 2002, 239) The identity of the individual comes to the center of 
the discussion, where the assumption that we perceive the monument differently is 
coupled with the assumption that individuals maintain a unique identity within the nation. 
                                                
9 The collective will, in this case, is different than the super-ego as discussed by Sigmund Freud. For Freud, 
though our ego is pressured by the super-ego (which consists of social norms and expectations), we are 
capable of wrestling with this pressure and retaining our agency. In other words, for Freud, as opposed to 
Fentress and Wickham, the existence of the super-ego in the self does not imply that we become 
“automatons.” (Freud 1989) 
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The individual does not get lost among the multitude but has an independent and 
autonomous presence.    
Participatory monuments  
In order to engage with the idea of collected memories, monuments have been designed 
to have the dual function of representing a collection of memories on the one hand, and 
addressing an audience composed by a plurality of memories on the other. To do so, 
many of the designs have an element of audience participation. The participation of the 
public is meant to work against the imposition of official (collective) memory from above 
and the distance that this creates between the monument and those viewing it. However, 
The use of the public in monument designs is a delicate matter because there is the 
danger in combining massed crowds and heroic architecture. For example, Michael North 
uses the example of Leni Reifenstal’s Triumph of the Will to illustrate the intrinsic danger 
of monuments. North argues that the integration of the public in the design of monuments 
could be dangerous if the public enters the monument only as “mass-ornament” rather 
than as a collection of individuals. (North 1992, 16) To avoid the use of the public as 
mere “mass-ornament,” the design of monuments has worked toward the integration of 
individual perception and experience.  
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Korean War Memorial in Washington, 
DC are interesting in this regard. Both share the use of reflection in their designs. Both 
monuments are made out of polished, shiny, black granite (another aspect that 
distinguishes them from any of the other monuments on the National Mall), which 
reflects the image of the viewers as they look at the monuments. By superimposing our 
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image with the names or etched faces of the dead, “the dead and the living meet.” (See 
Figure 11.) (Griswold 1993, 91) This effect forces us to reflect on our personal relation to 
the memories captured in the monument. The mirror effect in these monuments brings the 
public into the monument, thereby allowing, both literally and metaphorically, for a 
multiplicity of meanings. 
In a similar vein, the participation of the audience is invited in such monuments as 
the Monument Against Fascism by the Gerzes and the Wall for Peace by artist Clara 
Halter and architect Jean-Michel Wilmotte. The Wall for Peace is located in Paris on the 
Champ de Mars, at the foot of the Eiffel Tower. It consists of tall glass columns on which 
the word for peace is etched in several languages. At the center of the memorial, there is 
a structure that holds a screen and keyboard that welcomes visitors to enter a record of 
their thoughts or reactions to the memorial.10 As in the Monument Against Fascism, 
members of the public are invited to add their individual experiences and integrate them 
into the monument. This type of interaction with a monument work in a similar way at 
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. At the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, individuals can 
trace over the name of their lost and dear ones and take the rubbing home. There is also a 
tradition of leaving flowers, notes, and personal artifacts at the base of the monument.11 
These activities make the monument interactive in a double sense: individuals give their 
memories to the monument, which in turn become part of the monument itself, and 
                                                
10 The monument’s database is also open to contributions on-line at 
http://www.wallforpeace.com/mur.html# 
11 The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Collection was created in 1992. It is managed by the National Park 
Service and consists of the collection of artifacts left at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. A portion of this 
collection is exhibited at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington DC. 
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individuals take the memory of their loved ones from the monument. The participation of 
the audience in these three monuments reflects a growing concern with viewing the 
individual as an integral part of national memory. The individual is considered a 
participant in the construction of the memory that defines the boundaries and meaning of 
the nation.  
Conclusion 
Despite the transition in monument design from a representation of collective memory to 
collected memories, these new monuments cannot escape confronting the national 
context in which they are placed. The rejection of the term “collective memory” must not 
blind us to noticing “the different ways in which the ideas of individuals are influenced 
by the groups to which they belong.” (P. Burke quoted in Olick & Robbins 1998, 112) 
When an individual approaches “participatory monuments,” he is presumed to have a 
personal connection and memory of the event at hand. But if this personal connection is 
severed in some way (most possibly by a generational gap), the individual cannot help 
but rely upon other sources to construct an opinion or memory of the past. In other words, 
“participatory monuments” must reckon with the power of national discourse in the 
construction of memory, including the individual memories, of their audiences. 
National monuments, whether traditional, innovative, or counter-memorials, are subject 
to the discourses of nationalism because of their engagement with what is presumed to be 
a nationally significant past. National monuments refer to a past, or alternatively, they 
represent an interpretation of the past, that is meant to be significant to individuals as 
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members of the nation.12 The contestation of what a nation is, what it stands for, or the 
nature of memory does not change the fact that national monuments are a national 
practice. Alternatively, if national monuments did not contribute to the construction of 
national memory, they would not be national monuments. A more substantial rejection of 
the legitimacy and justification of the nation (such as cosmopolitanism) would in fact 
make national monuments impossible.  
To some extent, national monuments must engage in collective memory because a 
nation is a collectivizing entity. If we strip the nation of any collective properties, it 
would cease to be a nation. Recall that a for Renan nation requires belonging. (Renan 
1994) Regardless of what is theorized to join individuals together—whether race, 
ethnicity, language, territory, or values—these elements create a sense of belonging, that 
is, they join us. By extension, therefore, national monuments must engage with 
collectivizing values and narratives that join us into the nation.  
Monuments are therefore active participants in the construction of both national 
memory and the image of the nation. The relationship between monuments and memory 
is an uneasy one and requires constant challenges. The questions about the limits of 
memory, how it is formed, and what constitutes it can find a variety of solutions through 
different design ideas. However, what I have tried to show in this chapter is that these 
                                                
12 Even an innovative memorial such as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is meant to address Americans, 
rather than say, Vietnamese. In a conversation I had with Steven Johnston, he wondered how, and why, 
the national meaningfulness of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial would change if one constructed a 
parallel wall that listed the names of all the Vietnamese people who died during the Vietnam war. This, of 
course, would be impossible in practice since there are 58,195 Americans listed on the current memorial, 
whereas one would need space to list the 230,00 South Vietnamese and/or the 1,100,000 North 
Vietnamese killed during the war. 
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tensions imply a confrontation with questions of nationalism as well. The place of the 
individual in relation to the group, specifically the national community, is constitutive to 
the definition of the nation, because it is in the nature of this belonging that the nation is 
defined. Therefore, the challenges made to traditional monuments and memory must 
inevitably result in a critique of what defines and bounds the nation. The discourse of 
nationalism is articulated through and by monuments. 
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Chapter Four  /  Death and Dying in the Nation 
Michel Foucault wrote in his 1976 lectures that our society is no longer a society defined 
by death, but rather it is defined by life. In modern society, he argues, power is exercised 
through the extension of life, not the administration of death. Foucault sees the rise of 
bio-power as one of the main changes that distinguishes this episteme from its previous 
one, that is, the 16th and 17th centuries. (Foucault et al 2004) However, if we were to 
follow along with Foucault’s assessment, we would be surprised to find a dominant 
presence of the concept of death and dying in national narratives. National monuments in 
particular are overwhelmingly dedicated to memorializing the dead and not, as Foucault 
might predict, the celebration of the living.  
This chapter aims to examine the seemingly unlikely presence of the dead in the 
national narrative. I argue that the ubiquity of the concept of death and dying is not only 
necessary for defining the boundaries of belonging in a nation, but that, through the idea 
of sacrifice, it also guarantees the nation’s survival. Following Phillipe Ariès’ notion that 
a nation is “composed of both the dead and the living,” I look into how the inclusion of 
the dead in the imagined community is fundamental to creating a sense of belonging in 
the nation. (Ariès 1974, 74) The idea of a “national necropolis” (a term used by Ariès) is, 
in other words, integral to the definition of the national community. 
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The chapter also explores the way in which the nation reinterprets the death of 
individuals as the necessary guarantee for the life of the nation. I see the notion of 
sacrifice as the conceptual framework that allows for this transition (i.e., the death of the 
individual into the life of nation) to occur. Furthermore, I argue that sacrifice is crucial 
for linking the individual to the nation. Through the frequent presentation of death as 
sacrifice in national monuments, an individual death is not seen as final but rather as part 
of a continuous, national existence. This last part of the chapter aims to open up an 
examination, which continues in Chapter 5, about the way in which monuments of a 
liberal nation approach death and dying and how this approach fits in the context of 
liberal nationalism. 
I.  National necropolis: Death defines the nation 
The sense of belonging to a nation extends back in time so that we are not only connected 
to our contemporary national peers, but also to those who have lived before us. By 
extending our sense of belonging backward in time, we necessarily make those who have 
died—and their death—part of the time continuum along which the nation exists. This 
creates a sense of the passage of time, or more specifically, a sense of history. 
Furthermore, the existence of an imagined past implies an imagined future as 
well. Whether it is by thinking of the present generation as the “future” of generations 
past, or by simply extending the life of the nation beyond our own life span, the nation 
extends its reach both backward and forward in time. In the future lies the constructed 
image of our national destiny. The imagination of destiny can take different forms: the 
national destiny can be redemptive with promises of glory and salvation, or it can be 
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simply a promise that the nation will live eternally. Whatever form it takes, the imagined 
destiny guarantees that the nation has a future towards which it is headed. And, more 
often than not, it is this vision of the future that needs to be defended from potential 
dangers. 
The link between the present and the past, along which the nation is thought to 
have “lived,” often begins with a moment of founding. This is the point of reference for 
all future events in a nation’s “life” both because it is the beginning of time, so to speak, 
and because often it is cast as a nation’s best, or most authentic, moment. This moment is 
important to the nation’s self-definition, because it emphasizes the passage of time, and 
often the specifics of the founding moment provide a basis for the definition of the 
unique characteristics that are said to be shared by the members of the nation. 
The importance of founding moments in the national imagination is evident in the 
integration of historical monuments into the national narrative. As I discussed in Chapter 
2, historical monuments are places, such as old buildings or ancient ruins, that are 
conserved in the name of “some national legacy at risk.” (Lowenthal 1996, 25) Yael 
Zerubavel discusses the role of Masada, a collection of ancient ruins, in the national 
Zionist narrative. Zerubavel uses Masada to exemplify the sort of “political spin” that 
nationalist movements apply to their interpretation of the past. (Zerubavel 2004, 234) 
Masada is set on top of a butte near the Dead Sea, which made it the perfect location for 
the last Jewish stronghold against the Romans in the years 66–73 C.E. Masada became 
part of the Zionist discourse beginning in the 1920s when members of the Zionist youth 
movements would make nocturnal, somewhat ceremonial, pilgrimages to Masada. These 
trips had the effect of associating the contemporary Zionist struggle for an independent 
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state with the struggle of the Jews against the Romans. Later, after Israel gained 
independence, Masada became the location for military ceremonies which, once again, 
superimposed an event of the past on the current Israeli life. For Zerubavel, these 
activities are important to the way a nation approaches its past because they transform 
“the story of the last stand at Masada from a final chapter of Antiquity that ends with 
death and destruction to a narrative that leads to national renewal by inspiring the Zionist 
revival.” (Zerubavel 2004, 238) The appropriation of this historical monument helped the 
emerging Zionist nation expand its imagined community to include not only the Jews 
living today but also the Jews of the ancient past. 
However, the founding moments of the nation do not always imply the 
appropriation of historical places. Rather, much of what contributes to the emphasis on 
founding moments in national discourse is achieved symbolically. In particular, the 
construction and design of national monuments are key participants in linking the current 
nation to its (imagined) past. On the National Mall there are not one, but two founding 
moments that receive a central place in the layout of this ceremonial national space. The 
Washington Monument is located at the very heart of the Mall, making it central to this 
national space. The monument “pays tribute to the birth of the republic. It speaks to an 
American ‘in the beginning.’” (Johnston 2001) It is a monument that that marks the 
founding of the American nation. On axis with this monument, we find the Lincoln 
Memorial. (See Figure 12.) Here the Lincoln Memorial marks a second founding. It 
interprets the Civil War as an event that “constructed and consolidated the nation’s 
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founding.”1 (Johnston 2001) The inclusion of the past as part of the national narrative of 
the Mall, in the form of founding moments, is crucial to the way we imagine the nation—
we imagine that it has a past, and it is a past to which we feel connected.  
It is important to notice that creating a sense of a past also gives the nation its 
legitimacy as well as establishing the promises for the future. With a past, the nation 
appears to have always existed, or at the very least, that it is “rooted in the remotest 
antiquity.” (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983, 14) In doing so, the right of the nation to exist 
could potentially be based solely on its long, ancient history. This alone is a reason for 
self-assertion. But the past is used by the nation to define its characteristics and destiny as 
well. The Washington Monument and Lincoln Memorial, for example, do not only tell us 
that the American nation has a past, but also that the American nation stands for a 
commitment to freedom and justice. The past is therefore an integral part of the nation’s 
self-definition since it provides both its legitimacy and character.  
In order to strengthen our ties to the past, that is, to strengthen our sense of 
belonging to past generations, the nation also appropriates the wounds or humiliations of 
the dead. Isaiah Berlin, in fact, defines nationalism on the basis of such wounds. He 
characterizes national sentiment as arising from “some form of collective humiliation.” 
(Berlin 1990, 245) For Berlin it is precisely our identification with the wounds of the past 
that gives the nation its powerful appeal. For it is the name of those wounds, of that pain, 
                                                
1 It is this characteristic of the Mall, that is, the alignment of these two memorials, that made the 
construction of the National WWII Memorial controversial. The critique went beyond an aesthetic 
concern over the unobstructed view from the Lincoln Memorial to the Washington Monument. It 
concerned the place allotted to World War II in the way the American nation imagines itself. The current, 
prominent place of the National World War II Memorial signals at least the possibility that the American 
experience in the war was akin to a third founding moment in the nation.  
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that we assert our national identity today. In a similar vein, Ernest Renan writes that 
“common suffering is greater than happiness. In fact, national sorrows are more 
significant that triumphs because they impose obligations and demand a common effort.” 
(Renan 1994) For both of these thinkers, the connection to the dead of the past is more 
powerful through an identification with injury than through victory.2 
II.  Immortality in the nation: The national hero 
Precisely because we are made to feel the wounds of the past as though they were our 
very own, we should be careful not to consider the nation’s dead as lifeless. Rather, the 
dead in the nation are eternally alive. The dead are literally part of the life of the nation. 
They never cease to exist because they establish a past against which the present is 
defined. Without the dead, the nation itself would be without life. In other words, though 
the dead are indeed dead, they are nonetheless the life-blood of the nation. 
This strong presence of the dead in the imagined national community is important 
not only to the definition of the nation at large, but also to the way an individual thinks of 
his own death. In the case of the national hero, his death becomes immediately part of the 
national “necropolis.” The personal death of the hero becomes fused with the dead of 
centuries past, and in so doing, his death is converted from a personal death into a grand, 
                                                
2 The incorporation of the wounds of the dead into the national narrative becomes particularly poignant in 
Yael Zerubavel’s discussion of Masada. She describes an odd event: bones that were excavated at 
Masada were given an official military burial ceremony. Zerubavel is careful to point out that what makes 
this ceremony peculiar, but yet important, is that the burial of the bones was given the same treatment as 
the burial of fallen soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces. In this way, the terrible death of the people at 
Masada was quite literally integrated into the current national practices and discourse. However, creating 
an imagined community that is based on shared pain is not unique to the nation. We find this, for 
example, in the Jewish celebration of Passover. The observance of Passover is meant not only to 
commemorate but literally to reenact the pain and humiliation of slavery in Egypt.  
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national life. This transformation of death into life is fundamental to the way the nation 
imagines itself because it implies that in the nation there is no actual death: there is only a 
change from life today to eternal life.3  
This metamorphosis from death to life is nothing short of a promise of 
immortality in the nation. Anthony Smith notes that the promise of immortality in the 
nation works similarly to that found in religion. He argues that individuals overcome the 
“sense of futility” that arises from notions of absolute death by being linked “to persisting 
communities whose generations form indissoluble links in a chain of memories and 
identities.” (Smith 1986) In this sense, Smith views nationalism as a “surrogate religion.”  
But, precisely because the idea of immortality is not unique to the nation—we 
find this concept in both Greek philosophy and Christian theology—the question that 
must be asked is: How does the concept of immortality operate differently in the nation? 
To start, we should point out that much of what is at stake with the immortality of man in 
both Greek philosophy and Christianity is the distinction between body and soul. In 
Greek philosophy, for example, we find Plato conceiving of the soul as being trapped in 
the body. For him, the soul is free and eternal only once it is outside the body.4 (Plato 
1988) Similarly, in Christianity the soul and body are separate. But in Christian theology 
there is the added notion that the soul rather than the body bears the rewards and 
punishments of a virtuous, sinful, or repentant life. 
                                                
3 This, one should add, is also the case for the non-heroes in the nation. Through an identification with the 
hero, non-heroes live (and in this case also die) vicariously through him.  
4 Aristotle, on the other hand, argues against the possibility of the soul existing without the body, since he 
regards the soul as a form of the body, and a form cannot exist on its own.  
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The idea of the immortality of man in the national imagination operates 
differently than in both these cases. As opposed to the Christian and Platonic views, the 
immortality of man in the nation is not literal. The dead in the nation are dead, but it is 
their memories that are kept up beyond physical death. The memory of the dead is 
enshrined in a variety of national practices—such as national anthems, calendars, 
symbols, myths, and of course, monuments. Therefore, what distinguishes the concept of 
immortality in the nation from that of Greek philosophy and Christianity is that what 
remains alive is not one’s soul, but rather one’s memory.5 
However, the idea of immortality in the nation still begs the question of who 
deserves to live forever. In Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition we find an argument 
about immortality in which she claims that men can become immortal through their 
actions. For Arendt, the ability of men to create something in the world which does not 
disappear once they are dead, allows them, “their individual mortality notwithstanding, 
[to] attain an immortality of their own and prove themselves to be of a ‘divine’ nature.” 
(Arendt 1958, 19) Actions are, for Arendt, the key to becoming immortal. 
But in the nation, man’s immortality does not depend on his actions but rather on 
his belonging in the nation. It is sufficient for an individual to be part of the nation in 
order to enjoy the promise of immortality. This is especially true of an ethnic- or racially- 
based nation in which membership is defined by a biological trait. In such a nation 
membership does not depend either on beliefs or actions, but merely on biological 
                                                
5 Although we know that memories fade, nationalism promises that they will not. This is what makes 
nationalism, in Tismaneanu’s words, a “fantasy of salvation.” (Tismaneanu 1998) 
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composition. Immortality, in this case, is as predestined as the biologically-determined 
membership.  
However, immortality is also guaranteed in a nation in which membership is 
based on shared values and choice. In particular, a liberal nation that is composed of 
members who share a commitment to liberal values, regardless of their ethnic, cultural or 
racial background, also holds the promise of immortality on the basis of belonging alone. 
So long as one forms part of the nation, one partakes in its history. The shared values 
bind us to the dead of the past and they bind us equally to the generations of the future. In 
so doing, though we may choose to become part of the nation, once we belong, we are 
promised immortality.  
Immortality of the hero 
Immortality in the nation is particularly salient with regard to heroes. The hero’s 
immortality is conspicuous in the wide range of memorializing practices dedicated to 
him. He seems to preside over other members of the nation as someone who is 
particularly worth remembering. However, it is important to note that although the hero 
stands out among the multitude, his immortality is not unique. All those who belong to 
the nation, heroes or not, are immortal. For this reason, what becomes interesting about 
the place of the hero in the national discourse is the way in which his immortality differs 
from that of the multitude.  
The immortality of the hero is granted a level of detail that is absent from that of 
common people. In whatever form the hero is being immortalized, his image 
(metaphorical or not) is filled with such details as his name, his physical appearance, or 
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his life story. These details set him apart from common people who are immortalized in 
more abstract ways. Common people are present in the national imagination merely as 
parts of a larger whole, i.e., the nation. The hero, on the other hand, is distinguished by 
the specificity of his memory. 
The hero’s immortality also differs in its function. The hero is immortalized 
because his actions or afflictions represent something that the rest of us must either 
emulate or admire. The common person, on the other hand, is immortalized only insofar 
as he identifies with the hero or, as I will discuss later in the chapter, insofar as his death 
is linked to a national event or cause. The immortality of the common person strengthens 
the sense of continuity and shared destiny in the nation. But the immortality of the hero is 
sustained thanks to his function as an example for others. 
Although the role of the hero as an example is a primary justification for his 
immortality, this role is nonetheless problematic. Taking the hero to be an example can 
be ambiguous. It can mean, on the one hand, that the hero exemplifies certain national 
traits or experiences. This means that if indeed the traits are national in character, they 
are shared by everyone in the nation. To say, for instance, that George Washington’s 
commitment to republican values is exemplary, that is, that it represents the authentic 
national character, it means that we expect all other “true” Americans to have a similar 
commitment. Though Washington, as a national hero, may stand out for the ease and the 
strength of his conviction, this does not change the notion that we expect others to share 
his commitment to republican values. But—and here is the problem—there is an 
unavoidable tension between taking a hero to be an example and taking him to be an 
exception. To raise a hero above the multitude, with the intention of making an example 
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out of him, must necessarily mean that this person is exceptional in some way. To deny 
any sort of distinctiveness would leave no justification for deeming him outstanding.  
George Washington serves, in fact, as a particularly good example for this 
tension. Kirk Savage, in his essay on the construction of the Washington Monument, 
argues that the tension between example and exception lay at the heart of the debates 
surrounding the design of the Washington Monument. The first design proposal for the 
monument followed the “grand monarchical prototype.” (Savage 1992, 8) It was to be an 
equestrian statue with Washington represented in Roman dress. This design worked well 
with the notion of Washington as an exceptional human being, who merited a monument 
depicting him as a loftier, almost sacred, person. Other design proposals sought to 
emphasize Washington’s republic legacy instead. Here Savage traces two monument 
designs that looked to Washington as an example of the common man. One monument, 
by John Nicholas, was a “plain tablet, on which every man could write what his heart 
dictated,” and another, by George Washington Parke Custis, proposed creating a burial 
mound built by citizens from all over the country. In both these designs Washington’s 
legacy emerges out of the people, rather than towering above them.  
The contest between the different design proposals for the Washington Monument 
captured the problem of a national hero: “Was Washington an example (the double 
meaning of the word example is significant), or was he an aberration?” (Savage 1992, 8) 
The immortality of the hero distinguishes itself from the immortality of other nationals in 
this inherent tension. Therefore, to immortalize a hero, for instance, by building a 
monument in his honor, means wrestling with the function of the hero as either example 
or exception. 
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In addition, the immortality of the hero is distinguished from the multitude by the 
level of detail allotted to his memorialization. Traditionally, the heroes that were given 
this treatment in national discourse were great figures—such as founding fathers or 
liberators.6 The National Mall includes such figures, with monuments dedicated to 
Lincoln, Jefferson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and, soon, Martin Luther King as well. 
These monuments bear the inscription of the hero’s name, as well as accompanying texts 
and images that inform the audience of both the national ideals which they embody as 
well as the accomplishments they bestowed on the nation. 
The monument that stands out, of course, is the Washington Monument which 
does not include his name, image, or any descriptive element. The monument, as it stands 
today, is a cut-down version of an original design by Robert Mills. After much delay in 
the construction of the monument, the current obelisk is attributed to the efforts of 
Thomas Casey, an engineer. Casey’s monument is more of an engineering feat than one 
of architectural design; it suffices to point out that its initial attraction was the steam-run 
elevator in its interior. (Savage 1992) 
The terse nature of the Washington Monument distinguishes it from the other hero 
monuments on the Mall. Its wordlessness draws our attention away from Washington, the 
hero, and instead toward the character of the American nation. Its grandiose proportions 
elicit an image of the American nation as soaring upward, with literally the sky as its only 
                                                
6 Before the rise of nationalism, one could have also included “rulers” as heroes. But, in the nation, the 
ruler is always identified with the people. He does not represent a rulership for the sake of a divine entity 
or power, but always for the sake of the people. Therefore, a ruler in the nation cannot be immortalized 
simply because he is a ruler. Rather, he can be immortalized in a heroic manner only when he is 
perceived to have given or done something for, or in the name of, the nation itself.  
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limit. When we stand at the foot of the monument we can view the symbolic 
representation of the nation around us: with the Capitol to the east and the White House 
to the north, the Lincoln Memorial to the west, and the Jefferson Memorial to the South. 
The location, which remains true to L’Enfant’s original plan, emphasizes the glory and 
grandeur of the American nation in general. In a monument that lacks details of the hero 
it intends to immortalize, the memory of the hero disappears and instead we find a 
monument with a different purpose: the memorialization of the proclaimed virtues of the 
nation.7 
Immortality of the citizen-hero 
In addition to the traditional great figures of the nation, one can also find the 
immortalization of heroes who come from the multitude. Again, like most national 
heroes, these citizen-heroes are chosen because they represent certain national virtues, 
and it is on the basis of these virtues that they are immortalized as heroes (i.e., their 
memorialization is rich in detail and used as exemplary to others).8 The immortalization 
of the citizen-hero is particularly prominent in the national practices rising after the Civil 
War in the United States, and World War I in Europe. In both these cases, nations were 
engaged in a war of immense proportions which required the active involvement of 
                                                
7 The issue with the design of the Washington Monument is not the obelisk itself. There is a monument in 
the shape of an obelisk on Bunker Hill in Boston as well. The problem is with the “wordlessness” of an 
obelisk in honor of national hero. The obelisk on Bunker Hill is not problematic in this sense because it is 
intended to memorialize the Battle of Bunker Hill in general, not a national hero. 
8 The nation’s citizen-heroes are different than other folk-heroes, such as Robin Hood, because they 
represent strictly national virtues. For this reason, the existence of national citizen-heroes does not 
preclude the existence of other types of folk-heroes in the nation. It is simply a matter of the citizen-hero 
symbolizing a trait or experience that is specific to the national identity, and that other folk-heroes do not. 
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previously unthinkable numbers of citizens-soldiers. This resulted in the rise of 
monuments honoring the common soldiers, not generals or great commanders, and thus 
signaled an expansion of the concept of a national hero. (Borg 1991, Mosse 1991, Savage 
1997) The new status of the national hero gave the common soldier a new and privileged 
position in the national commemoration practices. The soldier was no longer grouped 
with the rest of the multitude, but was seen, for the first time, as an example of a 
willingness to sacrifice oneself for the nation. 
In particular, the creation of the tomb to the Unknown Soldier is significant in this 
regard. The idea for the tomb appeared almost simultaneously in England and France in 
1920, quickly spreading to other countries, including the United States in 1921. (Borg 
1991, Mosse 1991) The tombs of the Unknown Soldiers were meant to represent all the 
war dead but have since come to symbolize “the ideal of the national community as the 
camaraderie among members of equal status.” (Mosse 1991, 95) With the tomb to the 
Unknown Soldier, the citizen-hero is granted, like the great figures, an immortalization 
of, in this case, not his name, but his sacrifice for the nation, that is, an immortalization of 
his patriotic act. 
Today the inclusion of the soldier-hero in the national pantheon is familiar to us. 
However, the way in which soldiers are immortalized has changed. For example, the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial broke with the traditional ordering of the war-dead by rank. 
The listing of names in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is not unique. We find the listing 
of the names of the dead as far back as Roman war memorials and in many WWI 
memorials. In the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, however, architect Maya Lin organized 
the name chronologically. For Lin, “chronological listing is the heart of the memorial.” 
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(Mock 2003) It emphasizes the moment of a soldier’s death rather than his specific role 
in the war. By doing so, the memorial focuses on the topic of death (and, by extension, on 
the topic of loss) rather than patriotic zeal.9 
The recently inaugurated National World War II Memorial addresses the 
immortalization of the citizen-hero in a different manner. The National World War II 
Memorial combines a narrative and symbolic style. It includes 24 bas relief sculptures 
that tell the story of the war, as well as eagles holding a victory laurel representing 
American victory, and 56 pillars honoring the American states and territories that 
participated in the war. More pertinent to the discussion of the hero, the monument also 
includes 4,048 stars representing “more than 400,000 Americans who gave their lives.”10 
(See Figure 1.) The design of the stars in the National World War II Memorial is unusual 
because as opposed to either the detail accorded to every name of American soldier in the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial or the symbolism of one interred unknown soldier, the stars 
of the National World War II Memorial aim to be both specific and all-inclusive. The text 
in front of the stars, “Here we mark the price of freedom,” makes us aware of soldiers’ 
sacrifice for the nation (similar to the message of the tomb unknown soldier). But, 
because each star represents about 100 soldiers, any given star on which we may focus 
our attention does not connect us to the sacrifice made by one, unknown, soldier. Nor, on 
the other hand, does it connect us with all of the death caused by the war. The 
                                                
9 Maya Lin’s design was criticized for being too abstract. It was argued that the austere listing of names did 
not sufficiently represent the story, i.e., the willingness to die for the nation, of the soldiers. In response, 
Lin has said: “The people who protested the design saw that it is formally very abstract in nature, but they 
did not acknowledge how real the names are—more real than any depiction or representation.” (Lin 1995, 
41) 
10 See the National World War II Memorial website: http://www.nps.gov/nwwm/ 
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immortalization of the soldier-hero is problematic in this memorial because ultimately it 
does not give us the level of detail that distinguishes the immortalization of any national 
hero, whether soldier or great figure.11 
To further complicate the issue, the immortality of the citizen-hero and the great 
figures of the nation can be at odds with each other. In the Shaw Memorial in Boston, we 
can see an interesting example of the tension that these two kinds of hero 
memorializations can produce. In his book Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves, Savage 
uses the example of the Shaw Memorial to discuss the difficulty of designing a 
monument that accommodates our desire to honor, for example, both Colonel Robert 
Shaw and the individuals in his regiment. The memorial commemorates Colonel Robert 
Shaw and the 54th Massachusetts regiment which he commanded. It seeks to mark their 
famous attempt to capture Fort Wagner during the Civil War—an attack that was notably 
brave but ill-fated with most of the regiment being killed, including Shaw himself. 
The Shaw Memorial consists of a narrative relief with Colonel Shaw in the center, 
riding his horse and heading toward battle, and beside him are his troops, who are 
accorded a detailed and individual representation. (See Figure 13.) The monument fuses 
“two apparently antithetical types—a monument to a famous officer and to the common 
soldier he commanded.” (Savage 1997, 194) In so doing, the monument suggests how 
one might represent the immortality of both the common soldier and the great figure 
simultaneously. The citizen hero and the national hero do not need to stand in opposition 
                                                
11 In addition, the memorial is unusual because it commemorates the war dead as part of a bigger 
architectural complex, in which many different things are being memorialized (victory, states, territories 
of the US, the home-front, etc.) In such an ensemble, the memory of the soldiers is at risk of being lost 
amid the larger grand-national narrative.  
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to one another, but rather they can coexist. The Shaw memorial further suggests how 
infrequently we see such a synthesis.  
III.  Sacrifice for the nation 
The presence of death in the nation connects the individual to the group, i.e., the nation. 
In contradistinction to how the dead are thought of in the nation, death, as a concept also 
receives a particular interpretation in the national narrative. Death in the nation is never 
final. The untimely death of an individual, whether as the result of a heroic act or as a 
victim in a national war, is recast not as an individual death and loss, but rather as a 
sacrifice for the nation at large. This goes beyond our usual understanding of sacrifice in 
which death, despite its noble cause, is final. In the nation, death is transformed into life. 
This concept of sacrifice is crucial to the way the nation justifies the death of its 
members. It makes death a moment which strengthens the nation rather than weakens it.12 
The concept of sacrifice is only applicable in those cases in which an individual 
dies in the name of the nation. This could be either voluntary or involuntary (as in the 
case of a terrorist attack). By virtue of their circumstances, these deaths belong to the 
nation, and it is therefore possible to position them within the national narrative. These 
types of death should be distinguished from accidental deaths, such as from illness or 
automobile accidents. Accidental deaths do not depend on an individual’s belonging to 
the nation and they therefore lie outside the boundaries of the national narrative. 
                                                
12 This is contrary to Foucault’s argument that death signifies the limit of the state’s reach. 
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However, the distinction between a national death and an accidental death does 
not mean that the two may not overlap. A death that happened within a national 
framework can also be felt at the private level. The description of the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial, which accompanied the work in its original presentation to the judges of the 
competition, oscillates between conceiving of death in these two ways. In the first 
paragraph, Maya Lin writes: 
 These names, seemingly infinite in number, convey the sense of overwhelming 
numbers while unifying those individuals into a whole. For this memorial is 
meant not as a monument to the individual, but rather as a memorial to the men 
and women who died during this war as a whole. (Lin 1995)  
Here, Lin points to the national context in which we understand the death of the 
individual. The death of the individual can only be understood insofar as he is a member 
in the nation. The individuals that are listed on the wall are there precisely because they 
belonged to the American nation and died for its cause. 
However, further down in her statement, Lin interprets the deaths in Vietnam as a 
private matter rather than a national one. She writes: “For death is, in the end, a personal 
and private matter and the area contained within this memorial is a quiet place meant for 
personal reflection and private reckoning.” (Lin 1995) Lin makes explicit the dual 
characteristic of a national death. Though it may occur within a national context, it does 
not cease to be a death in which an individual, not a nation, loses his life. The Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial aims to be both a national monument and a funerary monument—a 
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monument that encourages us to approach it as both individuals and members of the 
nation.13  
But, what exactly does a national death mean? A national death is a death that is 
understood as occurring in the name of the nation and which becomes conceptualized as a 
sacrifice for the nation. The nature of this sacrifice lies in the transformation of the death 
of an individual into the continued life of the nation. The death itself is denied and the life 
of the nation is emphasized instead. Such sentences as “Freedom is not free” (engraved in 
the Korean War Memorial) and “Here we mark the price of freedom” (National World 
War II Memorial) refer to death but only as a price to be paid. That is, death is 
understood in terms of what was gained from it. Death does not exist other than as a 
contribution to the life of the nation—in this case, its freedom.14 
It is difficult for a nation to justify the death of its own members. The same entity 
that promises protection, a secured destiny, and immortality is the same one that may be 
responsible for our deaths. This problem is explored by Carolyn Marvin and David W. 
Ingle who apply Freud’s theory of totem and taboo to explain both the necessity of 
sacrifice in the nation as well as its justification. They take up Freud’s scheme of the head 
of the clan (the totem figure), his right to kill, and the prohibitions (the taboo) on the rest 
                                                
13 The ability of a monument to address us as both individuals and as members of a nation will be discussed 
in the next chapter on liberal nationalism and national monuments. 
14 Arguably both these monuments look to freedom as a universal concept. One may interpret these 
inscriptions as meaning: these are American sacrifices for the sake of freedom worldwide. This may be 
particularly true in the case of the Korean War Memorial because it explicitly mentions all the other 
countries that participated in the war. However, I think that since most of the design is centered around 
the American nation, it would be prudent to understand “freedom” as synonymous with “America.” 
Notice that the main element in the Korean War Memorial are American soldiers walking through 
inclement weather in full combat gear. 
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of the clan to appropriate this right. The authors argue that this scheme is at work in the 
nation where the nation is the totem which has the right to kill its own, while the 
prohibition to explicitly acknowledge this infanticide are the taboos. For Marvin and 
Ingle, the taboos in the nation are the mechanisms behind converting individual death 
into national life. In other words, the idea of sacrifice (i.e., death becomes life) is 
precisely the avoidance of acknowledging the terrible truth: a nation may require the 
death of its members for its own survival. 
Marvin and Ingle also go on to discuss, although somewhat implicitly, the 
consequences of the idea of sacrifice in the nation. One of them (which has already been 
discussed) is the metamorphosis of “individual bodies into social ones.” (Marvin & Ingle 
1999, 13) Sacrifice allows the individual to be connected—at best—or subsumed—at 
worst—into the group. For this reason, one can go on to say that sacrifice figuratively 
“creates the nation from the flesh of its citizens.” (Marvin & Ingle 1999, 63) The nation 
needs the occasional death of its members to guarantee its own existence. When such an 
idea is in place, any attack on the nation constitutes an attack on the citizens who died in 
its name. The sacrifice of individuals for the nation legitimizes its existence and, more 
importantly, it legitimizes the necessity of ongoing sacrifice. Sacrifice is therefore 
conceived as necessary for the nation. 
Sacrifice is also useful to the nation because it helps create and define its 
boundaries. Those who have sacrificed themselves for the nation are immediately 
included in the nation. This can be seen in monuments that are inscribed with the names 
of the dead. In such memorials, the names of the dead mark them as members of the 
nation while those who are not mentioned are not members of the nation. This is most 
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obvious in the exclusion of enemy fatalities from war memorials, but it is more 
interesting to note that in the case of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, for example, the 
overwhelming appearance of Latino and African American names highlight their 
inclusion in the nation, particularly in the face of their under-representation in many 
social and political areas. However, the marking of boundaries by the dead does not mean 
that those who did not die for the nation are excluded from it. Rather, it is sufficient to be 
willing to die for the nation, or at least to recognize the need for sacrifice to create such 
boundaries. The acceptance of the need for sacrifice in the nation is the only way that the 
nation can legitimize its existence. 
But sacrifice can also be seen as beneficial for the members of the nation. 
Through the metamorphosis from individual death to national life, the angst of death is 
lifted. Janet Donohoe argues that monuments which present us with the image of life 
after death in the form of national sacrifice “appease our anxiety about death, distract us 
from the fragility of life, and prevent our attentiveness to the human condition.” 
(Donohoe 2002, 238) Donohoe is critical of the presentation of sacrifice in monuments 
because she would like us to “be mindful of our own mortality.” (Donohoe 2002, 238) 
However, Donohoe overlooks the attractiveness of such distraction. Through sacrifice, 
we are promised to have life beyond our physical death. We are indeed invited to do what 
Donohoe fears: let go of the angst of dying. This promise of immortality may be 
particularly appealing in a world where, as Ariès argues, death has become a taboo. 
(Ariès 1974) Therefore, it should perhaps be no wonder that many monuments continue 
to reinforce the notion of sacrifice for this reason. 
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Cemeteries and funerary architecture  
Because the sacrifice of individuals in the name of the nation happens primarily in times 
of war, the interment of soldiers, i.e., their tombs, also becomes articulated in terms of the 
death of the individual transformed into the life of the nation. The first military cemetery 
in the United States is particularly interesting in this regard because it combines the Park 
Cemetery Movement of the 1830s with the transformation of soldiers’ tombs into 
national monuments.  
The Gettysburg National Cemetery (originally the Soldiers’ National Cemetery) 
was inaugurated by President Lincoln in 1863 following the Battle of Gettysburg. This 
military cemetery is notable for its park-like feeling. It is located on the slopes of 
Cemetery Hill and the layout of the cemetery follows the contours of the landscape.15 
This affinity with nature exemplifies the Park Cemetery Movement’s idea that cemeteries 
should invite contemplation of one’s natural environment. The contemplation of nature 
was supposed to “elevate and strengthen patriotism, for the character of the landscape 
where one’s loved ones were buried and its appeal to the emotions would lead one to love 
the land itself.” (Mosse 1991, 41) The link between the nation and the land can be seen in 
how David McConaughy, founder of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial, talks about the 
“rich, sensuous descriptions of the heroic contours of [the Gettysburg battlefield] 
landscape.” (Hass 1998, 48) McConaughy refers to “the massive rocks and wonderful 
stone defenses” combining a praise for the landscape with a praise for its utility in battle. 
                                                
15 Cemetery Hill holds the Evergreen Cemetery, a civilian cemetery established by the town of Gettysburg 
in 1858. 
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The location of the Gettysburg National Cemetery directs the appreciation of the natural 
surroundings towards a parallel admiration of those who died to protect them.  
The Gettysburg National Cemetery is also famous for being the location of the 
Gettysburg Address. Lincoln asked that the “dead shall not have died in vain.” This 
remark is important in the context of this discussion because in it Lincoln articulates for 
the first time what it means to die as members of the nation. (Hass 1998, 52) The dead 
soldiers of the Battle of Gettysburg were conceived as a guarantee for the life of the 
nation. By attaching their death to a national cause, Lincoln’s words aimed to undo the 
literal death of the soldiers and convert it instead into a promise of “a new birth of 
freedom.” The end of life—death—was presented as quite the opposite, its beginning: 
birth. 
In a similar but different way, the Arlington Cemetery in Virginia has also 
become incorporated into a distinctly national, not just funerary, landscape. Although 
separated by the Potomac, the Arlington Cemetery is part of the architectural scheme of 
the National Mall. It is an extension of the east-west axis of the Mall, located at the end 
of the Arlington Memorial Bridge southwest of the Lincoln Memorial. It is odd that the 
Arlington Cemetery is part of the National Mall because Arlington is not home to a 
monument honoring the American dead, but rather it is their actual resting place. Ariès 
refers to the Arlington Cemetery as an example of a general change in the attitude toward 
death in the 19th century. Ariès argues that the proximity of the cemetery to the nation’s 
monuments exemplifies the way in which “today, the cult of dead is one of the forms or 
expressions of patriotism.” (Ariès 1974, 75) The location of the Cemetery in relation to 
the Mall means that what the National Mall stands for and what it symbolizes can only be 
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accomplished in the shadow of a cemetery that is dedicated to the sacrifice of American 
soldiers. 
Furthermore, the case of the Arlington and Gettysburg cemeteries reflects a 
blurring between national cemeteries and national monuments. War memorials in the 
20th century are inspired by funerary architecture in their design, particularly Christian 
symbols that are traditionally used at the gravesites. The most common Christian symbol 
is the cross, though it is also common to find angels and postures of crucifixion or 
resurrection.16 The cross is especially potent in the context of national monuments 
because it establishes a link between the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus in Christianity 
and the way death is conceived in the nation. (Borg 1991, 7, Mosse 1991, 32) Using the 
cross in national memorials that commemorate war creates in particular a parallel 
between Christ and a soldier’s sacrifice. The death of Christ and the soldier’s death are 
seen as simultaneously necessary and painful. Also, the ultimate redemption becomes 
parallel to the life and triumph that a soldier’s death granted the nation. The most salient 
example of this type of monument is the Spanish National Memorial at Valle de los 
Caídos (the Valley of the Fallen). The memorial is dedicated to all those who died during 
the Spanish Civil War and it consists of a cathedral built into the mountain with an 
oversized stone cross, 500 feet tall, on top of it. (See Figure 14.) 
The funerary character of the Spanish National Memorial is further emphasized 
by the inclusion of the graves of Franco and Primo de Rivera within the structure. Such a 
                                                
16 Alan Borg argues that “crosses were not widely used as war memorials before the 20th century, but this 
reflects the fact that individual or communal war memorials were not themselves common in mediaeval 
or early modern Europe.” (Borg 1991, 9)  
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combination of grave and monument is not unique to Valle de los Caídos; one can find 
traces of it in the National Mall as well. One of the early proposals for Washington’s 
Memorial on the National Mall was the construction of a public tomb (despite 
Washington’s desire to be buried in Mount Vernon), in the form of a “huge outdoor 
mausoleum.” (Savage 1992, 10) The idea to incorporate Washington’s actual dead body 
with his monument made his death, and not merely his achievements in life, linked to the 
nation. The proposal, like the Spanish National Memorial, brings the grave into the 
monument similar to the way the Arlington Cemetery brings the monument into the 
cemetery.  
The appropriation of funerary architecture into national monuments can also be 
seen in the Jefferson Memorial. In the Jefferson Memorial, the interior and exterior dome 
mimics the Pantheon of Rome, a structure that has been used as a tomb since the 
Renaissance. (See Figure 15.) In the case of the Jefferson Memorial, the monument is 
also funerary without being an actual grave. The tendency to design monuments with 
funerary architecture has led Ariès to refer to such monuments as “‘tombs’ without 
sepulchers.” (Ariès 1974, 78) 
National monuments may encourage funerary practices as well. Here, the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial is an exceptional example, because it was purposefully 
designed as a mourning space and not merely a memorial or national space. The Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial is famous for the practices that have grown around it, most notably 
the leaving of objects by the wall. Kristin Hass traces the memorial practices of the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial to American funerary traditions. Hass argues that the 
memorial traditions of non-Anglo, non-Protestant groups, such as Latinos, African-
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Americans, and Italians, have “an active, ongoing relationship between the living and the 
dead.” (Hass 1998) She shows how the different practices which already existed in these 
groups before the construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial found expression in 
the current practices seen at the Wall.17 Hass’ account illustrates how national 
monuments may be sites for practices that are not only unofficial and private, but ones 
that indicate a blurring between tomb and monument. 
Conclusion: Memorializing loss, not sacrifice 
So far we have seen how death in the nation becomes interpreted as an element of 
strength. Even death in war, which would seem on its face to be a tragedy, becomes 
recast as an assurance of life for the nation. It is not common to have monuments that 
commemorate a loss, as opposed to sacrifice, for the nation. A loss is often traumatic for 
the nation and therefore the nation and its members avoid an immediate confrontation 
with the event. For this reason, we find that “people often avoid building monuments 
soon after an emotional upheaval.” (Halbwachs 1992, 16) Monuments that address an 
event that was traumatic are not only uncommon but are often built when some time has 
passed after the event. This makes the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the National Mall 
an unusual case. It was built only seven years after the end of the Vietnam War, and the 
process for its approval by Congress began even two years earlier.18 Though it aimed to 
                                                
17 On a recent trip to the National World War II Memorial, I saw a rose and a note left near one of the 
monument’s fountains. Perhaps the practices that developed around the Vietnam Veterans Memorial have 
begun to inspire similar practices in other monuments, particularly ones that address death and loss. 
18 In contradistinction, the National World War II Memorial was built 59 years after the end of WWII, the 
Korean War Memorial was built 42 years after the end of the war, and the Holocaust Museum was built 
52 years after the last extermination camp was destroyed. 
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distance itself from any political message, its temporal proximity to the war as well as the 
political turmoil caused by the war made this monument unavoidably controversial. 
In her writings about the design of her monument, Maya Lin distinguishes 
between viewing death in a war like the Vietnam war as a loss and viewing it a defeat. 
She writes: “[the memorial] was supposed simply to acknowledge the loss. I don’t think 
that it is about defeat, and I never will.” (Lin 1995, 45) For Lin it is important to 
distinguish between these two terms because thinking of death as loss allows for 
mourning, “personal reflection and private reckoning,” which is the focus of her design. 
Defeat, on the other hand, is problematic for Lin because it can invite such feelings as 
blame, regret, anger, or shame which threaten the apolitical character that the guidelines 
for the monument’s design specified.  
However, despite Lin’s efforts to make the monument apolitical, the controversy 
that surrounded its construction demonstrates its failure to do so. Steven Johnston argues 
that the current memorial space of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, which includes both 
Hart’s figurative Three Soldiers sculpture and the Vietnam Women’s Memorial, 
represents the plurality of perspectives and approaches to the war. Johnston argues that 
the proliferation of monuments on the site “does not mean [the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial] is flawed; rather it points to the need for memorial multiplicity.” (Johnston 
2001, 33) For Johnston, the memorial space of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial aptly 
represents the political divisiveness caused by the Vietnam War and our inability to offer 
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a unified, unchallenged interpretation of what the war meant for the nation.19 Death, in 
this case, is not smoothly folded into a cohesive national narrative. Rather, the concept of 
death remains contested and problematic, never settling down into a single national 
interpretation. 
The difficulty of addressing death in the nation when it cannot be reinterpreted as 
an honorable sacrifice is also present when the nation is responsible for the death of its 
own people in an internal conflict. This can occur either during a civil war or, for 
example, in the extermination of a minority group within the population. The case of a 
civil war lies somewhat outside our discussion because this kind of war de facto splits the 
nation into two separate nations fighting with each other. In this case, death can be 
interpreted as being the responsibility of the “other” rather than of one’s own nation. 
However, the persecution of minorities within the nation does not split the nation 
itself but rather it aims to strengthen (or purify) the nation through an internal killing 
(“cleansing”) of individuals. A nation that perpetrates a genocide among its own people, 
must confront the concept of death in an entirely different way. In the case of Germany, 
during the time of the killing of the German Jews, their death was presented as a 
necessary action aimed at saving the purity and life of the German nation as a whole. 
(Lifton 1986) In this case, the concept of death was not problematic for the German 
nation because it was justified within the national narrative. The problem arises when a 
nation like Germany recognizes after the fact that such actions are not only unjust but 
                                                
19 Johnston does not, however, argue that an endless series of monuments would be the best way to 
represent the plurality of perspectives in a nation. Rather, he argues that the periodic replacement of 
monuments would be more fitting to a democratic community. 
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shameful. It is in the face of such recognition of wrongdoing that death is articulated in a 
new and different way. 
Germany has led the way in the construction of monuments that confront the 
difficulties that the Holocaust presents to the definition and integrity of the nation.20 As I 
discussed in Chapter 3, the movement of counter-memorials has sought to challenge the 
very possibility of memorializing such an event. Monuments that address the issue of 
absence are especially relevant here because they recognize the loss that the Holocaust 
has created in Germany. Death in this case is approached as something that ought to be 
mourned rather than glorified. This is different than the mourning that Lin seeks in her 
design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, because she is interested in personal 
mourning, while in Germany the monuments invite collective, national mourning. 
The way in which a nation addresses death, as in the case of the Holocaust, also 
depends on an ability and willingness to do so. In the United States, there has been a lack 
of memorialization of either the killing of Native Americans or African American 
slavery. The absence of such monuments can be the result of either a lack of consensus 
about how these events should be memorialized or about whether these events should be 
memorialized at all.21 However, whatever reasons lie behind the absence of such 
monuments, what remains clear is that the death of Native Americans and African 
Americans has not been easily articulated within the American national narrative. To 
                                                
20 This process was far from being unified and free of conflict. However, the process has nonetheless set 
Germany apart from other nations confronting the moral consequences of the Holocaust. 
21 There have been efforts to memorialize these events through the recent inauguration of the American 
Indian Museum and the future construction of the African American Heritage Museum. These, however, 
are not monuments and they are not exclusively dedicated to the tragedies that these groups suffered. 
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address these deaths would imply a willingness for not only introspection but also the 
potential for self-criticism. Such openness may be especially appropriate for a country 
that is committed to liberal values, and I return to this point in the next chapter. 
However, a confrontation with traumatic events, such as death that is a result of 
defeat or genocide, can unsettle a nation’s unity. Here I do not only mean that a 
confrontation is bound to be divisive. Rather, a willingness to include introspection and 
self-criticism in the way a nation deals with difficult cases of death in the nation can lead 
to a questioning of the merit of the nation itself. If a nation can be held responsible for 
unjust or unjustifiable acts, what incentive would one have to continue belonging to such 
a group? If a nation can be responsible for deaths that are not worthwhile, either for the 
nation or for our ourselves as members in the nation, why would one choose to link one’s 
life to the life of the group? A willingness to answer these questions can shake the 
foundations of belonging in the nation. 
Therefore, the challenge of a nation aiming toward openness and self-criticism is 
to accept responsibility for the nation’s actions without rejecting the nation as a group 
that is still worth belonging to. This challenge is partially met by the Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin. The monument is composed of a field of square 
columns covering a large plaza near the Brandenburger Tor in the center of Berlin. What 
is significant about this monument is that while it acknowledges the German 
responsibility for the Holocaust, it does so without creating shame in its German viewers. 
The German responsibility is well documented in the underground visitor center beneath 
the monument. But the centrality of the monument as well as the prominence of its design 
reflect a confidence, if not pride, in the national reckoning with the Holocaust. The 
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monument stands not only for the acceptance of responsibility for the crimes committed 
by Germany but also for the efforts of a nation to make critical introspection a sign of 
strength rather than a catalyst for disintegration. The Monument to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe shows how death that cannot be classified as sacrifice (the usual interpretation of 
death within the national context) can, nonetheless, be made part of the national 
narrative—in the case of Germany, a narrative of openness and responsibility. 
In the chapter that follows, I expand on this argument by looking into the way 
monuments can participate in the construction of an image of a nation that upholds liberal 
values. As the case of Germany shows, some monuments are able to reflect an alternative 
view of the traditional conceptualization of death in the nation, and by extension, 
alternative images of the nation. Therefore, this last chapter of the dissertation is 
dedicated to examining, first, how monuments might be made more liberal without losing 
sight of their national contexts, and second, what these more open monuments tell us 
about liberal nationalism in general. The chapter aims to draw out the relationship 
between what is imagined, in this case a liberal nation, and how one might do so. 
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Chapter Five  /  Liberal Monuments 
So far we have seen how monuments function as national practices. They form a part of 
the national narrative by contributing to the construction of an image of the nation. 
However, the particular image of a nation that results from these practices can vary 
considerably. Thus far, my discussion of monuments has not made this particular point 
explicit, that is, that monuments can construct different types of national images. In 
Chapters 3 and 4, I have alluded to this point by discussing, for example, the ways in 
which monuments can incorporate a more “open” view of memory, thus making some 
monuments more responsive than others to the inclusion of personal memories in the 
national narrative. Or, as I explored in Chapter 4, some monuments distance themselves 
from the traditional idea of death as “sacrifice” and lean instead toward death as a basis 
for “reckoning” and “responsibility,” thus making the values upheld by the nation more 
open to debate. In this final chapter, I pick up on these threads and discuss the ways in 
which monuments may construct a particular image of the nation. Specifically, I am 
interested in a liberal nation.  
At the heart of my discussion is the assumption that if monuments are national 
practices, they must operate not only in a traditional (e.g., ethnic) national narrative, but 
also in a liberal national one. Like other national narratives, a liberal national narrative is 
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also composed of a variety of national practices that both support and construct an image 
of the nation. In the case of a liberal national narrative, this image will be that of a liberal 
nation—a nation that melds together national and liberal values. The task of this chapter 
is to explore the ways in which monuments may operate as national practices in a liberal 
national narrative. The chapter is guided by the following questions: What does it mean 
for a national monument to be liberal, as well? What, indeed, would make a national 
monument liberal? How can such a monument speak both to traditional national values 
and to liberal ones? And, finally, what does the discussion about these monuments tell us 
about liberal nationalism more generally?1 
I.  The illiberal tendencies of monuments 
Monuments in a liberal context cannot be limited to fostering traditional national values, 
such as loyalty and belonging, but must also foster liberal values. However, the extent to 
which they can do that, and more generally, the extent to which monuments can (at all) 
be national practices in a liberal context, is not without its problems. There are aspects in 
the construction and design of monuments that can make them fundamentally antithetical 
to a liberal nation. As I have shown in previous chapters, monuments seem to be 
naturally coupled with traditional nationalism: their massive structures attribute 
permanence and grandeur to the nation, the treatment of death subsumes the individual in 
the nation, and the creation of a national memory silences the multiplicity of personal 
                                                
1 For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the chapter I will use the term “liberal monument” to mean a 
liberal national monument. Likewise, I will use the term “liberal narrative” or “liberal context” to mean a 
liberal national narrative and a liberal national context. Since the whole dissertation is about nationalism, 
the reference to “nation” should be understood. The meaning of a “liberal nation” is based my analysis of 
liberal nationalism in Chapter 1. 
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memories. The place of monuments in a nationalistic environment seems almost intuitive, 
but the place of monuments in a nation that upholds liberal values alongside national ones 
is neither immediate nor obvious. In the following section I discuss the possible problems 
of monuments in a liberal context, namely their illiberal tendencies.  
Permanence 
The static nature of monuments seems to run counter to the dynamic nature of a healthy 
liberal state. In an environment that is rooted in the ability to debate, change, and 
negotiate, a monolithic monument can be incongruous at best, if not, as some have 
argued, downright dangerous. Monuments seem to be problematic in a liberal context 
because they require a certain degree of permanence. In order to serve as reminders, 
monuments must be able to exist long enough for us, the living, to remember the dead, 
and long enough for future generations to remember us. Therefore, most monuments aim 
to exist beyond a single generation and in so doing monuments give the illusion of an 
eternal existence. This illusion is not, however, fantasy: it is rooted in an actual 
permanence of the monument.2 In a liberal nation anything that declares itself to be 
permanent and unchanging can pose a direct threat to the nation’s ability to enact the 
debate and self-reflection that its values demand. For this reason, Steven Johnston argues 
that “given the likely fate of diminishing returns with each passing generation” we should 
allow for the periodic destruction of monuments. (Johnston 2001) 
                                                
2 It should be noted that this is precisely why the actual destruction of monuments serves as a direct 
political blow to the promises made by the nation that erected it.  
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Furthermore, the permanence of monuments can also be seen as a hindrance to the 
representation of pluralism in the nation. The physical structure of the monuments, which 
by its very essence is limited and bounded, cannot contain or reflect a plurality of ideas or 
identities. The monument is often restricted to one, often authoritative, representation of 
the past. As I discussed in Chapter 3, this aspect of monuments is especially salient with 
respect to the representation of a singular national memory. A monument is traditionally 
responsible for capturing a collective memory, a notion that assumes that memory is in 
some way independent from the personal memories of individuals.  
The problems of monuments and memory is based on Pierre Nora’s argument that 
monuments are a last resort for the diminishing organic memory. Whereas organic 
memory allowed for personal reflection and interpretation, and was based on personal 
interactions, the monument freezes (if not archives) memory in monolithic form. 
Although monuments safeguard memory from total annihilation, they also fundamentally 
transform it. Memory in monuments cannot help but be out of reach for the individual—
memory must be kept safe, after all. However, by keeping memory safe, monuments 
disallow the type of participation and plurality that we would expect in a liberal nation. 
Resort to emotions 
Permanence seems to be one of the key challenges that monuments pose to liberalism. 
However, there is also the mode through which monuments operate as a national practice 
that can trigger a suspicious eye regarding their place in a liberal context. Monuments, 
like nationalism, operate through an appeal to our emotions. As I have argued previously, 
national identity is born out of sentiments such as pride, fear, or humiliation. The role of 
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emotions in the national discourse is not new. Nationalism appeals to our emotions, not 
necessarily our reason. Similarly, monuments are predicated on our ability to have an 
emotional response to the object. If a monument makes us adequately sad or angry, for 
example, it means that the monument has been able to transport us to another place and 
time. Furthermore, the awakening of these emotions is important to monuments as a 
national practice, because these emotions ultimately serve to define, legitimize, and 
strengthen the idea of the nation. In so doing, the monument has the capability of 
harnessing emotions for the exercise of political—in this case national—power.  
The use of emotions in the operation of monuments makes sense if we think of 
them as strictly national tools. However, this aspect of monuments is particularly difficult 
if we want to think of them in a liberal context. Since liberalism assumes that individuals 
use reason rather than instinct or passion to calculate their choices, the central role of 
emotions in monuments can be particularly unsettling.  
Themes 
In addition to the challenges to liberal values posed by the permanence and the emotional 
appeal of monuments, one must also confront the traditional themes that they tend to 
represent. The representation of these themes can come into conflict with liberal values. 
The glorification of the hero, for example, is a routine subject of monuments. The 
memorialization of the hero attributes one person with the exemplary qualities of the 
nation, be it loyalty, sacrifice, or valor. It also, more importantly, elevates one person 
over all others as encapsulating the national traits that should be, if only imperfectly, 
characteristic of all the individuals in the nation. This type of memorialization is 
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problematic in a liberal nation, because the focus on an exemplary individual easily 
eclipses the importance, and voices, of all other individuals. This difficulty is well 
exemplified in the case of the intents to memorialize George Washington. Kirk Savage 
argues that the commemoration of Washington led to the questioning of “the very act of 
commemoration, for any monument—merely by signaling out the hero from the great 
mass—undermined [pure republicanism’s] basic assumption that virtue and power 
resided in the ordinary individual. The republicans were caught in a dilemma: how to 
commemorate Washington without reproaching the people.” (Savage 1992, 11) The 
debates that surrounded the construction and design of the Washington Monument 
illustrate the challenges that the memorialization of the hero poses to monuments in a 
liberal context. 
However, there are other types of hero monuments that, unlike the Washington 
Monument, try to mitigate their illiberal tendencies by memorializing an anonymous but 
still exemplary individual. Here I have in mind two monuments which I have also 
discussed previously: the monument to the common soldier and the tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier. In both these cases, the hero memorialized is not specific to one 
person but rather through its abstraction any individual (at least any soldier) can see 
himself in the monument. While the monuments avoid commemorating one person at the 
expense of many others, they too, however, run the risk of being problematic in a liberal 
context. Since these anonymous-type monuments are based on a certain degree of 
abstraction, they risk becoming too abstract: that is, by memorializing everyone they 
could also be said to memorialize no one. What is missing from these monuments is an 
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attention to the particular individual voices of the nation. The abstraction that these 
monuments demand may overlook individual pluralism. 
Another important and common theme in monuments is the memorialization of 
war. Johnston argues that war memorials are particularly problematic in a liberal 
democracy because monuments to war tend to narrate war and death in absolute terms. 
(Johnston 2001) In his discussion of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Johnston shows 
that war memorials tend to focus on how the war affected the nation—bringing victory or 
defeat—but they do not address how the war affected the enemy. The memorial is 
singularly oriented toward the nation, leaving the “other” entirely outside of its discourse. 
This quality of war memorials, exemplified but not unique to the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial, is problematic in a liberal nation because, Johnston argues, a liberal nation has 
an obligation to reckon with its actions, whether at home or abroad. A traditional war 
memorial disallows this type of reckoning. 
The absolute-like character of war memorials also tends to overlook any 
disagreements that occurred before or during the war. Even a memorial such as the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial—known for the controversies surrounding it—does not 
address in its design the anti-war movement that has come to symbolize the war era as 
much as the war itself. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial overlooks, as most war 
memorials do, the varied voices of approval or criticism that any war is bound to create. 
And this is precisely what makes war memorials problematic—at least as far as a liberal 
nation is concerned: they tend to enshrine war as a totalistic national action rather than as 
the sum of coordinated—and maybe contested—actions of individuals. An adequate 
representation of the latter would be more than befitting to a liberal nation. 
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II.  What justifies the discussion of liberal monuments? 
Monuments have illiberal tendencies because they hint at authoritarianism and invite 
closure. They seem to be completely misplaced in a liberal context. Why, then, should 
this chapter be dedicated to discussing them in light of liberalism? What justifies a 
discussion about liberal monuments if we know that, in some fundamentally ways, they 
are illiberal? There are two answers. 
First, despite the illiberal tendencies of monuments, we do find monuments in 
liberal nations. Monument construction thrives today in liberal nations such as Germany, 
France, Israel, and the United States. All of these nations claim to uphold liberal values, 
and yet they participate in the continual construction and design of national monuments. 
The existence of such monuments, deeply entrenched in a liberal environment, implies 
that the question we ought to ask is not whether monuments should exist in a liberal 
context—since they obviously do—but rather how do these monuments operate in a 
liberal nation? And, more importantly for this project, what does the presence of national 
monuments in liberal nations teach us about liberal nationalism more generally? 
The second justification for the study of monuments in a liberal context is based 
on the understanding that all nations need monuments. In Chapter 2, I discussed 
monuments as national practices. I argued that national practices such as monuments 
produce national meanings which are crucial for the definition of the boundaries and 
character of the national community. John Gillis draws a similar connection between 
commemorative practices and the construction of identity by arguing that both efforts are 
born out of  “an intense awareness of conflicting representations of the past.” (Gillis 
1994, 8) For Gillis, commemorative practices, in which he explicitly includes 
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monuments, are unique in their ability to construct meaning from the past. And although 
Gillis does not speak directly to national identity, he argues that the construction of 
identity is dependent on a representation of the past which gives meaning to the present. 
Hence, in the case of national identity, a nation needs commemorative practices such as 
monuments in order to frame the past and thereby define its particular national identity. 
Therefore, a liberal nation, like any other nation, is in need of monuments. Their 
task is to provide a boundary for the imagined community—a community that is as 
present in a liberal nation as in any other. However, what indeed distinguishes the role of 
monuments in a liberal nation is their distinctly illiberal tendencies. These tendencies 
seem to fundamentally contradict the liberal values that the nation upholds. However, 
precisely because a liberal nation needs monuments, the potential threat that they pose to 
liberal values is not sufficient grounds to dismiss them as irrelevant. Rather, I would like 
to argue that what distinguishes the construction and design of monuments in a liberal 
nation is that they demand far more subtlety and care than monuments in other nations.  
Furthermore, the illiberal tendencies of monuments does not mean that they 
cannot serve liberal values. Monuments can fit in a liberal context in different ways and 
each way offers a different solution for how to resolve the inevitable tension between the 
illiberal tendencies of monuments and the liberal context in which they are found. This 
means that a liberal monument cannot be one that completely undoes or avoids the 
illiberal dangers. Rather, a liberal monument can only be a representation of a particular 
solution and, often, it makes the conundrum of monuments in a liberal context explicit—
it generates an awareness of the problem and subsequently demands caution. 
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III.  Liberal monuments 
However, a liberal monument must go beyond being solely a representation of the tension 
between monuments and liberal values. Ultimately, a liberal monument must participate 
in the construction of an image of a liberal nation. To do so, liberal monuments need, 
first, to wrestle with defining a liberal nation, and, second, to match this idea with the 
design of the monument. Since I have already discussed at length (in Chapter 1) the idea 
of a liberal nation, here I expand my analysis to an exploration of the different ways that 
this idea is translated into the design of monuments. My analysis relies on the assumption 
that what a monument represents must affect how it is represented. So, in this case, I look 
into how a representation of a liberal nation (or at least, a contribution to its definition) 
has an effect on the design of liberal monuments. 
I have divided my discussion into three different sections. Each section covers a 
different type of liberal monument. Naturally, these are not strict categories but rather 
they should serve as a way to give some order to the diverse ways in which monuments 
can be liberal. The first section discusses monuments that represent liberal values. These 
are monuments that, although they can look like traditional monuments, their themes are 
quintessentially liberal. The second and third sections describe monuments that move 
beyond the representation of liberal values. These are monuments whose design is a 
crucial component in their role within a liberal context. The second section discusses 
monuments that seek to embody liberal values by encouraging the actual enactment of 
liberal values, and the third section describes monuments that can accommodate liberal 
values by making the space around them also meaningful to the liberal context in which 
they are found.  
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Liberal monuments representing liberal values 
Monuments that represent liberal values are those that give a physical representation to 
liberal values. The monument works as a symbol that as such stands in for something 
else. That is, the monument is not a liberal value in and of itself, but rather it serves as a 
reminder (or a teaching tool) for the liberal values that define the nation. Unexpectedly, 
the design of these monuments may seem entirely traditional and seem, for all intents and 
purposes, illiberal. Take, for example, the Lincoln Memorial. The design of the Lincoln 
Memorial can be easily interpreted as illiberal. Its large scale, likeness to a temple, and its 
centrality on the National Mall make the monument speak in a single, potentially 
authoritarian, voice about Lincoln. His image is untarnished, with no room for 
questioning his motives or the decisions he made in his political life. The design of the 
monument emanates absolutism. However, the content of what is being memorialized is 
profoundly liberal. Starting with the texts on the walls and ending with what Lincoln 
stands for (at least as he is shown in this memorial), what is memorialized are 
quintessentially liberal values: equality and freedom. The Lincoln Memorial shows that 
despite the illiberal aura of the monument’s design, the values which it represents make it 
fit within a liberal context.  
In monuments that represent liberal values, the content (rather than the form) are 
the focus of the monument. What is central in these monuments is the themes that are 
memorialized and not the different designs that are used to convey these ideas. It is not 
surprising that a main theme in liberal monuments is liberty. The celebration of liberty, or 
freedom, is often made explicit through the text that is incorporated into the monuments. 
The Korean War Memorial and the World War II Memorial are the most obvious 
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examples—the word “freedom” is a prominent component in both—but one can also find 
allusions to the concept in the Jefferson Memorial, the FDR Memorial, the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial and, as I mentioned before, in the Lincoln Memorial. However, the 
memorialization of the concept does not only occur through texts. Naturally, it is much 
harder to make a representational sculpture of such a broad concept than to simply carve 
the words that describe it. But, Savage has shown that during the Reconstruction Era 
there was an effort, albeit a failed one, to memorialize the emancipation of slavery and, 
by extension, the concept of freedom itself. In particular, Savage discusses two examples 
of such efforts: one is a sculpture of Lincoln with an emancipated slave at his feet, and 
the other is of an African American soldier who sits high on a column while his 
emancipated family looks up toward him from the foot of the column. (Savage 1997) 
Both these monuments use representation to capture a particular moment in the history of 
the nation that is strongly linked to the idea of freedom and a nation’s willingness to 
defend it.3 
Liberal monuments embodying liberal values 
The process  
Monuments that represent liberal values such as freedom tend to separate between their 
form and content. In them, the themes are liberal but the form can look remarkably 
similar to monuments in non-liberal nations. In this section I turn to monuments that do 
                                                
3 Savage goes on to argue that the memorialization of emancipation was, in fact, problematic during 
Reconstruction. In a still-divided nation, he shows that it was more common to find monuments to the 
“generic citizen-solider who had fought in the war on both sides” than to the emancipated slave. (Savage 
1997, 19) Civil War monuments, he argues, opted to memorialize loyalty over freedom. 
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not only represent such liberal themes as I have discussed above, but whose design itself 
embodies liberal values.4 These monuments respond to Robert Musil’s call that we 
should “demand more of monuments.” (Musil 1986) Rather than “stand quietly by the 
side of the road,” these monuments depend on the active participation of individuals. Just 
walking past them is not enough. The monuments discussed here call upon the 
individuals to be involved in the process of memorialization and by doing so, the 
monuments reflect the idea that individuals are active participants in the definition and 
creation of their nation. The quality whereby a liberal nation understands individuals to 
have control and choice over their national identity is therefore emphasized in these 
monuments. 
To start, the embodiment of liberal values in the design of monuments can 
sometimes be traced to the very process that precedes their construction. This process has 
often taken the form of public, open competitions. Competitions have been a popular way 
to choose a monument design because they tend to have a greater public presence and 
seem to enact liberal-democratic values.  
However, there has been criticism of the competition process for being less than 
democratic. Some of the criticism centers around who is allowed to enter the competition. 
Far from being open, many competitions are limited to professionals or architect firms. 
This limited participation weakens the sense in which the competition process reflects an 
open engagement and debate among individuals in a liberal nation. Similar, the final 
                                                
4 Furthermore, the themes in these monuments are not restricted to liberal ones. Their attention to design 
means that a monument, such as a war memorial (whose theme is not unique to a liberal nation), will look 
differently in a liberal nation than in an ethnic nation.  
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choice of design is often closed to the general population and is limited to the ruling of a 
jury. Here too the jury is appointed by a committee and is composed of professional or 
politically connected individuals. However, even if we concede that participation should 
be limited to professionals only and that the jury should be thought of as a 
“representation of the people,” the structure of the competition itself can be problematic. 
According to Shenglin Chang, the restriction of design proposals to the format of poster-
boards, and the lack of actual conversation with the artist, makes design competitions 
vulnerable to shutting down communication between the artist and the jury who are 
judging his or her work.5 In order to alleviate this problem, Chang suggests the creation 
of some kind of grassroots organization that could work with architects and designers. 
And, in a similar vein, Jack Nasar argues that “competitions exclude the public and the 
users from the process.” (Nasar 1999, 38) He therefore suggests that design proposals 
should be more attuned to the opinions and needs of those who are meant to use the 
proposed design. Therefore, by encouraging a real dialogue with individuals, design 
competitions can regain some of their liberal democratic character.  
Counter-monuments: a second look 
Beyond the processes that precede the construction of a monument, one must look at the 
design of the monuments themselves. Here I want to discuss monuments whose very 
form calls for an engagement with liberal values. As I mentioned before, the themes that 
are memorialized in these monuments are not restricted to typically liberal themes, such 
                                                
5 Prof. Chang made these comments in a conversation I had with her in Fall 2007 in Berkeley. 
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as freedom, but can also be dedicated to, for instance, the traditional memorialization of 
war. What distinguishes these monuments is the idea that the design itself should reflect a 
commitment to, or celebration, reminder, or instruction of, liberal values. Many of these 
monuments have filtered this concern through a re-evaluation of memory and its relation 
to monuments. As I have discussed in Chapter 3, most of these monuments are part of the 
counter-monument movement that tackles such questions as the memorialization of 
collected memories, vicarious memory, and absence.  
However, the memory-related questions brought up by counter-monuments go 
beyond merely a discussion about memory. They illustrate the possibilities of having 
monuments in a liberal nation. Some of the design solutions seen in counter-monuments 
work to emphasize the way in which liberal values can be enacted through a monument 
rather than simply being represented in it. For example, the incorporation of an 
interactive component in some counter-monuments makes the participation of individuals 
part of the monument. That is, in these monuments, the design of the monument relies on 
the participation of individuals—the monument cannot function without them. The 
possibility of interacting with a monument (through etching or the leaving of objects, for 
example) brings the individual to bear on the meaning of the monument. The individual 
does not only make the monument come to life, but he literally gives it its meaning. This 
component of monument design can be thought of as the enactment of the liberal value of 
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deliberation and engagement.6 The individual is not left to be subsumed by the nation, but 
he participates in its creation and definition. Or, alternatively, this design gives the 
individual control over the parameters of his identity. He is, in a sense, self-governing. 
Ambiguity 
Similarly, the ambiguity of an unsettling effect, which has been used in some counter-
monuments, can work to enact a certain aspect of liberal values as well.7 Maya Lin 
describes the Vietnam Veterans Memorial as leaving “open the possibility of asking a 
question.” (Lin 1995, 46) For Lin the ambiguity of the monument is different than how it 
operates in counter-monuments. Whereas in counter-monuments ambiguity is often 
associated with the fluidity of memory, in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial the ambiguity 
is an invitation for an action: to question. This point is made explicit by Johnston who 
argues that the Vietnam Veterans Memorial represents an “ongoing moral and political 
conflict over questions of American national identity and institutions.” (Johnston 2001, 
47 Italics added) Johnston pushes this idea further to claim that keeping such questions 
“permanent and perpetual … befits a democratic polity.” The ability to question is 
important in a liberal nation because it makes explicit the idea that the existence and 
                                                
6 Johnston argues that although the leaving of objects at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial has lost some of 
its original “authenticity” (because now it has become a self-conscious and non-spontaneous act), the 
deliberation involved in leaving an object continues to make this action (and monument) politically 
significant, particularly in a democracy. (Johnston 2001) 
7 Many counter-monuments avoid the over-use of text or recognizable symbols. They rely, instead, on the 
impact of the design itself. For example, the “Versunkene Bibliothek” (“sunken library”) by Micha 
Ullman, an underground chamber lined with empty bookshelves, is accompanied by only a small plaque 
with the memorial’s name and designer. The message of the monument and how one ought to read it are 
left vague on purpose. To some degree this occurs at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial as well, but the 
addition of text at the center of the Wall and the addition of the Hart sculpture undo some of the original 
open-ended effect. 
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meaning of the national identity is a matter of individual choice. Therefore, a monument 
whose design is geared to raise questions about the nation and leaves them open to debate 
embodies one of the fundamental values in a liberal nation.  
Death and reckoning 
The way a nation relates to death is particularly interesting in this regard. Death, as I 
discussed in Chapter 4, is often memoralized as sacrifice. This conceptualization of death 
subsumes an individual’s life into that of the nation. Sacrifice goes beyond an honorable 
death for a justifiable cause; it signifies the melding of an individual’s life to that of the 
nation. Therefore, in order to avoid this subsuming of the individual, monuments must 
look for other ways to memorialize death in the nation. There are two ways I would 
briefly like to mention here. The first I have discussed previously in connection to Lin’s 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial. In this memorial, Lin is concerned that the dead should be 
memorialized both as a public, national loss and as a private loss. The memorial plays the 
dual role of grieving for the dead as members of a nation and as individuals with close 
family members and friends. The wall, on which all the names are etched, serves as 
metaphor for the shared national belonging. And the individual names, which were 
purposefully etched so one can feel and touch them, allow for an intimate connection 
with the dead. A memorial that is able to capture both these levels of loss is able to 
distance itself to a greater degree from the total eclipsing of the individual by the grand 
national narrative and instead call attention to individual and personal suffering. Second, 
death can be memorialized in living memorials. These are memorials that serve a social 
function, such as freeways, parks or cultural centers. This type of memorial downplays 
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the narrative of sacrifice and emphasizes instead the service of those that died in order for 
our society to function the way it does. Here death is not converted into (national) life. 
Death is accepted as final but as valuable to the nation. In both these cases death is not 
denied, but reckoned with. This type of reckoning can be important if we are interested in 
critical thinking and the engagement of citizens.  
Experience 
In order to emphasize the centrality of the individual, some have argued that monuments 
must shed their materiality and be thought of as an actual experience. Recall, for 
example, Lin’s distinction between memorial and monument. She emphasizes the 
importance of designing a memorial space that allows for “experience and for 
understanding experience.” (Lin 1995, 13) For Lin, experience is necessary to achieve a 
“personal reflection and private reckoning.” (emphasis added) In other words, a 
“memorial experience” is focused on the engagement of the individual rather than on 
keeping him at a distance as a passive passerby. Such a monument relinquishes “all 
appearances of objectivity, thereby forcing everyone to confront her or his own 
subjectivity.” (Gillis 1994, 17) The monument does not only put the individual at its 
center, but it also allows the individual to think for himself and to make and control his 
own life choices. This, arguably, makes a monument conceived as an experience be more 
appropriate to a liberal context. 
But, what would a “dematerialized monument” look like? There are three 
examples I would like to discuss briefly. The first is a hypothetical case introduced by 
Johnston. He discusses an episode from the television show Star Trek in which the shuttle 
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crew comes across a monument left behind by a now-forgotten civilization. The 
monument works through a virtual reenactment of a battle scene which ended in a tragic 
massacre. The visitors take an active part in the scene either as victims or as perpetrators 
of the massacre. The monument memorializes the event by making its visitors live 
through the experience. Johnston discusses this memorial primarily to discuss the ways in 
which a nation confronts its own wrong-doing—the memorial is built not by the victims 
but by those who were responsible for the atrocity. He thinks that a nation should be able 
to exercise “humility, self-effacement, [and] confession.” (Johnston 2002, 204) However, 
what is equally interesting about Johnston’s example is the idea that, as he phrases it, 
“people do not visit this monument; the monument visits people.” The memorial works 
through experience. It assumes that in order to adequately memorialize an event we must 
first live through it. Naturally, we cannot go back in time, so a virtual experience of the 
event works as a way to transport us to the past and therefore to gain a more complete 
understanding of what happened. Only through better understanding can we actually be 
said to memorialize the event. 
However, incorporating experience into memorial design does not need to take 
the form of a virtual reality. A good example for an alternative might be the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum. This is both a memorial and a museum. It is designed so 
that the visitor travels through a series of exhibitions before arriving at the memorial hall. 
Walking through the exhibitions often goes beyond education about the events of the 
Holocaust; it also leads the visitor to experience some elements from the event: at one 
point the visitor walks through a train cart used to transport Jews to the extermination 
camps, and at another point the visitor walks through a narrow hallway built as a replica 
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of the collection bins of shoes, hair and glasses collected at the camps.8 The exhibitions 
are designed to make the visitor experience the Holocaust to a certain degree. It is this 
experience that later gives the arrival point—the memorial—its depth. Experience, once 
again, is used to draw the individual, in a more personal way, into the process of 
memorialization.9 
Finally, the last example of a memorial experience that I would like to discuss 
does indeed lack any materiality (either virtual or physical). The experience here is one of 
debate. James Young argues in favor of thinking of monuments as “the never-to-be-
resolved debate” surrounding their construction. (Young 1997, 879) For him, the act of 
debating constitutes the real memory-work. Young is not the first to see the processes 
that precede the actual building of a monument as the heart of the memorial process. In 
Savage’s discussion of the Washington Monument, he quotes one senator who in 1832 
asked “Where is [Washington’s] monument? Our answer is, in our hearts.” (Savage 1992, 
12) The idea that a built memorial is somehow inadequate, or at least incomplete, speaks 
to the understanding that in order to memorialize there needs to be active participation. 
And, furthermore, that participation can take the form of entering a debate. Encouraging 
and even enshrining debates about the event or person to be memorialized means that the 
individual has an opportunity to speak his mind, that is, he has a say about what and how 
his national identity is being defined. This makes the memorial-as-debate a memorial that 
uses experience as a way to enact liberal values. 
                                                
8 The items in the bins are the original ones found at the camps. 
9 To a certain extent one could argue that the FDR Memorial does the same. Walking through the three 
spaces representing FDR’s three terms is akin to “experiencing” FDR’s presidency. 
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Liberal monuments accommodating liberal values 
The third and final type of liberal monuments that I would like to discuss are ones that 
work in a liberal nation not by virtue of their themes or design, but by virtue of the type 
of activities they allow or inspire. These monuments seek to mitigate some of the dangers 
of monuments (i.e., their illiberal tendencies) by encouraging an environment that, at the 
very least, does not get in the way of our living up to liberal values. What is striking 
about these monuments is that they do not necessarily challenge the traditional themes 
and designs of monuments, but rather, they tackle the way monuments work in space.  
Monument multiplicity 
One of the challenges of monuments in a liberal nation is that they tend to express a 
single, self-contained narrative about the event memorialized. This is problematic in a 
liberal nation because it goes against the idea that the nation is constructed by and 
through a plurality of perspectives. Therefore, one way to make monuments more liberal 
is to open them up to multiple interpretations. As I have discussed above, this can be 
done by building into them an ambiguity of meaning. However, in this section I want to 
discuss a different way of encouraging multiplicity, one that does not resort to ambiguity 
or vagueness.  
A multiplicity of meanings can be represented in monuments by building several 
monuments to the same event. Rather than make memorialization culminate in a single 
monument (no matter how liberal), it can instead be memorialized by a variety of 
monuments. Here I do not only mean having multiple monuments to the same event 
throughout the country—for example, the many memorials to WWI in the United States. 
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Following Johnston’s idea of simultaneous “memorial multiplicity,” I mean here the 
construction of several monuments in the same memorial space—a memorial complex, if 
you will. (Johnston 2001, 33) The Vietnam Veterans Memorial is a good example of this 
way of representing multiplicity. Johnston argues that the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
should not be understood only as Lin’s Wall, with Hart’s sculptures and the Women’s 
Memorial as tacked-on additions, but rather he argues that the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial should be seen as a memorial complex that is constituted by these three 
memorials together. (See Figure 16.) The other two memorials are equally crucial to the 
memorialization of the Vietnam War because “each of the three memorials offers a 
contending interpretation or understanding of the War, the nation that fought it, and its 
proper place in American memory.” (Johnston 2001, 27) By creating such memorial 
multiplicity, the monument (as a complex) can better represent the nation as embodying 
these contested and conflicting views of the war. The memorial complex serves, in other 
words, as a sculptural representation of the many and varied voices in a nation. And, 
furthermore, by giving each of these their space, it also signals a willingness to hear these 
voices and respond to them.10 
However, even when we might manage to have a memorial complex that 
represents the plurality of voices in the nation, its permanence—like that of all traditional 
monuments—can once again threaten the liberal values for which it stands. Along with 
his discussion of simultaneous “memorial multiplicity,” Johnston also argues in favor of 
                                                
10 Johnston is not clear on the number of monuments that can exist simultaneously in one memorial space. 
He is also unclear on whether a limit should be placed and, if not, how to deal with the to potential over-
crowding of memorial space. 
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sequential “memorial multiplicity.” For Johnston the problem is not building monuments 
in a liberal democracy, the problem is leaving them in place for too long. He suggests that 
monuments can exist in a liberal democracy only if they are matched by a willingness to 
periodically destroy them: 
What if the legacy represented by the Washington and Lincoln, among others, 
might be better served—and the millions allocated to their upkeep better 
utilized—by taking to them the wrecking ball? … A democracy ought to 
demolish, intermittently, the monuments and memorials it builds for and to itself, 
recognizing the paradoxical character of architectural designs conceived in 
singularity and permanence and aimed at remote futurity. (Johnston 2001, 10) 
However, Johnston’s suggestion does not make clear what continuity we might expect 
from one period of destruction to another. If there is no such continuity—that is, if there 
is complete renewal—then one might say that Johnston would like the nation to be 
completely reinvented every so often. This is not an entirely foreign idea. Thomas 
Jefferson argues that a nation should never be thought of as an entity that lasts for more 
than one generation. For Jefferson, “we may consider each generation as a distinct nation, 
with a right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the 
succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants of another country.” (Jefferson 1999, 
599) Therefore, whereas a simultaneous “memorial multiplicity” would work to represent 
the current pluralism of a nation, a sequential “memorial multiplicity” is more likely to 
reflect changes in the image of the nation over a period of time.11 
                                                
11 Assuming, of course, that we maintain some kind of record of past memorializations, against which we 
can measure such changes.  
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Traveling monuments 
However, the antidote to permanence does not need to be destruction. A traveling 
monument, for example, can also unsettle the traditional way in which monuments are 
fixed to one place and, by extension, to one meaning. The AIDS Quilt and the Traveling 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial are instances of such a traveling monument.12 These 
monuments are present in any given place only temporarily. The memorialization process 
that they entail is more fleeting and therefore more precious. But, more importantly, 
because they reveal themselves, so to speak, rather unexpectedly, they achieve a startling 
effect—an effect that is very good at grabbing our immediate attention. In this vein, 
Robert Musil went so far as to argue that monument-building should learn from the antics 
used by advertisers: “Why don’t the figures of a marble group rotate around each other, 
like the better figures in store windows, or at least open and close their eyes?” (Musil 
1986, 322) If monuments would “make more of an effort” to grab our attention, then they 
could do their jobs better—they would distract us from our daily lives in order to 
contemplate an event or value that is meaningful to us. 
The traveling monument is also an interesting liberal monument because, like the 
virtual memorial in Star Trek, the monument visits people and not the other way around. 
By appearing at different places at different times, the monument is more accessible to 
people. A wider exposure does not only mean that more people will see it (though this is 
certainly true), but more importantly, in each new location, the monument is seen through 
                                                
12 For a good discussion of the AIDS Quilt see (Crichton 1992). For a recent article about the Traveling 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial see (Kim 2005). 
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different eyes. The local environment affects the meaning that individuals take, and give 
to, the monument. The traveling monument illustrates how the same monument can have 
different meanings depending on who sees it. Therefore, one can think of the traveling 
monument as responding to the local and cultural environments of individuals. These 
contexts are not only accommodated by the national narrative, but are actually integrated 
into it. It is this quality that makes the traveling monument work as a liberal monument.13 
Memorial public space 
The monuments I described in this last section on liberal monuments share the idea that 
what makes a monument liberal is not only, or necessarily, its content or form, but the 
responses that the monument allows. Here, I continue with this idea but rather than look 
at what monuments can allow, I look into the space around monuments. I consider this 
space memorial space because it plays a role in the memorialization process of the 
monument.14 It too, along with the object of the monument, constitutes a part of the 
construction of a national narrative. Therefore, in liberal monuments, one could expect 
the space around them to equally contribute to the construction of the image of a liberal 
nation. 
The space around a liberal monument can be simultaneously attentive to the 
individual and his relation to the nation. It is a space that asserts neither the individual 
                                                
13 A similar argument can be made about counter-monuments that are placed in neighborhoods. They too 
bring the monument to the people. But, whereas part of their motive for entering the neighborhoods is 
unsettling the separation between the sacred and profane space that I discussed in Chapter 2, the traveling 
monument does not necessarily do so.  
14 I avoid the term “monumental” space because it implies grandiosity. But if we could avoid that 
connotation, monumental space would, as far as my reading of the term is concerned, be as good a term 
as memorial space. 
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over the nation nor the nation over the individual. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
works, in this case, as a unique example. In Chapter 4, I discussed the funerary practices 
that surround the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. These practices are both personal—e.g., 
the leaving of things and the rubbing of the names—and national—e.g., wreath laying 
and official ceremonies. Lin was keenly aware that she wanted the space of the 
monument to be intimate (“the intimacy of reading”) but also that the space should 
operate as a national ground for remembering. (Lin 1995, 13) As one enters the space of 
the memorial, the silence that envelops the Wall makes one’s encounter with the 
memorial extremely personal. If one is looking for a relative’s name on the Wall, the 
sense of personal connection is augmented. But even as we focus on one name on the 
Wall, we are conscious of all the other names that are near it. The Wall allows for 
personal contemplation, but it does not close us off from the presence of others. As we 
enter the space around the memorial we enter both as individuals—individuals who have 
someone to mourn —and as members of a nation—members who have something, 
maybe a shared loss, in common. 
But once we enter a memorial space, what do we do? Beyond our immediate 
reaction to the monument, there are the specific activities that the space around the 
monument allows or encourages. To begin with, monuments can create a public space 
that is conducive to public gatherings. Individuals can use the space to congregate and 
interact with one another. However, the character of these interactions is crucial to how 
the space operates in a liberal context. For example, North warns that the presence of 
people in memorial space can easily become a “mass-ornament”—such as the stylized 
and extremely choreographed marches in Nazi Germany. (North 1992, 16) He argues that 
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gatherings, or marches, around a monument can become themselves monolithic and serve 
as an extension of the already-existing illiberal tendencies. In other words, as mass-
ornaments only our bodies matter, whereas North wants our minds to be engaged as well.  
Therefore, North refers to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial as a successful 
memorial public space because “to view the piece is not simply to experience space but 
also to enter a debate.” (North 1992, 20) Johnston makes a similar point claiming that 
“the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is more than a public commemorative space in a 
democracy,” the activity that the monument inspires on its grounds makes the “space 
itself democratic.” (Johnston 2001, 35) However, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is not 
alone in hosting such a public space. The Lincoln Memorial, for example, has been the 
host of many political protests and demonstrations. It functions as a stage, if you will, on 
which actors can put on any variety of plays. But, again, what is the character of these 
gatherings around monuments? Both North and Johnston imply, the former explicitly and 
the latter implicitly, that these are public spaces in the Habermasian sense. They are 
places in which individuals can engage one another in critical communication. (Habermas 
1991, 32) The discussion, either among individuals or of a rally as a whole, goes beyond 
commentary on the monument itself—it tackles larger political question about national 
identity, the nation, its meaning and boundaries. A monument that can host this type of 
public space, i.e., one that allows for discussion and deliberation about foundational 
questions about the polity, fits in a liberal context because individuals can enter this space 
as critical citizens.  
The public space that may surround monuments is different from other public 
spaces, such as public squares or gardens. The memorial public space links the meaning 
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of the monument with the activities that are done in its vicinity. Demonstrations or rallies 
are inspired by the meaning of the monument and use it to give weight or an added 
significance to themselves. For example, in Martin Luther Kings famous “I have a 
dream” speech, he explicitly refers to the Lincoln monument that stands behind him.15 
The public space around a monument is never neutral, never meant to be neutral, and 
therefore any activity on its grounds necessarily comes into dialogue with the meaning of 
the monument.16 
However, it is not simply the activities in the memorial public space that are 
affected by the monument. The monument itself becomes richer and more complex when 
it allows for a public space in its surroundings. Take, for example, King’s speech once 
again. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the speech itself has become part of the memories 
embodied in the monument. Today, the Lincoln Memorial stands for more than a 
memorialization of Lincoln, the Civil War, or the Emancipation Proclamation. Because 
of the famous speech delivered on its grounds, the Lincoln Memorial also memorializes 
the Civil Rights Movement. The example of King’s speech shows how the meaning of a 
monument can expand thanks to the activities that occur on its grounds. But this does not 
need to be the case. Johnston argues that in the case of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 
official ceremonies held at the site can be in complete conflict with the original design 
competition criteria, e.g., that the memorial should remain apolitical. There can be an 
                                                
15 “Five score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today, signed the 
Emancipation Proclamation.” (King 1992, 102)  
16 Granted, the “true” meaning of the monument can be nebulous, especially if it is a monument that sets 
out to be ambiguous. But, whatever meaning is read into the monument, it has an effect on the meaning 
of the activities that the public memorial space allows.  
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unexpected tension between the form of the monument and the space around it. But, for 
Johnston, “perhaps this is as it should be.” He argues that precisely because “the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial … is made and remade through myriad ritual practices,” it 
“vindicates multiplicity and refuses monopoly.” (Johnston 2001) By allowing for a public 
space that encourages debate, the meanings of the monument become layered. Far from 
remaining static, the memorial practices of a monument in whose vicinity we find a 
memorial public space are continually changing and evolving. In other words, the 
monument opens itself up to multiple interpretations and interactions by allowing for a 
memorial public space around it.17 
Conclusion 
There are different ways in which monuments can be liberal. Each way addresses, to 
some degree, the problems that monuments confront when they enter a liberal context. A 
liberal monument must respond, on the one hand,  to the illiberal tendencies of 
monuments, and on the other, it must also contribute to the construction of a liberal 
national narrative. As I have shown, liberal monuments can do so either by representing, 
embodying, or accommodating liberal values. In turn, each of these paths offers an array 
of different solutions to the possibility of liberal monuments, whether it is through the 
selection of different themes and designs or through the configuration of space. The 
                                                
17 And, consequently, this implies that monuments that disallow or at least discourage the creation or use of 
public space, have limited versatility. This is the case, for example, with counter-monuments that employ 
the effect of invisibility such as the Ashcrott-Brunnen memorial. 
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diversity of liberal monuments indicates that a liberal nation is not a cohesive idea but 
that it can be interpreted (and practiced) in a variety of ways. 
However, despite their diversity, none of the liberal monuments I have discussed 
is perfectly immune to illiberal tendencies, and none can be considered to be a 
comprehensive construction of a liberal nation. A monument such as the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial that in many ways opens up liberal possibilities remains a static 
memorial that risks losing its sense of intimacy and interaction in a generation or so, once 
those who knew the dead are no longer alive. Or, to give a different example, the Lincoln 
Memorial, despite memorializing liberal themes and offering a space for political 
deliberation, can easily be regarded as a traditional, if not an illiberal, memorial in 
another context. This chapter has sought to show, among other things, that there is not 
one perfectly liberal monument. Even as we expect monuments to carry meaning in a 
liberal nation, they are not foolproof to their own illiberal tendencies. Rather than reject 
liberal monuments because of their innate imperfection, the discussion in this chapter 
should convince us, I hope, that there are many tools that can help monuments mitigate 
their illiberal tendencies and, for this reason, allow them to function reasonably well as 
national practices in a liberal context.  
Furthermore, the possibility (and reality) of having liberal monuments serves as a 
lens through which we can examine liberal nationalism. The tensions that I discussed in 
the first chapter of the dissertation, that is, between national versus liberal values, take 
form in liberal monuments as well. Monuments that are too traditional risk becoming 
inappropriate to a liberal context. Such monuments would, similar to illiberal 
nationalism, construct an image of the nation in absolute terms. The visitor would be 
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merely a spectator rather than an active participant in the process of memorialization. His 
membership in the national community would be announced by the monument as a fait 
accompli rather than as a matter of choice and deliberation. These monuments would shut 
down discussion, their message would appear to be immutable, and finally they would 
silence any personal or contesting voices in the nation. 
On the other hand, monuments that challenge the illiberal character of traditional 
monuments are also confronted with challenges. These alternative monuments would 
bring into question their own existence—by, for example, disappearing into the ground. 
By making us aware that a monument’s message is never absolute or final and that, 
consequently, memorialization must rely on people rather than objects, such monuments 
unsettle the very justification of having monuments at all. The monument becomes a 
vehicle for dialogue and deliberation rather than closure. However, such monuments, 
despite their efforts to open up possibilities, are still bound, first, to the monument-form 
and, second, to the national community that they address. A monument that no longer 
speaks to us through its articulation in space is no longer a monument. This does not 
mean that a monument must be built in order to affect us. As I have discussed before, the 
processes that precede the construction of a monument (the negotiations or competition) 
can be seen as part of the monument itself. However, these processes can only be 
considered as a monument if they continue to debate how the form of the monument and 
its articulation in space speak to the values being memorialized. If these questions are 
absent from the discussion, that discussion may be interesting (and important) but it is no 
longer an extension of what we consider a monument. Moreover, monuments that invite a 
debate about the character and nature of the boundaries of the nation must still do so 
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under the assumption that the nation exists. If the very existence and legitimacy of the 
nation is challenged, then the monument may be valuable but it is no longer a national 
monument. It may be, perhaps, an anti-national monument. Therefore, similar to liberal 
nationalism, liberal monuments must also tread the narrow path between distancing 
themselves from a chauvinistic nationalism without at the same time undoing national 
belonging altogether.  
 Although the tensions that I explored in Chapter 1 appear here in liberal 
monuments, they reveal to us something that the theoretical analysis did not: liberal 
nationalism can be practiced. If liberal nationalism is to be a nationalism at all it must 
have its own set of practices. These participate in the construction and maintenance of an 
image of a liberal nation. Liberal monuments are one such practice and although they do 
so imperfectly, their very existence has shown us that we can reconcile, or at least live 
with, the tensions between liberal and national values. Despite being theoretically 
oxymoronic, the overlap in liberal monuments between a nationalist and liberal discourse 
shows that at least in the practices that are situated in our everyday life—such as 
memorialization practices—there is a way both to attend to our national belonging and to 
secure our autonomy and individual liberty. 
This means that liberal monuments do not only illustrate that liberal nationalism 
can be practiced; they also indicate that monuments have an important role in a liberal 
nation. Monuments are indeed a challenge to liberalism but, in a liberal nation, they can 
allow us (if not encourage us) to live the lives of liberal individuals—in addition to the 
easier task of fostering a sense of national community and belonging. In other words, 
liberal monuments have the surprising capacity of representing and enacting liberal 
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values—an element that strengthens, rather than weakens, a liberal polity. Liberal 
monuments do so in a variety of ways, many of which I have outlined in this chapter, and 
others to which I have alluded throughout the dissertation. Here, however, I would like to 
emphasize three of these avenues through which monuments can, as Gillis puts it, 
“remain useful” today. (Gillis 1994) First, a new and different approach to memory in the 
design and construction of monuments can give a venue for pluralism and introspection 
in the nation. By incorporating the notion that memories are not strictly social, as 
Halbwachs would have it, but that they are also intensely personal, monuments would 
respond to the individual need to remember and memorialize. Doing so would make 
monuments a practice that allows us to exercise our unique “experiments of living,” in 
this case our unique “memories of living”—and that makes space for critical evaluation 
of our political and social surroundings. 
Second, a move away from a celebration of the past to a reckoning with the past 
would open the way to critical thinking and the taking of responsibility. A monument that 
approaches the past with room to question it, particularly the justification and legitimacy 
of death, can play an active role in allowing for self-criticism in the nation. By having 
monuments that self-consciously make us think and question the past, we would be 
encouraged to contemplate our actions—potentially even do so using our reason—and 
avoid following blindly and irrationally the path set out by some superior (patriotic, 
perhaps) force. 
Finally, monuments can be a vehicle for the expression and exercise of pluralism 
in a liberal society. The most obvious way to do so is by integrating multicultural 
representation into monument design, as was done, for example, in Hart’s sculpture at the 
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Vietnam Veterans Memorial.18 However, for Andrew Shanken this attempt “to bronze 
multiculturalism” is insipid and quickly devolves into kitsch. (Shanken 2005) Its 
literalness closes, rather than opens, the field of possibilities. However, monuments can 
give voice to pluralism in another way. As I have discussed before, Johnston argues that a 
memorial complex with numerous memorial structures to the same event can express a 
plurality of views and interpretations. Such a proliferation of monuments does not need 
to be seen as an over-crowding or an obnoxious clutter. Rather it can represent, or more 
accurately be, an active playing field of ideas that is constantly changing and reinventing 
itself. This means that monuments can enact pluralism in a broader sense. They can 
provide us with the tools and the space “by which individuals and groups come together 
to discuss, debate, and negotiate the past and, through this process, define the future.” 
(Gillis 1994, 20) In this dissertation, I have sought to show that liberal monuments 
capture the dilemmas of liberal nationalism, and they articulate these dilemmas in space. 
As a tool of liberal nationalism, monuments go beyond merely representing an image of a 
liberal nation; they are a valuable practice for it to remain both liberal and a nation. In 
other words, liberal nations not only can tolerate monuments: they can benefit from 
monuments. 
                                                
18 The three figures in the sculpture are each of a different ethnic background: White, African-American, 
and Latino. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1. The National World War II Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
 
a. Aerial view of WWII Memorial. (Photo: Jürgen Nagel) 
 
 
b. The Freedom Wall: “Here we mark the price of freedom.” (Photo: Aude Vivere) 
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Figure 2.  The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. 
 
Floorplan of the USHMM, with the Hall of Remembrance at the end of the permanent 
exhibit. (From USHMM visitor’s brochure) 
 
Figure 3. The Euston Memorial and the Memorial to the Men of Hull, London 
   
The cross is a common symbol both to mark a grave site and in memorials.  
(From Borg, 1991) 
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Figure 4. Nixon at the Lincoln Memorial 
 
Nixon honoring Lincoln’s birthday, 1974.  
(Photo: Robert L. Knudsen) 
 
Figure 5. The Washington Monument from Arlington 
 
The obelisk, both as a funerary memorial at the Arlington 
Cemetary (foreground) and as a national monument (the 
Washington Monument is seen in the background).   
(Photo: Avital Shein) 
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Figure 6. The Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
 
“In this temple, as in the hearts of the people for whom he saved the Union, the memory of 
Abraham Lincoln is enshrined forever.” (Photo: National Park Service) 
 
Figure 7. The Marine Corps War Memorial 
 
Monuments are sacred spaces which prohibit play. (Photo: Avital Shein) 
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Figure 8. The Monument against Fascism, Harburg 
   
The Monument against Fascism in 1986 (left) and 1992 (right). (From Art in America, 
April 2004) 
 
Figure 8. Stumbling Blocks, Berlin 
 
A Stumbling Block in Berlin.  
(Photo: Georg Slickers) 
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Figure 10. The Aschrott-Brunnen Memorial Fountain, Kessel 
 
a. Looking down into the Aschrott-Brunnen Fountain.  
(From Young, 1994) 
 
 
b. The artist’s model of the inverted Aschrott-
Brunnen Fountain (From Young, 1994) 
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Figure 11. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
 
Reflections at the Wall. (Photo: Stephen Tobriner) 
 
Figure 12. The National Mall, Washington, D.C. 
 
The Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial located along the main axis of the 
National Mall, with the VVM oriented towards both of them. (Photo: USGS) 
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Figure 13. The Shaw Memorial, Boston 
 
 (Photo: Avital Shein) 
 
Figure 14. El Valle de los Caídos, Madrid 
 
 (Photo: Håkan Svensson) 
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Figure 15. The Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
 
The dome of the Jefferson Memorial imitates that of the Roman Pantheon. 
(Photo: Jet Lowe) 
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Figure 16. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
Hart’s Three Soldiers overlooking the Wall. (Photo: Library of Congress) 
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